Pandora
Pandora is a Windows malware family/rootkit and backdoor, and the name is also used in reporting for a ransomware family active in early to mid-2022. High-confidence reporting describes Pandora as a multi-stage Windows implant discovered in 2020 in activity attributed to Iron Tiger/LuckyMouse/EmissaryPanda/APT27 (tracked by Trend Micro as Earth Smilodon) targeting a Philippine-based gambling company and other organizations in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. In that intrusion set, Pandora used DLL side-loading, privilege escalation through Windows services, and code injection into a newly created svchost.exe process during its first stage. A later stage used CPU-Z CVE-2017-15303 together with the Process Monitor driver procxp152.sys to bypass Windows Driver Signature Enforcement and load a kernel driver (drvx64.sys). The driver registered a Windows Filtering Platform callback, filtered incoming HTTP traffic using a predefined encrypted token stored in the Registry, and enabled processing of remote commands. The final payload installed itself as a Windows service, exchanged messages with the kernel driver, and injected the final payload into lsass.exe. Reported capabilities include gaining system privileges through Windows services, installing itself as a Windows service, starting and injecting code into svchost.exe, writing an encrypted token to the Registry, encrypting communications with D3DES, and using public code components including Blackbone, WFP Sample, HTTP Parser, StryKer, D3DES, and QuickLZ. Separately, the content also identifies Pandora as a ransomware family deployed by DEV-0401 in February 2022, primarily via unpatched VMware Horizon systems vulnerable to Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228). That ransomware was active in early to mid-2022 and targeted the automotive industry. The content further notes that HUI Loader variants have appeared in operations involving Pandora ransomware, and that string similarities in ransom notes and payload modifications suggest CatB may be an evolution or direct rebrand of Pandora ransomware.
Hunt this family in your stack
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
Vulnerabilities exploited
2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Utilizes a known vulnerability (CPU-Z CVE-2017-15303) that allows it to read and write into physical memory and read CPU control registers to turn the DSE off. | On two occasions (in March and October 2020), we found a kernel rootkit that had been deployed. After analysis, it appears that this rootkit’s behavior is very similar to that of the NDISProxy driver and remote access trojan (RAT). We chose to call it “Pandora” based on the program database (PDB) path of the unpacked stage 2.
In February of 2022, DEV-0401 was observed deploying the Pandora ransomware family, primarily via unpatched VMware Horizon systems vulnerable to the Log4j 2 CVE-2021-44228 vulnerability.
Groups observed using it
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Since around 2021, HUI Loader variants have been deployed in operations involving the ransomware families LockFile, AtomSilo, NightSky, LockBit 2.0, and Pandora.
On two occasions (in March and October 2020), we found a kernel rootkit that had been deployed. After analysis, it appears that this rootkit’s behavior is very similar to that of the NDISProxy driver and remote access trojan (RAT). We chose to call it “Pandora” based on the program database (PDB) path of the unpacked stage 2.
Techniques & procedures
23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
DEV-0401 differs from many of the attackers who rely on purchasing access to existing malware implants or exposed RDP to enter a network. Instead, the group heavily utilizes unpatched vulnerabilities to access networks, including vulnerabilities in Exchange, Manage Engine AdSelfService Plus, Confluence, and Log4j 2.
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
Persistence
3 techniques
Persistence
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution. | Many malware families store configuration, payloads, encryption keys, C2 addresses, or other operational data in Registry keys, such as QakBot storing configuration in a randomly named subkey under HKCU\Software\Microsoft and PolyglotDuke writing encrypted JSON configuration files to the Registry.
Privilege Escalation
4 techniques
Privilege Escalation
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors injecting shellcode, DLLs, or payloads into legitimate processes such as svchost.exe, explorer.exe, iexplore.exe, cmd.exe, lsass.exe, and browser processes.
GuLoader has the ability to inject shellcode into a donor processes that is started in a suspended state. GuLoader has previously used RegAsm as a donor process. Cardinal RAT injects into a newly spawned process created from a native Windows executable.
Stealth
11 techniques
Stealth
On two occasions (in March and October 2020), we found a kernel rootkit that had been deployed... The rootkit has multiple stages before getting to the actual payload.
"Action RAT's commands, strings, and domains can be Base64 encoded within the payload." / "ADVSTORESHELL... strings... encrypted with an XOR-based algorithm; some strings are also encrypted with 3DES and reversed." / "APT29 has used encoded PowerShell commands." / "APT41 used VMProtected binaries..."
Examples include: “ComRAT has encrypted and stored its orchestrator code in the Registry…”, “ShadowPad maintains a configuration block and virtual file system in the Registry.”, and “QakBot can store its configuration information…under HKCU\Software\Microsoft.”
The launcher starts by instantiating the CLoadInfo object... Directory to copy all files %PROGRAMDATA%\Test\ ... Name of the legitimate executable dlpumgr32.exe ... Lastly, the launcher starts a suspended process with the command line “C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServices,”and injects the appropriate shellcode into it.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors injecting shellcode, DLLs, or payloads into legitimate processes such as svchost.exe, explorer.exe, iexplore.exe, cmd.exe, lsass.exe, and browser processes.
GuLoader has the ability to inject shellcode into a donor processes that is started in a suspended state. GuLoader has previously used RegAsm as a donor process. Cardinal RAT injects into a newly spawned process created from a native Windows executable.
The version we found is slightly different — the driver isn’t digitally signed but instead utilizes a known exploit to bypass Windows Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) protection and load the driver directly into the system.
Defense Impairment
2 techniques
Defense Impairment
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution. | Many malware families store configuration, payloads, encryption keys, C2 addresses, or other operational data in Registry keys, such as QakBot storing configuration in a randomly named subkey under HKCU\Software\Microsoft and PolyglotDuke writing encrypted JSON configuration files to the Registry.
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
Discovery
2 techniques
Discovery
Command and Control
4 techniques
Command and Control
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."
Recent activity
18 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Pandora is a malware sample detected in the analysis, but specific details are not provided in the content.
Pandora is a ransomware family cited in connection with HUI Loader-supported operations and BRONZE STARLIGHT-linked activity.
Malware that starts a new svchost process and injects code into it.
A ransomware family active in early to mid-2022 that is suggested to be related to or rebranded as CatB.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.