Skip to main content
Meet us at Black Hat USA 2026— Las Vegas, August 1–6Book a Meeting
Mallory
MalwareRansomwareUsed by 3 actorsExploits 2 CVEs

Pony

Pony is an information-stealing malware family, also referred to in the content as Pony/FAREIT and in some contexts Evil Pony. It is primarily associated with credential theft and has been widely used by financially motivated threat actors and malware delivery operations. The content shows Pony being delivered as a follow-on payload by Hancitor, including campaigns where malicious macro-enabled documents installed Hancitor, which then downloaded Pony variants alongside other malware such as DanaBot. H1N1 has also been known to deliver Pony DLLs, and RockLoader was observed loading Pony in April 2016. Bedep was reported retrieving Pony during malvertising and exploit activity involving Adobe Flash vulnerability CVE-2015-0311. Raspberry Robin distribution via fake crack/keygen SFX archives was also observed dropping Pony together with AZORULT and Raspberry Robin.

Observed infection and delivery vectors in the content include spearphishing attachments, spearphishing emails containing malicious links, and lures attempting to get victims to download attached executables or documents, including ZIP, RAR, or CAB archives, PDFs, and Microsoft Office files. Pony is also explicitly associated with exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 in Microsoft Office and with campaigns leveraging CVE-2015-0311. The malware has used scripts to delete itself after execution.

The content links Pony to multiple criminal ecosystems and campaigns. It was frequently used by Nigerian BEC actors tracked as SilverTerrier and by the Nigerian TMT group, which used publicly available spyware and RATs including Pony to steal credentials from browsers, email clients, and FTP clients in support of business email compromise. Pony was also one of the most popular information stealers in SilverTerrier activity, averaging 330 unique samples per month in 2018. Spamhaus identified 69 Pony-associated command-and-control servers in its reporting, and Pony held the top spot among credential stealers for two years before Loki overtook it in 2018.

Targeting in the content is broad rather than sector-specific, though Pony appeared in campaigns affecting organizations and users through mass phishing, malspam, exploit-kit activity, and BEC operations. High-confidence behaviors directly supported by the content are credential theft/information stealing, delivery via phishing attachments and links, use as a secondary payload by loaders/downloader malware, and self-deletion after execution. Notable malware and campaign associations mentioned in the content include Hancitor, H1N1, RockLoader, Bedep, DanaBot, AZORULT, LokiBot, Agent Tesla, NetWire, Dridex, Kegotip, and Raspberry Robin.

Share:
For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

2 CVES
CVE-2017-11882Microsoft Office Equation Editor Remote Code Execution

CVE-2017-11882 ... Products Associated Malware: Loki, FormBook, Pony/FAREIT | CVE-2017-11882 ... Associated Malware: Loki, FormBook, Pony/FAREIT | CVE-2017-11882 Vulnerable Products: Microsoft Office 2007 SP3/2010 SP2/2013 SP1/2016 Products Associated Malware: Loki, FormBook, Pony/FAREIT

via cisa advisoriescisa.gov
CVE-2015-0311Adobe Flash Player remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2015-0311)Exploited in the wild

CVE-2015-0311 (Flash up to 16.0.0.287) integrating Exploit Kits Patched with Flash 16.0.0.296 ... first seen exploited by Angler EK ... soon after used in standalone mode in huge malvert campaign ... integrated today in RIG ... Fiesta ... Nuclear Pack ... Sweet Orange ... Neutrino ... Magnitude | ...Bedep (doing adfraud and grabbing malware : Pony mostly from what I saw)... CVE-2015-0311 used in standalone mode to drop Bedep grab Pony and perform adfraud...

via malware dontneedcoffeemalware.dontneedcoffee.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
SilverTerrier

The info stealers most popular with SilverTerrier last year were LokiBot (446 unique samples/month), Pony (330 unique samples/month), and Agent Tesla .NET keylogger (95 unique samples/month).

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
TMT

The group relied exclusively on a variety of publicly available spyware and Remote Access Trojans (RATs), including AgentTesla, Lokibot, AzoRult, Pony, and NetWire.

via group ibgroup-ib.com
TA505

These early campaigns were distributed via the Lerspeng downloader while later campaigns occasionally used Pony or Andromeda as intermediate loaders...

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

CVE-2015-0311 has been first seen exploited by Angler EK ... soon after used in "standalone" mode in huge malvert campaign ... Top adult site xHamster involved in large malvertising campaign

T1566PhishingEvidence2

In recent weeks, we detected a marked increase in email campaigns attempting to install Locky... This particular campaign... used malicious document attachments... Outside of the very large campaign detected on April 7th, the ransomware in many of these campaigns is being installed via JavaScript attachment files rather than documents.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware being delivered through phishing or spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments such as Microsoft Office documents, PDFs, RAR/ZIP archives, CHM, ISO, IMG, HTA, LNK, and executable files disguised as documents.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence3

On September 26, Proofpoint researchers observed a campaign with hundreds of thousands of email messages targeting US recipients. The emails used an eFax lure and contained a URL linking to the download of a document containing malicious macros.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

APT1 has used the Windows command shell to execute commands, and batch scripting to automate execution. Blue Mockingbird has used batch script files to automate execution and deployment of payloads. During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used Windows batch files for persistence and execution.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

CVE-2015-0311 has been first seen exploited by Angler EK ... soon after used in "standalone" mode in huge malvert campaign ... CVE-2015-0311 has been integrated today in RIG ... Fiesta successfully exploit Windows XP IE8 Flash 16.0.0.257 using CVE-2015-0311 ... Nuclear Pack successfully exploit ... using CVE-2015-0311 ... Sweet Orange firing exploit for CVE-2015-0311 ... Neutrino firing his bundle of Sploit ... Magnitude - CVE-2015-0311 exploited successfully

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes victims being lured into opening malicious attachments, enabling macros, launching installers, clicking embedded files/links, or otherwise directly executing malicious content.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

Sandworm Team leveraged Microsoft Office attachments which contained malicious macros that were automatically executed once the user permitted them... APT29 has used various forms of spearphishing attempting to get a user to open attachments... DarkGate is distributed through phishing links to VBS or MSI objects requiring user interaction for execution.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence4

To keep them under the antivirus radar, Nigerian actors techniques use "crypters" - software tools designed to encrypt, obfuscate, and modify malware.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

"Bumblebee has been delivered as password-protected zipped ISO files" / "Flagpro has been delivered within ZIP or RAR password-protected archived files." / "TA505 has password-protected malicious Word documents."

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence7

Anchor has used cmd.exe to run its self deletion routine. Gelsemium can use a batch script to delete itself. Pony has used batch scripts to delete itself after execution. Lazarus Group used a batch file mechanism to delete its binaries from the system.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The info stealers most popular with SilverTerrier last year were LokiBot (446 unique samples/month), Pony (330 unique samples/month), and Agent Tesla .NET keylogger (95 unique samples/month).

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence2

Information stealers seem to be the preferred type of malware to help in their fraudulent email attacks... The attacker can pilfer data about the targets and use it to create efficient messages for diverting transactions or asking money to be sent to fraudsters' account.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence1

“actors used the following commands… to enumerate user accounts: net user >> %temp%\download; net user /domain >> %temp%\download … APT1 used the commands net localgroup, net user, and net group to find accounts… APT32 enumerated administrative users using the commands net localgroup administrators … OilRig has run net user, net user /domain, net group "domain admins" /domain …”

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence1

Examples include "Bazar can also check if the Russian language is installed on the infected machine and terminate if it is found," "DropBook has checked for the presence of Arabic language," and "Maze has checked the language of the infected system using the GetUSerDefaultUILanguage function."

Collection

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The info stealers most popular with SilverTerrier last year were LokiBot (446 unique samples/month), Pony (330 unique samples/month), and Agent Tesla .NET keylogger (95 unique samples/month).

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

Once deployed, the malware communicated with the attackers’ command-and-control (C&C) servers using common protocols like SMTP, FTP, and HTTP.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors, malware, and campaigns using HTTP and/or HTTPS for command and control, including examples such as BlackEnergy communicating with C2 over HTTP POST requests and many other families using HTTP/S for C2.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

The Hancitor malware, first observed in 2015, is a downloader known to deliver several other malware. In its first years, Hancitor was observed delivering information stealers such as Pony or Vawtrak, and in recent years, Ficker stealer and NetSupport RAT. In 2021, Hancitor was observed delivering the Cobalt-Strike attack framework...

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

Examples include: "FIN4 has used HTTP POST requests to transmit data," "SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used HTTP for C2 and data exfiltration," and "PinchDuke transfers files from the compromised host via HTTP or HTTPS to a C2 server."

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

The stolen credentials were then sent to predefined email addresses controlled by the attackers, enabling unauthorized access to victims’ accounts and systems.

Impact

1 technique
T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

Scammers running business email compromise (BEC) fraud have grown in number, attack more often, and turn to remote access trojans as the preferred malware type to accompany their raids.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

280 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
9 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
2 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
269 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching280

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities2

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping22

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.