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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 4 actorsExploits 4 CVEs

SALATSTEALER

SalatStealer is a Go-based Windows malware family, often described as a Malware-as-a-Service infostealer that also includes substantial RAT functionality. Reported samples include UPX-packed or fake-UPX-labeled PE32 binaries. High-confidence capabilities described in the source material include theft of browser credentials, cookies, login data, local state files, authentication tokens, browser session data, cryptocurrency wallet data, Telegram Desktop data, Discord tokens, Steam data, clipboard contents, screenshots, and keylogged input. It targets more than 30 browsers in some reporting, including Chromium-family and Gecko-family browsers, and more than 24 cryptocurrency wallets and numerous wallet-related browser extensions. Reported RAT features include remote shell/command execution, screen capture and recording, webcam capture, microphone capture, hidden desktop interaction, file download, process control, SOCKS5 or P2P proxying, task scheduling, persistence, and self-deletion. Additional reported techniques include Registry Run key persistence, Task Scheduler persistence, Microsoft Defender exclusion abuse, LSASS targeting, token theft, privilege adjustment, COM elevation abuse, and browser secret decryption via DPAPI, App-Bound Encryption bypass, and NSS-related routines.

Its command-and-control design is notably resilient. Reporting states that SalatStealer encrypts its C2 configuration in the binary, resolves infrastructure at runtime via DNS-over-HTTPS, and communicates over WebSocket/HTTPS with QUIC/HTTP3 support. A later sample, yesamsevo.exe, reportedly added TON blockchain DNS resolution using tonutils-go, with fallback to Cloudflare DoH, and periodic re-resolution to rotate C2 infrastructure. Mentioned infrastructure and branding link the malware to the NyashTeam/WebRat MaaS operation, including domains such as nyash[.]team, salat[.]cn, salator[.]es, websalat[.]top, sa1at[.]ru, wrat[.]in, webrat[.]ru, and webrat[.]top, as well as Beget-hosted backend servers at 85.198.98.75 and 217.26.28.234. One report states NyashTeam marketed SalatStealer as WebRAT for about 1,199 RUB per month and used Telegram bots for sales and support.

Observed delivery and distribution vectors in the provided content include phishing and social-engineering campaigns, ClickFix-style fake Google Meet lures, GitHub-hosted payloads and scripts, compromised websites, archives containing executables, and exploitation of a WinRAR vulnerability identified as CVE-2025-8088. CERT-UA and Symantec-linked reporting associates SalatStealer with the UAC-0252 campaign impersonating Ukrainian government institutions and regional authorities, alongside SHADOWSNIFF and DEAFTICK. Other reporting shows SalatStealer being distributed through the Amadey botnet/pay-per-install campaign fbf543, alongside families such as Vidar, LummaStealer, QuasarRAT, XWorm, RustyStealer, and SantaStealer. McAfee also reported cases where a broader trojanized-software campaign ultimately delivered SalatStealer or Mesh Agent.

Targeting and victimology in the source material include Ukrainian government institutions and Ukrainian-speaking organizations in some campaigns, while other distribution activity is commodity cybercrime-oriented and broad. Detection-relevant behaviors explicitly mentioned include ffmpeg.exe abuse via the Windows DirectShow interface for device discovery and active webcam/video capture, use of PowerShell and BITSAdmin for staging, execution from temporary or user-writable directories, and collection/exfiltration of browser and wallet data. Specific file indicators mentioned for SalatStealer include main.exe SHA-256 c149a236ddf07fb96de1a893b8d09cdfdd2c28abfc4c3c17bb3ebd8c3c7b5cef, main.deupx.exe SHA-256 a4f1a6f8f5a407ea0113253b557a6dc75c35398edf21bbc5322c47ac1fd0b689, yesamsevo.exe SHA-256 8651bf3f8f38d547530e0dcdd89da904e14ee7bd87c05f5ff429038ba73013ef, and analyzed sample hashes ec2e071a6241ac4d12452070c37ffde5bd01650c6d9a5503d768cb583fea6756 and 30a50cc0f7b317c9734e6792e7e4ec174035d92031bdcc87a80ad8826adc60b2. Reported network indicators include salat[.]cn/sa1at/ and salator[.]ru/sa1at/.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

4 CVES
CVE-2025-8088WinRAR Windows Path Traversal via NTFS Alternate Data StreamsExploited in the wild

UAC-0252 Campaign (Jan--Feb 2026) SalatStealer was deployed alongside three other tools in a campaign targeting Ukraine, tracked as UAC-0252 ... Initial vector: CVE-2025-8088 (WinRAR path traversal) distributed via the PalachPro Telegram channel. | A fresh SalatStealer sample ( yesamsevo.exe ) ships with a previously undocumented capability: resolving its C2 server address via TON blockchain DNS using tonutils-go.

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
CVE-2025-12596Buffer Overflow in Tenda AC23 saveParentControlInfo

NyashTeam has been distributing SalatStealer through 15+ fake CVE proof-of-concept repositories on GitHub: ... github[.]com/DExplo1ted/CVE-2025-12596-Exploit

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
CVE-2025-55234Windows SMB Server Relay-Based Elevation of Privilege

NyashTeam has been distributing SalatStealer through 15+ fake CVE proof-of-concept repositories on GitHub: ... github[.]com/h4xnz/CVE-2025-55234-POC

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
CVE-2025-10294Authentication Bypass in OwnID Passwordless Login for WordPress

Campaign Context Distribution via Fake CVE PoCs (NyashTeam, Dec 2025 -- present) NyashTeam has been distributing SalatStealer through 15+ fake CVE proof-of-concept repositories on GitHub: github[.]com/RedFoxNxploits/CVE-2025-10294-Poc github[.]com/FixingPhantom/CVE-2025-10294

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

4 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UAC-0252

The group's arsenal includes an infostealer named SHADOWSNIFF, a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) variant called SALATSTEALER, and DEAFTICK, a Go-based backdoor strain.

via broadcombroadcom.com
Handala

This analytic detects active video capture performed by FFmpeg (ffmpeg.exe) via the Windows DirectShow (dshow) interface, a technique observed in SalatStealer and related UAC-0252 campaigns.

via splunk researchresearch.splunk.com
FIN7

This analytic detects active video capture performed by FFmpeg (ffmpeg.exe) via the Windows DirectShow (dshow) interface, a technique observed in SalatStealer and related UAC-0252 campaigns.

via splunk researchresearch.splunk.com
NyashTeam

A fresh SalatStealer sample ( yesamsevo.exe ) ships with a previously undocumented capability: resolving its C2 server address via TON blockchain DNS using tonutils-go.

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

40 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1584Compromise InfrastructureEvidence1

The threat actors also abuse the GitHub platform to host their payloads and scripts.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

They either deliver a compressed archive containing a malicious executable file directly, or they provide a link to a compromised website.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

CERT-UA identified a malicious campaign (dubbed UAC-0252) impersonating national executive authorities and regional government officials to deceive the victims.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation Initial Access Phishing: Spearphishing Link T1566.002 Cracked software download links

Execution

5 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

On execution: mutex check ( checkDupe ), UAC bypass ( Elevate ), persistence via registry Run key and Task Scheduler...

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

the threat actor leverages PowerShell, BITSAdmin, and lightweight obfuscation techniques to stage and deploy SalatStealer

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

the threat actor leverages PowerShell, BITSAdmin, and lightweight obfuscation techniques to stage and deploy SalatStealer

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

This campaign demonstrates how ClickFix-style social engineering continues to evolve through abuse of legitimate Windows tooling and user-assisted execution workflows.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

They either deliver a compressed archive containing a malicious executable file directly, or they provide a link to a compromised website.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

On execution: mutex check ( checkDupe ), UAC bypass ( Elevate ), persistence via registry Run key and Task Scheduler...

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Implementation Modify Registry T1112 Registry Run key persistence, Defender exclusion bypass

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

the threat actor leverages PowerShell, BITSAdmin, and lightweight obfuscation techniques to stage and deploy SalatStealer

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

On execution: mutex check ( checkDupe ), UAC bypass ( Elevate ), persistence via registry Run key and Task Scheduler...

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

On execution: mutex check ( checkDupe ), UAC bypass ( Elevate ), persistence via registry Run key and Task Scheduler...

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Implementation ... Process Injection T1055 WriteProcessMemory , SetWindowsHookEx

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

main.DuplicateUserTokenFromSessionID -- WTS token duplication main.getSystemToken -- SYSTEM token acquisition

T1134.001Token Impersonation/TheftEvidence1

main.DuplicateUserTokenFromSessionID -- WTS token duplication main.getSystemToken -- SYSTEM token acquisition

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

On execution: mutex check ( checkDupe ), UAC bypass ( Elevate ), persistence via registry Run key and Task Scheduler...

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

the threat actor leverages PowerShell, BITSAdmin, and lightweight obfuscation techniques to stage and deploy SalatStealer

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Implementation ... Process Injection T1055 WriteProcessMemory , SetWindowsHookEx

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Cleanup via selfDelete() and remote Suicide() command.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

main.DuplicateUserTokenFromSessionID -- WTS token duplication main.getSystemToken -- SYSTEM token acquisition

T1134.001Token Impersonation/TheftEvidence1

main.DuplicateUserTokenFromSessionID -- WTS token duplication main.getSystemToken -- SYSTEM token acquisition

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

the threat actor leverages PowerShell, BITSAdmin, and lightweight obfuscation techniques to stage and deploy SalatStealer

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Implementation Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion T1497 VirtualBox/VMware registry key checks, ACPI enumeration

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Implementation Modify Registry T1112 Registry Run key persistence, Defender exclusion bypass

Credential Access

8 techniques
T1003.001LSASS MemoryEvidence1

main.NtQuerySystemHandles -- Handle enumeration (LSASS targeting) main.findLsassProcess -- LSASS process location

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

main.runKeylogger -- Start capture main.keyPressCallback -- SetWindowsHookEx WH_KEYBOARD callback main.windowChangeCallback -- Active window change (context labeling)

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

Collection hits 34 browsers, 28 crypto wallets, Telegram/Discord/Steam tokens, keylogger with window context, screenshots, and clipboard.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

The malware’s extensive browser and cryptocurrency wallet targeting highlights the continued operational focus on credential theft, session hijacking, and digital asset compromise.

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Implementation Credentials in Files T1552.001 Browser profile data, wallet files

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

The malware’s extensive browser and cryptocurrency wallet targeting highlights the continued operational focus on credential theft, session hijacking, and digital asset compromise.

T1555.001KeychainEvidence1

Firefox gets parallel treatment through NSS master key derivation with ASN.1 PBE parsing, 3DES and AES decryption paths, and proper PKCS5 unpadding.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

Chromium-based browsers get the full treatment: DPAPI master key decryption, AES-GCM cookie/password decryption, and -- critically -- a GetAppBoundKey function that bypasses Chrome v127+'s App-Bound Encryption via the IElevator COM interface.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Implementation System Information Discovery T1082 Win32_Processor , Win32_LogonSession , HWID

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Implementation Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion T1497 VirtualBox/VMware registry key checks, ACPI enumeration

T1614System Location DiscoveryEvidence1

The bc.exe filename observed in a second Triage submission suggests the binary is distributed under different names to affiliates. System language and location discovery TTPs in that submission indicate geo-targeting or geo-fencing behavior.

Collection

6 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The group's arsenal includes an infostealer named SHADOWSNIFF, a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) variant called SALATSTEALER

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

main.runKeylogger -- Start capture main.keyPressCallback -- SetWindowsHookEx WH_KEYBOARD callback main.windowChangeCallback -- Active window change (context labeling)

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

main.(*wsSess).ffdesktop -- Real-time screen streaming via ffmpeg

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence2

Collection hits 34 browsers, 28 crypto wallets, Telegram/Discord/Steam tokens, keylogger with window context, screenshots, and clipboard.

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

Capability Functions Method ... Microphone ffwmic , getMics ffmpeg

T1125Video CaptureEvidence4

Device discovery of this kind maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1125 (Video Capture), where threat actors profile the system's multimedia capabilities as a precursor to covert audio or video surveillance.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The transport layer uses gorilla/websocket over HTTPS with QUIC/HTTP3 support (via quic-go). The C2 path is /saat/ with a WebSocket session protocol ( wsSess ) for bidirectional command execution.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence3

Every infected host becomes a SOCKS5 proxy node: main.(*socks5Conn).Serve -- SOCKS5 server ... main.p2pSocks -- P2P SOCKS relay

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The actual C2 connection uses WebSocket over TLS for command-and-control, and QUIC (HTTP/3) for bulk data exfiltration.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

the threat actor leverages PowerShell, BITSAdmin, and lightweight obfuscation techniques to stage and deploy SalatStealer

T1568.001Fast Flux DNSEvidence1

A tloop function implements a polling loop that periodically re-resolves via TON, meaning the operator can rotate infrastructure mid-campaign and all infected hosts will follow within one polling interval. This is Fast Flux DNS with the blockchain as the authoritative server.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence1

The actual C2 connection uses WebSocket over TLS for command-and-control...

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Exfiltration compresses to sent.zip , ships over WSS and QUIC.

Other

1 technique
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence1

Windows Defender is disabled early in the intrusion using an unsigned .NET executable deployed to the host. Security-related services are stopped via sc.exe

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

40 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
23 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
16 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app16 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching40

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution4

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities4

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping40

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.