RedLeaves is a Windows remote access trojan associated with targeted intrusion activity, particularly operations linked to menuPass/APT10. First observed in 2016, it has been used in targeted phishing campaigns and is notable for being closely related to the open-source Trochilus RAT, with substantial code overlap indicating it was likely derived from and modified from that codebase. Some RedLeaves development and deployment routines also show similarities to PlugX, suggesting operational or developmental continuity between toolsets used by the same intrusion cluster.
RedLeaves is commonly deployed through DLL search order hijacking or DLL sideloading. A typical execution chain uses a legitimate signed application, a malicious loader DLL, and an encoded payload file. The loader decodes and executes the payload, after which RedLeaves injects itself into a benign process, including observed use of Internet Explorer via process hollowing, and continues operating from the injected process for stealth.
The malware communicates with command-and-control infrastructure over multiple modes, including HTTP, HTTPS, TCP, and custom protocols, and encrypts command-and-control traffic with RC4. It functions as a full-featured espionage implant capable of executing shell commands, performing file operations, uploading and downloading files, collecting system and drive information, obtaining network configuration details, identifying logged-on users including Remote Desktop sessions, capturing screenshots, stealing browser-stored usernames and passwords, deleting specified files, and acting as a proxy. For persistence, RedLeaves attempts to create a shortcut in the Windows Startup folder and, if that fails, falls back to Registry Run-based autostart.
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1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
When we tracked ChessMaster back in November, we noted that it exploited the SOAP WSDL parser vulnerability CVE-2017-8759 (patched in September 2017) within the Microsoft .NET framework to download additional malware.
5 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
menuPass has used process hollowing in iexplore.exe to load the RedLeaves implant.
We have seen different threat actors using these providers, including the ChessMaster’s RedLeaves toolkit and the Adwind cross-platform RAT.
UAT-7290 primarily leverages a Linux based malware suite but may also utilize Windows based bespoke implants such as RedLeaves ... commonly linked to China-nexus threat actors.
Tools QuasarRAT, RedLeaves, PoisonIvy, ChChes, QuasarRAT Loader, PlugX, ANEL, Cobalt Strike
Some of the notable Windows implants ... include RedLeaves (aka BUGJUICE) and ShadowPad
27 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Numerous entries state malware can create a remote shell or reverse shell, for example 4H RAT, BLACKCOFFEE, DarkComet, PlugX, QuasarRAT, and others. | The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using cmd.exe, the Windows command shell, to execute commands, launch payloads, run batch files, and automate actions on compromised hosts.
C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under Registry Run keys such as HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and by placing shortcuts or files in Startup folders.
実行されたRedLeavesは設定内容に応じてプロセス(Internet Explorer)を起動し、自身をインジェクションします。その後、RedLeavesはインジェクションされたプロセスの中で動作するようになります。
C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under Registry Run keys such as HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and by placing shortcuts or files in Startup folders.
Priority MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Defense Evasion T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File Encoded malware strings and obfuscation
実行されたRedLeavesは設定内容に応じてプロセス(Internet Explorer)を起動し、自身をインジェクションします。その後、RedLeavesはインジェクションされたプロセスの中で動作するようになります。
Agent Tesla can gather credentials from a number of browsers... APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne to gather credentials... TrickBot can obtain passwords stored in files from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge... SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins; CryptUnprotectData
Agent Tesla can gather credentials from a number of browsers... APT3 has used tools to dump passwords from browsers... APT41 used BrowserGhost, a tool designed to obtain credentials from browsers, to retrieve information from password stores... TrickBot can obtain passwords stored in files from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge
AdFind can extract subnet information from Active Directory; actors used ipconfig /all after exploiting a machine; numerous malware and groups used ipconfig, ifconfig, arp, route, netsh, nbtstat, NBTscan, and related APIs to gather IP, MAC, DNS, DHCP, gateway, proxy, domain, ARP cache, routing, and adapter details.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting the victim username, identifying logged-in users, running whoami, query user, quser, or similar commands to determine the current user or user sessions.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as hostname, OS version, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, language, and other machine characteristics; e.g., "Action RAT has the ability to collect the hostname, OS version, and OS architecture of an infected host."
Analysis of the SprySOCKS backdoor reveals some interesting findings... Meanwhile, the structure of SprySOCKS’s command-and-control (C&C) protocol is similar to one used by the RedLeaves backdoor...
The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing showing numerous malware families and threat groups that 'use HTTP,' 'use HTTPS,' 'HTTP POST requests,' 'HTTP GET requests,' or 'HTTP/S' for command and control communications.
インジェクションされたRedLeavesは、HTTP POSTリクエストまたは独自プロトコルでC&Cサーバに接続します。
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors that can "download files from C2," "download additional payloads," "upload and download files," "retrieve payloads from the C2 server," and "copy files to remote machines."
‘baobeilong’ also has a GitHub account that shows a strong interest in Remote Access Trojans (RATs) including QuasarRAT and Trochilus, which baobeilong forked in 2015.
53 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
66 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Mentioned only as a malware family sharing traits with SprySOCKS.
A backdoor with significant source code overlap with SprySOCKS, built on the Trochilus codebase.
A backdoor with extensive source code overlaps with Trochilus and common traits shared with SprySOCKS.
A backdoor referenced as sharing characteristics with SprySOCKS.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.