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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Summary BigSquatRat is a fully-featured, multi-os, persistent JavaScript RAT C2 domain: aurevian.cloud Attacker controlled npm packages: axios-net , bigmathix , bigmathex , bignumx , bigmathutils
in January 2026, I observed a novel RAT that I called BigSquatRAT ... ReversingLabs attributed this activity to FAMOUS CHOLLIMA’s Contagious Interview campaign ... They dubbed this aspect of Contagious Interview graphalgo.
in January 2026, I observed a novel RAT that I called BigSquatRAT ... ReversingLabs attributed this activity to FAMOUS CHOLLIMA’s Contagious Interview campaign ... They dubbed this aspect of Contagious Interview graphalgo.
14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
On Linux, you’ll observe a node -> systemctl process tree, as it uses a systemctl service for persistence
On Linux, you’ll observe a node -> systemctl process tree, as it uses a systemctl service for persistence
Obfuscated multi-stage infection chain Utilisation of multiple logic gates and dynamic variables to prevent immediate deobfuscation/decryption
15 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A remote access trojan associated with the broader DPRK/FAMOUS CHOLLIMA activity discussed as part of Contagious Interview. It is described as a novel RAT tied to big.js-themed package impersonation.
A multi-stage, cross-platform Node.js malware campaign centered on malicious npm packages that ultimately deploy a persistent JavaScript remote access trojan. The infection chain uses obfuscation, encrypted strings, DNS resolution, GitHub-hosted dead-drop content, and staged payload retrieval from aurevian.cloud. The final payload polls for commands, executes child processes, exfiltrates files, establishes persistence across Windows/Linux/macOS, checks for the MetaMask Chrome extension, and can self-delete.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.