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MalwareUsed by 2 actors

Imminent Monitor

Imminent Monitor is a commercial .NET remote access trojan (RAT), also described as remote control software, with the string "Imminent-Monitor-Client-Watermark" observed in payloads and an official website referenced as imminentmethods.net. The malware has been delivered via multiple infection chains, including Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro-enabled .xls documents that downloaded a disguised MSI installer executed with msiexec, which dropped an obfuscated .NET loader in %temp%, established persistence with a startup LNK, used InstallUtil.exe in the execution chain, and connected to the C2 domain linkadrum.nl. Proofpoint also observed TA2541 using DiscordApp URLs linking to compressed files that delivered Imminent Monitor in late 2021, and noted scheduled-task and registry-based persistence in those campaigns. TA2541 has targeted aviation, aerospace, transportation, manufacturing, and defense organizations, while APT-C-36 has been reported to have obtained and used a modified variant of Imminent Monitor.

Capabilities directly described in the content include remote webcam monitoring, remote microphone monitoring, keylogging, remote desktop access, browser password recovery via a PasswordRecoveryPacket module, and remote shell/script execution via CommandPromptPacket and ScriptPacket modules. The malware can decode components and drop them to the system, upload a file containing debugger logs, network information, and system information to C2, set file attributes to hidden as part of a dynamic debugging feature, delete files related to that debugger feature, disable Windows Task Manager, and use CreateProcessW() to execute the debugger. MITRE-style references in the content associate Imminent Monitor (S0434) with audio capture, keylogging, exfiltration over the C2 channel, and remote desktop functionality.

High-confidence indicators and artifacts mentioned in the content include hxxps://jplymell.com/dmc/InvoiceAug5e1063535cb7f5c06328ac2cd66114327.pdf, the C2 domain linkadrum.nl, the dropped file 033ventdata.exe, the path %temp%\ProtectedModuleHost.exe, and the watermark string "Imminent-Monitor-Client-Watermark."

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TA2541

beginning in late 2021, Proofpoint observed this group begin using DiscordApp URLs linking to a compressed file which led to either AgentTesla or Imminent Monitor.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
APT-C-36

APT-C-36 obtained and used a modified variant of Imminent Monitor.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.002ToolEvidence2

The content repeatedly states that threat actors 'obtained,' 'acquired,' or 'used' publicly available, open-source, legitimate, or modified tools such as Mimikatz, Cobalt Strike, PsExec, Empire, Impacket, and many others.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

TA2541 uses themes related to aviation, transportation, and travel. When Proofpoint first started tracking this actor, the group sent macro-laden Microsoft Word attachments that downloaded the RAT payload. The group pivoted, and now they more frequently send messages with links to cloud services such as Google Drive hosting the payload.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

When Proofpoint first started tracking this actor, the group sent macro-laden Microsoft Word attachments that downloaded the RAT payload... Proofpoint has also observed this actor leverage attachments in emails. For example, the threat actor may send compressed executables such as RAR attachments with an embedded executable containing URL to CDNs hosting the malware payload.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

In recent campaigns, Proofpoint observed this group using Google Drive URLs in emails that lead to an obfuscated Visual Basic Script (VBS) file.

Execution

5 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

TA2541 has also established persistence by creating scheduled tasks... In recent campaigns, vjw0rm and STRRAT also leveraged task creation... Scheduled Task: schtasks.exe /Create /TN "Updates\BQVIiVtepLtz" /XML C:\Users\[User]\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7CF8.tmp

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

APT19 downloaded and launched code within a SCT file; APT32 used COM scriptlets to download Cobalt Strike beacons; APT37 used Ruby scripts to execute payloads; ArcaneDoor included the adversary executing command line interface (CLI) commands.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

If executed, PowerShell pulls an executable from a text file hosted on various platforms such as Pastetext, Sharetext, and GitHub. The threat actor executes PowerShell into various Windows processes and queries Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) for security products such as antivirus and firewall software, and attempts to disable built-in security protections.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

In recent campaigns, Proofpoint observed this group using Google Drive URLs in emails that lead to an obfuscated Visual Basic Script (VBS) file.

T1106Native APIEvidence2

"Native API" (listed under AsyncRAT, Imminent Monitor, NETWIRE, njRAT, WarzoneRAT)

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

TA2541 has also established persistence by creating scheduled tasks... In recent campaigns, vjw0rm and STRRAT also leveraged task creation... Scheduled Task: schtasks.exe /Create /TN "Updates\BQVIiVtepLtz" /XML C:\Users\[User]\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7CF8.tmp

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

TA2541 has also established persistence by creating scheduled tasks and adding entries in the registry... Registry: Key: HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svchost Data: C:\Users[User]\AppData\Roaming\server\server.exe

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

TA2541 has also established persistence by creating scheduled tasks... In recent campaigns, vjw0rm and STRRAT also leveraged task creation... Scheduled Task: schtasks.exe /Create /TN "Updates\BQVIiVtepLtz" /XML C:\Users\[User]\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7CF8.tmp

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

TA2541 has also established persistence by creating scheduled tasks and adding entries in the registry... Registry: Key: HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svchost Data: C:\Users[User]\AppData\Roaming\server\server.exe

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence6

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, deobfuscating, or unpacking payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 responses prior to execution or use.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence2

Agent Tesla has created hidden folders. AppleJeus has added a leading . to plist filenames, unlisting them from the Finder app and default Terminal directory listings. APT28 has saved files with hidden file attributes. FIN13 has created hidden files and folders within a compromised Linux system /tmp directory and also used attrib.exe to hide gathered local host information.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

"Input Capture: Keylogging" (listed under Agent Tesla, AsyncRAT, Imminent Monitor, jRAT, NETWIRE, njRAT, Revenge RAT, WarzoneRAT)

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware stealing usernames, passwords, cookies, session tokens, and other saved credentials from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Edge, Opera, Safari, and Yandex.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

"File and Directory Discovery" (listed under Imminent Monitor, jRAT, NETWIRE, njRAT, WarzoneRAT)

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

gh0st RAT is able to open a remote shell to execute commands. Imminent Monitor has a CommandPromptPacket... for creating a remote shell... Whitefly has used a simple remote shell tool that will call back to the C2 server and wait for commands.

Collection

3 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

"Input Capture: Keylogging" (listed under Agent Tesla, AsyncRAT, Imminent Monitor, jRAT, NETWIRE, njRAT, Revenge RAT, WarzoneRAT)

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

"Audio Capture" (listed under Imminent Monitor, jRAT, Revenge RAT)

T1125Video CaptureEvidence2

Agent Tesla can access the victim’s webcam and record video. AsyncRAT can record screen content on targeted systems. Bandook has modules that are capable of capturing video from a victim's webcam. ... ZxShell has a command to perform video device spying.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

TA2541 uses Virtual Private Servers as part of their email sending infrastructure and frequently uses Dynamic DNS (DDNS) for C2 infrastructure.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

If executed, PowerShell pulls an executable from a text file hosted on various platforms such as Pastetext, Sharetext, and GitHub.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

Bonadan can create bind and reverse shells on the infected system. gh0st RAT is able to open a remote shell to execute commands. Whitefly has used a simple remote shell tool that will call back to the C2 server and wait for commands.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2... Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers... numerous malware and groups sent victim data, files, credentials, or host information over existing C2 channels.

Impact

1 technique
T1496Resource HijackingEvidence1

"Resource Hijacking: Compute Hijacking" (listed under Imminent Monitor)

Other

2 techniques
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware disabling, stopping, uninstalling, or modifying antivirus, EDR, Windows Defender, AMSI, logging, and other security controls.

T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

"Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools" (listed under Agent Tesla, Imminent Monitor, WarzoneRAT)

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
4 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

37 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

proofpointNews
Feb 9, 2022
TA2541: Threats to Aviation, Aerospace, & Travel | Proofpoint US

Remote access trojan used by TA2541 for remote control and information gathering; observed delivered via Discord-hosted archives and persisted via scheduled tasks and registry run keys.

Read more
palo alto networks unit 42 blogNews
Dec 2, 2019
Imminent Monitor - a RAT Down Under

A commodity remote access trojan/tool sold on underground forums that provides full remote administration (remote desktop, file/process/registry management, keylogging, webcam/microphone monitoring, password recovery) and includes stealth/persistence and AV-evasion features (crypter/FUD, hidden logs, process watcher, disabling Task Manager, hidden remote desktop). Later versions added a cryptocurrency miner.

Read more
mitre attack websiteNews
Oct 22, 2019
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools, Sub-technique T1562.001 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®

Remote access trojan with functionality to disable Task Manager and hinder user response.

Read more
360totalsecurity blogNews
Oct 30, 2018
The analysis of the attack which uses Excel 4.0 macro to avoid antivirus software detection | 360 Total Security Blog

Imminent Monitor is a commercial remote control (RAT) tool delivered via Excel 4.0 macros that fetch a disguised MSI payload, drops a .NET executable, establishes persistence (LNK in Startup), injects a .NET PE via InstallUtil.exe, decompresses an embedded payload using 7z/LZMA, and connects to a C2 (e.g., linkadrum.nl) to provide full remote-control functionality.

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IOC matching5

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping28

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.