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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 2 actorsExploits 2 CVEs

Pandora

Pandora is a Windows malware family/rootkit and backdoor, and the name is also used in reporting for a ransomware family active in early to mid-2022. High-confidence reporting describes Pandora as a multi-stage Windows implant discovered in 2020 in activity attributed to Iron Tiger/LuckyMouse/EmissaryPanda/APT27 (tracked by Trend Micro as Earth Smilodon) targeting a Philippine-based gambling company and other organizations in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. In that intrusion set, Pandora used DLL side-loading, privilege escalation through Windows services, and code injection into a newly created svchost.exe process during its first stage. A later stage used CPU-Z CVE-2017-15303 together with the Process Monitor driver procxp152.sys to bypass Windows Driver Signature Enforcement and load a kernel driver (drvx64.sys). The driver registered a Windows Filtering Platform callback, filtered incoming HTTP traffic using a predefined encrypted token stored in the Registry, and enabled processing of remote commands. The final payload installed itself as a Windows service, exchanged messages with the kernel driver, and injected the final payload into lsass.exe. Reported capabilities include gaining system privileges through Windows services, installing itself as a Windows service, starting and injecting code into svchost.exe, writing an encrypted token to the Registry, encrypting communications with D3DES, and using public code components including Blackbone, WFP Sample, HTTP Parser, StryKer, D3DES, and QuickLZ. Separately, the content also identifies Pandora as a ransomware family deployed by DEV-0401 in February 2022, primarily via unpatched VMware Horizon systems vulnerable to Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228). That ransomware was active in early to mid-2022 and targeted the automotive industry. The content further notes that HUI Loader variants have appeared in operations involving Pandora ransomware, and that string similarities in ransom notes and payload modifications suggest CatB may be an evolution or direct rebrand of Pandora ransomware.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

2 CVES
CVE-2017-15303Arbitrary kernel memory write in CPUID CPU-Z driverExploited in the wild

Utilizes a known vulnerability (CPU-Z CVE-2017-15303) that allows it to read and write into physical memory and read CPU control registers to turn the DSE off. | On two occasions (in March and October 2020), we found a kernel rootkit that had been deployed. After analysis, it appears that this rootkit’s behavior is very similar to that of the NDISProxy driver and remote access trojan (RAT). We chose to call it “Pandora” based on the program database (PDB) path of the unpacked stage 2.

via trend micro researchtrendmicro.com
CVE-2021-44228Log4ShellExploited in the wild

In February of 2022, DEV-0401 was observed deploying the Pandora ransomware family, primarily via unpatched VMware Horizon systems vulnerable to the Log4j 2 CVE-2021-44228 vulnerability.

via microsoft generalmicrosoft.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Cinnamon Tempest

Since around 2021, HUI Loader variants have been deployed in operations involving the ransomware families LockFile, AtomSilo, NightSky, LockBit 2.0, and Pandora.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
Threat Group-3390

On two occasions (in March and October 2020), we found a kernel rootkit that had been deployed. After analysis, it appears that this rootkit’s behavior is very similar to that of the NDISProxy driver and remote access trojan (RAT). We chose to call it “Pandora” based on the program database (PDB) path of the unpacked stage 2.

via trend micro researchtrendmicro.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

DEV-0401 differs from many of the attackers who rely on purchasing access to existing malware implants or exposed RDP to enter a network. Instead, the group heavily utilizes unpatched vulnerabilities to access networks, including vulnerabilities in Exchange, Manage Engine AdSelfService Plus, Confluence, and Log4j 2.

Execution

2 techniques
T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1
T1574.001DLLEvidence3

Upon execution, CatB payloads rely on DLL search order hijacking to drop and load the malicious payload. The dropper (versions.dll) drops the payload (oci.dll) into the System32 directory.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution. | Many malware families store configuration, payloads, encryption keys, C2 addresses, or other operational data in Registry keys, such as QakBot storing configuration in a randomly named subkey under HKCU\Software\Microsoft and PolyglotDuke writing encrypted JSON configuration files to the Registry.

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

Depending on the privileges of the process, the malware will add a value to the “Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run” key, or it will create a service that runs the malware at boot time.

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence6

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors injecting shellcode, DLLs, or payloads into legitimate processes such as svchost.exe, explorer.exe, iexplore.exe, cmd.exe, lsass.exe, and browser processes.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence2

GuLoader has the ability to inject shellcode into a donor processes that is started in a suspended state. GuLoader has previously used RegAsm as a donor process. Cardinal RAT injects into a newly spawned process created from a native Windows executable.

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence4

Utilizes a known vulnerability (CPU-Z CVE-2017-15303) that allows it to read and write into physical memory and read CPU control registers to turn the DSE off.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

Depending on the privileges of the process, the malware will add a value to the “Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run” key, or it will create a service that runs the malware at boot time.

Stealth

11 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence1

On two occasions (in March and October 2020), we found a kernel rootkit that had been deployed... The rootkit has multiple stages before getting to the actual payload.

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

"Action RAT's commands, strings, and domains can be Base64 encoded within the payload." / "ADVSTORESHELL... strings... encrypted with an XOR-based algorithm; some strings are also encrypted with 3DES and reversed." / "APT29 has used encoded PowerShell commands." / "APT41 used VMProtected binaries..."

T1027.011Fileless StorageEvidence1

Examples include: “ComRAT has encrypted and stored its orchestrator code in the Registry…”, “ShadowPad maintains a configuration block and virtual file system in the Registry.”, and “QakBot can store its configuration information…under HKCU\Software\Microsoft.”

T1027.015CompressionEvidence1
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The launcher starts by instantiating the CLoadInfo object... Directory to copy all files %PROGRAMDATA%\Test\ ... Name of the legitimate executable dlpumgr32.exe ... Lastly, the launcher starts a suspended process with the command line “C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServices,”and injects the appropriate shellcode into it.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence6

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors injecting shellcode, DLLs, or payloads into legitimate processes such as svchost.exe, explorer.exe, iexplore.exe, cmd.exe, lsass.exe, and browser processes.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence2

GuLoader has the ability to inject shellcode into a donor processes that is started in a suspended state. GuLoader has previously used RegAsm as a donor process. Cardinal RAT injects into a newly spawned process created from a native Windows executable.

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1
T1211Exploitation for Defense EvasionEvidence1

The version we found is slightly different — the driver isn’t digitally signed but instead utilizes a known exploit to bypass Windows Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) protection and load the driver directly into the system.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

The CreationTime, LastWriteTime, and LastAccessTime will be updated according to the C:\Windows\system32\kernel32.dll file and their file attributes will be set to “hidden” and “system”.

T1574.001DLLEvidence3

Upon execution, CatB payloads rely on DLL search order hijacking to drop and load the malicious payload. The dropper (versions.dll) drops the payload (oci.dll) into the System32 directory.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution. | Many malware families store configuration, payloads, encryption keys, C2 addresses, or other operational data in Registry keys, such as QakBot storing configuration in a randomly named subkey under HKCU\Software\Microsoft and PolyglotDuke writing encrypted JSON configuration files to the Registry.

T1553.006Code Signing Policy ModificationEvidence2

Pandora can use CVE-2017-15303 to bypass Windows Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) protection and load its driver.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1040Network SniffingEvidence1

Registers WPF callback and filters incoming traffic with a predefined token... If the incoming traffic contains a token and is in the HTTP format, the backdoor will intercept the traffic and process the command.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1040Network SniffingEvidence1

Registers WPF callback and filters incoming traffic with a predefined token... If the incoming traffic contains a token and is in the HTTP format, the backdoor will intercept the traffic and process the command.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The tool is used to hide the threat actors’ tools and services... file management functions (such as search, delete, move, upload, and download)

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1
T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

Attackers move directly to deploying ransomware by editing a Group Policy.

What this page doesn’t show

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities2

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping23

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.