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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 1 actor

m6699.exe

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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DragonSpark

The Golang malware m6699.exe uses the Yaegi framework to interpret at runtime encoded Golang source code stored within the compiled binary, executing the code as if compiled.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1106Native APIEvidence1

ShellCode_Loader uses the Python ctypes library for accessing the Windows API to load the shellcode in memory and start a new thread that executes the shellcode.

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

The main purpose of m6699.exe is to execute a first-stage shellcode that implements a loader for a second-stage shellcode.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

“allocat[es] executable… heap memory… places the first-stage shellcode… and executes it.” / “ctypes… load the shellcode in memory and start a new thread”

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The Golang malware m6699.exe uses the Yaegi framework to interpret at runtime encoded Golang source code stored within the compiled binary, executing the code as if compiled. This is a technique for hindering static analysis and evading detection by static analysis mechanisms.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

“allocat[es] executable… heap memory… places the first-stage shellcode… and executes it.” / “ctypes… load the shellcode in memory and start a new thread”

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

“The malware first Base-64 decodes and then decrypts the shellcode.” / “decodes before passing… for execution.”

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

m6699.exe then evaluates the source code in the context of the Yaegi interpreter and uses Golang reflection to execute the run.Main function.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The first-stage shellcode implements a shellcode loader. The shellcode connects to a C2 server using the Windows Sockets 2 library and receives a 4-byte big value... The first-stage shellcode then receives from the C2 server the second-stage shellcode and executes it.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

After gaining access to environments, the threat actor conducted a variety of malicious activities, such as lateral movement, privilege escalation, and deployment of malware and tools hosted at attacker-controlled infrastructure.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
3 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching5

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping8

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.