Skip to main content
Meet us at Black Hat USA 2026— Las Vegas, August 1–6Book a Meeting
Mallory
🇨🇳 🇹🇼 🇭🇰 🇸🇬 CN8 malware familiesExploits CVEs in the wild

DragonSpark

Also known asDragonSpark

DragonSpark is a cluster of opportunistic intrusions targeting organizations in East Asia. SentinelLABS assessed it is highly likely that a Chinese-speaking threat actor is behind the activity, but the reporting did not attribute it to a specific named group. The activity may support either espionage or cybercrime objectives. The campaign is characterized by consistent use of the open-source SparkRAT remote access trojan. Reporting describes DragonSpark as the first concrete malicious activity in which SentinelLABS observed sustained SparkRAT use. The actor also used Golang malware that interprets embedded Golang source code at runtime via Yaegi to hinder static analysis and evade detection, including the custom malware m6699.exe. Additional custom malware included ShellCode_Loader, a PyInstaller-packaged Python loader that decrypts and executes shellcode. Execution of both m6699.exe and ShellCode_Loader enabled Meterpreter sessions for remote command execution. Observed initial access involved compromises of Internet-exposed web servers and MySQL servers. On compromised web servers, China Chopper webshell activity was observed. After access, the actor conducted lateral movement, privilege escalation, and deployment of additional malware and tools from attacker-controlled infrastructure. DragonSpark relied heavily on open-source tools associated with Chinese-speaking developers or vendors, including SharpToken and BadPotato for privilege escalation and GotoHTTP for remote access, persistence, file transfer, and screen viewing. Kroll also reported ongoing campaigns using SPARKRAT with a previously undocumented Golang loader dubbed LESLIELOADER, which decodes and decrypts an embedded secondary payload and injects it into a suspended notepad.exe process. Kroll linked frequent SPARKRAT use to the DragonSpark campaign, but also noted LESLIELOADER is not exclusive to SPARKRAT. Infrastructure observed in the campaign included staging systems in Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, and Singapore, with command-and-control servers identified in Hong Kong and the United States. Known alias in the provided content: dragonspark.

Share:
Are they targeting you?

Know when an actor pivots toward your sector

Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.

OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • CN
  • TW
  • HK
  • SG
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

24 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

9 of 15 tactics27 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0001
Initial Access
2 techniques
T1189
Drive-by Compromise
T1190
Exploit Public-Facing Application
TA0002
Execution
3 techniques
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001
PowerShell
T1059.006
Python
T1106
Native API
T1129
Shared Modules
TA0003
Persistence
1 technique
T1505
Server Software Component
T1505.003
Web Shell
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
T1055
Process Injection
T1548
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
TA0005
Stealth
5 techniques
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1055
Process Injection
T1070
Indicator Removal
T1070.004
File Deletion
T1140
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1620
Reflective Code Loading
TA0007
Discovery
3 techniques
T1057
Process Discovery
T1082
System Information Discovery
T1083
File and Directory Discovery
TA0009
Collection
1 technique
T1113
Screen Capture
TA0011
Command and Control
4 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001
Web Protocols
T1095
Non-Application Layer Protocol
T1105
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219
Remote Access Tools
TA0040
Impact
1 technique
T1489
Service Stop
IOCS

Observables

19 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping24

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal8

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs1

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables19

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.