Backdoor.Turn
Backdoor.Turn is a custom Go-based backdoor/RAT used by DragonForce ransomware operators. It was observed in an intrusion against a major U.S. services company and is described as hiding command-and-control traffic inside trusted Microsoft Teams relay infrastructure. The malware obtains an anonymous Teams visitor token from Microsoft’s Skype-backed identity services, uses a legitimate Microsoft TURN relay to establish connectivity, and then runs a QUIC session to the attackers’ real command-and-control server, causing defenders to primarily see outbound traffic to legitimate Microsoft Teams servers. Multiple sources in the content describe this as the first known in-the-wild or publicly documented abuse of Microsoft Teams TURN relay infrastructure for covert malware C2, similar to the previously described Ghost Calls concept.
The malware is associated with the DragonForce ransomware operation, which has been active since at least 2023 and has been linked in the reporting to Scattered Spider. In the reported campaign, attackers likely gained initial access through an unknown SQL or MSSQL server vulnerability or via purchased access from an initial access broker. During the intrusion they used DLL sideloading, persistence mechanisms, fake or additional user accounts, Windows security and firewall changes, reconnaissance, credential theft, lateral movement, and bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver techniques to disable security tools. Drivers mentioned in the reporting include Huawei HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys, Topaz Antifraud wsftprm.sys, Tower of Fantasy GameDriverx64.sys, K7 Security K7RKScan.sys, and the ABYSSWORKER malicious driver masquerading as a Palo Alto Networks component.
Backdoor.Turn was reported as being injected into the legitimate DbgView64.exe process after DragonForce ransomware deployment, which researchers assessed may indicate an attempt to preserve covert access for future re-entry or resale. Reported capabilities include command execution, process creation, network scanning, LDAP and Active Directory enumeration, collection of TLS certificate information, lateral movement using stolen credentials, and browser credential theft. The victim sector directly mentioned in the content is a U.S. services firm.
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Vulnerabilities exploited
3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
The drivers involved included Huawei’s HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys, Topaz Antifraud’s wsftprm.sys (CVE-2023-52271), Tower of Fantasy’s GameDriverx64.sys (CVE-2025-61155), and K7 Security’s K7RKScan.sys (CVE-2025-1055).
The drivers involved included Huawei’s HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys, Topaz Antifraud’s wsftprm.sys (CVE-2023-52271), Tower of Fantasy’s GameDriverx64.sys (CVE-2025-61155), and K7 Security’s K7RKScan.sys (CVE-2025-1055).
The drivers involved included Huawei’s HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys, Topaz Antifraud’s wsftprm.sys (CVE-2023-52271), Tower of Fantasy’s GameDriverx64.sys (CVE-2025-61155), and K7 Security’s K7RKScan.sys (CVE-2025-1055).
Groups observed using it
3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Операторы вымогательской группировки DragonForce начали использовать необычную тактику для маскировки своей активности... в одной из недавних атак хакеры использовали кастомный бэкдор Backdoor.Turn, который маскирует обмен данными с управляющим сервером под обычный трафик Microsoft Teams.
Операторы вымогательской группировки DragonForce начали использовать необычную тактику для маскировки своей активности... в одной из недавних атак хакеры использовали кастомный бэкдор Backdoor.Turn, который маскирует обмен данными с управляющим сервером под обычный трафик Microsoft Teams.
Threat actors associated with the DragonForce ransomware have been observed using a custom Go-based remote access trojan (RAT) called Backdoor.Turn to conceal command-and-control (C2) traffic inside Microsoft Teams relay infrastructure.
Techniques & procedures
23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
Privilege Escalation
Stealth
3 techniques
Stealth
Credential Access
2 techniques
Credential Access
Discovery
5 techniques
Discovery
Функциональность нового бэкдора включает ... сканирование сети
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
Command and Control
6 techniques
Command and Control
кастомный бэкдор Backdoor.Turn, который маскирует обмен данными с управляющим сервером под обычный трафик Microsoft Teams
Tracked as Backdoor.Turn, the newly identified malware is written in Go and hides its C&C server communication as legitimate Microsoft Teams traffic in a sophisticated manner. “Backdoor.Turn obtains an anonymous Teams visitor token from Microsoft’s Skype-backed identity services, uses a legitimate Microsoft TURN relay to set up the connection, and then runs a QUIC session to the attacker’s real [C&C] server,”
Backdoor.Turn first obtains an anonymous Microsoft Teams visitor token, then uses Microsoft’s TURN relay infrastructure to route traffic through legitimate Microsoft servers before connecting to the attackers’ command-and-control server.
Impact
1 technique
Impact
Recent activity
11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Custom Go-based backdoor used by DragonForce that tunnels C2 communications through Microsoft Teams TURN infrastructure and QUIC sessions to disguise malicious traffic as legitimate Teams traffic. It supports command execution, process launching, network scanning, LDAP and Active Directory discovery, TLS certificate collection, and browser credential theft, likely to enable persistence and future re-entry after ransomware deployment.
A custom Go-based remote access trojan used to hide C2 traffic via Microsoft Teams TURN relay infrastructure. It obtains anonymous Teams visitor tokens, uses legitimate Microsoft TURN relays for connection setup, and then establishes a QUIC session to the real C2 server. It supports command execution, process creation, network scanning, LDAP and Active Directory search, credential-based lateral movement, and browser credential theft.
A Go-based backdoor that obtains an anonymous Microsoft Teams visitor token and abuses Microsoft TURN relay infrastructure to disguise command-and-control traffic as legitimate Teams communications. It may also allow attackers to retain access, steal browser credentials, or resell access to the compromised network.
A custom Go-based backdoor used to hide command-and-control traffic inside Microsoft Teams TURN relay infrastructure, making malicious communications appear as legitimate Teams traffic.
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Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
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Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.