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RedCurl, also known as Earth Kapre, GOLD BLADE, and Red Wolf, is a Russian-speaking corporate cyber-espionage group active since at least June 2018 and first identified in 2019. It targets commercially sensitive documents, business correspondence, personnel records, and legal information. Known victims include banking, financial services, insurance, construction, consulting, retail, and legal organizations in Russia, the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Norway, Ukraine, and Australia. Its geographic origin and state sponsorship are not established. RedCurl conducts targeted spear-phishing using impersonated HR communications, employee incentive announcements, recognizable brands, and freight-company notifications. Infection chains use malicious optical disk images and document-themed shortcuts to launch DLL payloads through legitimate Windows utilities. The group conceals original documents and substitutes malicious shortcuts to induce execution. In a November 2022 attack against a major Russian bank, it compromised a contractor and modified a client-document archive on a shared network drive after direct phishing attempts were blocked. Its custom tooling includes RedCurl.SimpleDownloader, RedCurl.Downloader, RedCurl.Extractor, and RedCurl.FSABIN, supporting staged payload delivery, reconnaissance, persistence, and remote control. The group uses PowerShell, scheduled tasks masquerading as legitimate software components, encrypted strings and payloads, and anti-debugging and virtualization checks. It harvests passwords from browsers, files, and the Windows Registry using LaZagne, conducts lateral movement, and abuses cloud services for command delivery and output transmission. Operations can last two to six months before sensitive data is exfiltrated. Documented corporate-espionage campaigns emphasized covert information theft rather than encryption, ransom demands, or theft of funds from bank accounts.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
50 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
16 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
11 additional families tracked in Mallory.
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
100 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as an annotation to a renamed-Python-binary detection; no actor-specific campaign or behavior is described.
Referenced only as an annotated actor associated with the detection technique.
The detection annotations list “RedCurl” under exploitation references.
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Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.