Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
This post details the multi-component architecture and functionality of a sample, referred to as mim221. We assess that mim221 is a recent version of an actively maintained credential theft capability upgraded with new anti-detection features.
This post details the multi-component architecture and functionality of a sample, referred to as mim221. We assess that mim221 is a recent version of an actively maintained credential theft capability upgraded with new anti-detection features.
13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The attackers also moved laterally across victims’ networks, used Scheduled Task for persistence, and dumped SAM and System hives from the registry.
To hinder static analysis and evade detection, the webshell uses various code obfuscation techniques, including XOR encoding, hexadecimal character representation, string concatenation, and randomized variable names.
AddSecurityPackage64.dll injects pc.dll into LSASS by deploying pc.dll as a Security Package.
AddSecurityPackage64.dll disables Windows event logging by killing threads of the Windows Event Log service without stopping the execution of the service itself.
Password dumper – cpfwplgx.dll Drops a file to call the MiniDumpWriteDump API to dump a process memory.
the attackers employ custom modified versions of Mimikatz, including an executable named pc.exe... ultimately result in stealing credentials from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process.
The attackers also moved laterally across victims’ networks, used Scheduled Task for persistence, and dumped SAM and System hives from the registry.
From the initially compromised endpoints, the attackers moved laterally across the internal network, primarily using RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) connections and pass-the-hash techniques. For the pass-the-hash attacks, they used a custom modified version of Mimikatz, implemented in an executable named bK2o.exe.
6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.