Carbanak, also known as Anunak, is a financially motivated cybercrime group best known for targeted intrusions into banks, payment processors, e-payment systems, and other financial institutions. The group emerged around 2013 and became widely known after large-scale bank-heist operations that compromised internal banking staff and systems rather than end customers. Public reporting has linked the operation to thefts totaling hundreds of millions of dollars to more than one billion dollars across more than 100 financial institutions in over 40 countries. The actor is widely associated with Russian-speaking cybercrime and has also been linked in some reporting to the later Cobalt lineage; after arrests in 2018, the broader Carbanak/Cobalt ecosystem appears to have fragmented into smaller cells. Carbanak specialized in high-value, hands-on intrusions. Initial access commonly relied on spearphishing with weaponized Office documents and other malicious attachments. Once inside a victim environment, operators conducted extensive reconnaissance, captured screenshots and screen video, monitored employee workflows, and moved laterally to systems tied to payment operations, card processing, ATM management, SWIFT, core banking platforms, and point-of-sale environments. The group used living-off-the-land techniques and legitimate administrative tools alongside malware, including remote services for internal spread and tools associated with credential dumping and memory access. The group’s malware ecosystem centered on the Carbanak backdoor, a remote-access trojan related to leaked Carberp code, but reporting also links the actor to additional tooling including first-stage backdoors, modified Meterpreter components, point-of-sale malware, and later Go-based malware such as GOSH. Carbanak malware and associated payloads have been observed performing host profiling, process enumeration, screenshot capture, keylogging, payload download and execution, in-memory loading, service installation, privilege escalation attempts, process injection, and masquerading under legitimate-looking names. Campaigns have also shown abuse of trusted third-party services for command and control, including legitimate cloud and collaboration platforms, to blend malicious traffic with normal activity. Carbanak monetized access through several distinct fraud schemes: fraudulent interbank and e-payment transfers, ATM cash-out operations, manipulation of card-processing or ATM-management systems, theft of payment-card data from point-of-sale systems, and database manipulation to inflate account balances before withdrawing the fabricated funds. The actor targeted banks directly, but also hit adjacent financial and payment infrastructure, casinos, hotels, restaurants, and retail environments where payment systems could be monetized. Known aliases include Anunak and Carbanak Group. Some reporting and vendor tracking have conflated Carbanak with related clusters such as Cobalt or later successor groups, while other reporting treats them as distinct but overlapping actors within the same Russian-speaking financial cybercrime ecosystem. High-confidence characterization supports Carbanak primarily as a financially motivated threat actor focused on targeted theft from financial institutions and payment systems.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
55 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
25 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
20 additional families tracked in Mallory.
2 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 2 of them exploited in the wild.
In other cases attackers used RTF files with different exploits, including an exploit for one of the latest Microsoft Office vulnerabilities, CVE-2015-1770, which was patched by Microsoft in June 2015 in MS15-059.
The trojan attempts to exploit a vulnerability – CVE-2015-2426 in the OpenType manager module (ATMFD.dll) – which was patched by Microsoft in MS15-078. The exploit for this vulnerability was leaked in a Hacking Team dump.
124 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as an associated threat actor in the detection annotation for a Linux usermod root UID set analytic; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Financially motivated bank-heist operations against banks, e-payment systems, and other financial institutions using spearphishing, long dwell time, insider-like reconnaissance, ATM jackpotting, fraudulent transfers, and database balance manipulation.
Listed as an associated threat actor for exploitation activity related to abuse of the Windows Cloud Files API / cldapi.dll detection.
Listed as a threat actor associated with exploitation and privilege-escalation detection coverage for Windows admin password changes by non-admin users.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.