Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Central to the operations is a browser-centric remote-access and information-stealing platform called XG-Web.
18 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
In its largest operation, a single planted script placed a watering-hole on more than 15 government webmail tenants in a Middle Eastern country at once.
The researchers explained that the threat actor obtained write access to the webmail installation used by multiple government ministries and agencies after compromising a shared web-hosting platform operated by the state telecommunications provider and national services agency.
For delivery, the framework served a freshly obfuscated payload on every request. This was XOR encoded with a random key so no two downloads were identical.
Once installed, the extension could read cookies, watch for new session tokens, inspect browsing history and bookmarks, take screenshots, and capture clipboard contents.
Once installed, the extension could read cookies, watch for new session tokens, inspect browsing history and bookmarks, take screenshots, and capture clipboard contents.
"Both missions are administered from a single control panel, XG-Web, a browser-centric remote-access and information-stealing framework that turns a victim's browser into a full remote-control channel..."
When a ministry staff member logged in, the script opened a WebSocket to the C&C, completed the cryptographic handshake and reported in.
Once running, Antino uses the Microsoft Graph API as its C&C channel, hiding its traffic inside legitimate Microsoft cloud services... the backend created a public Google Document, wrote an obfuscated payload into the body, and had implants fetch the documents and execute the payloads.
19 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A browser-centric remote-access and information-stealing framework that turns a victim's browser into a remote-control channel, steals credentials and browser data, retrieves obfuscated payloads, and supports broader host and internal network access via associated implants.
A remote-access and data-theft framework used by Jewelbug to manage campaigns and victim information.
A browser-focused control system used to remotely control infected browsers via a malicious Chrome/Firefox extension. It can read cookies, monitor session tokens, inspect history and bookmarks, take screenshots, capture clipboard contents, inject code into websites, and intercept browser traffic.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.