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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The callers sought access through Microsoft Quick Assist, a built-in remote-support utility, or an alternative remote-management application when Quick Assist was unavailable.
7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Over the last few years, threat actors have flocked to exploit legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools—blue-chip IT software like ScreenConnect, LogMeIn Resolve, and PDQ Connect—blurring the line between legitimate IT administration and malicious intrusion.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Legitimate Microsoft remote-support utility abused by the attackers to gain remote access during the social-engineering phase of the intrusion.
Remote administration tool that allows viewing of a remote machine's interactive session and full screen activity.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.