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RedCurl is a corporate cyber-espionage threat actor active since at least 2018 and also tracked as Earth Kapre, Gold Blade, and Red Wolf. The group is notable for long-running, targeted intrusions against private-sector organizations across multiple industries, with a primary objective of stealing internal corporate documentation rather than conducting disruptive attacks, financial theft, or ransomware operations. Reported victim sectors include construction, finance, consulting, retail, insurance, and legal services. RedCurl commonly uses spearphishing for initial access, including lures themed as human resources communications, staff incentive changes, job-related correspondence, and other business-relevant topics. The actor has used malicious disk image and archive-based delivery chains, LNK-based execution, and custom malware loaders and backdoors. Public reporting links the group to RedLoader and FSABIN, including infection chains that leverage DLL sideloading, scheduled-task persistence, and staged payload delivery. Operationally, RedCurl is characterized by patient and covert campaigns that can last months from initial compromise to data theft. The group performs reconnaissance before and after compromise, gathering publicly available information on targets and then enumerating host and domain details inside victim environments. Reported behaviors include collection of system and infrastructure information, domain account discovery using tools such as AdExplorer functionality, automated collection, and harvesting of credentials from browsers, files, and the Windows Registry using LaZagne. RedCurl has also used batch scripts and PowerShell during operations. For command and control and data movement, RedCurl has used HTTP, HTTPS, WebDAV, DNS-related PowerShell activity, and cloud services. The actor has demonstrated defense-evasion tradecraft such as hiding original files to induce execution of malicious shortcuts and using custom tooling that avoids common post-exploitation frameworks. Persistence has included scheduled tasks, and later-stage activity has involved downloading and executing additional payloads. The group is widely assessed as focused on espionage against corporations, especially theft of business emails, personnel records, legal documents, court-related records, and other sensitive internal information.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
47 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
12 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
7 additional families tracked in Mallory.
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
34 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as one of many threat actors associated with the detection's ATT&CK-style annotations for PowerShell and DNS TXT command-and-control behavior; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Mentioned only as one of many threat actors associated with the ATT&CK technique/detection annotation for automated collection using Windows dir piped to findstr.
Listed as an associated threat actor in detection annotations for Ghostscript exploitation; no specific campaign activity is described in this reference.
Listed in annotations associated with the credential-access technique.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.