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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 6 actorsExploits 4 CVEs

NETWIRE

NetWire is a remote access trojan (RAT) and credential-stealing malware family. The provided content associates it with process injection, keylogging-related behavior, command-and-control traffic, automated data collection, credential theft, persistence, and delivery through phishing and malware downloaders. NetWire has been observed stealing passwords from messaging and mail client applications and from web browsers including Internet Explorer, Opera, Yandex, and Chrome. It can automatically archive collected data, write collected data to files in a ./LOGS directory, copy itself to and execute from hidden folders, and inject code into processes including notepad.exe, svchost.exe, and vbc.exe. The content also notes registry-based persistence via HKCU\SOFTWARE\NetWire and an autorun entry under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, as well as macOS persistence through LaunchAgents. Execution and delivery vectors mentioned include spearphishing and email campaigns with malicious attachments or documents, PowerShell-based execution, and distribution by GuLoader. NetWire is described as cross-platform in at least one context, and Bahamut is specifically noted as using the publicly available cross-platform RAT NETWIRE alongside Revenge RAT. Threat actors and clusters explicitly associated with NetWire in the content include ModifiedElephant, which used NetWire and DarkComet against human rights activists, academics, journalists, and lawyers in India; TA2541, which has used NetWire in campaigns targeting aviation, aerospace, transportation, manufacturing, and defense organizations; Bahamut; and Nigerian BEC actors tracked as SilverTerrier. The content also notes behavioral overlap between NetWire and other commodity RATs such as WarZoneRAT, njRAT, and NanoCore due to similarities in injection, keylogging-related calls, and C2 traffic.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

4 CVES
CVE-2014-1761Remote Code Execution in Microsoft Word via Crafted RTF DataExploited in the wild

Observed lure documents repeatedly made use of CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2014-1761, CVE-2013-3906, CVE-2015-1641 exploits to drop and execute their malware of choice. | The threat actor uses spearphishing with malicious documents to deliver malware, such as NetWire, DarkComet, and simple keyloggers... The primary malware families deployed were NetWire and DarkComet remote access trojans (RATs).

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
CVE-2013-3906Remote Code Execution in Microsoft GDI+ TIFF ParsingExploited in the wild

Observed lure documents repeatedly made use of CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2014-1761, CVE-2013-3906, CVE-2015-1641 exploits to drop and execute their malware of choice. | The threat actor uses spearphishing with malicious documents to deliver malware, such as NetWire, DarkComet, and simple keyloggers... The primary malware families deployed were NetWire and DarkComet remote access trojans (RATs).

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
CVE-2012-0158MSCOMCTL.OCX ActiveX Controls Remote Code ExecutionExploited in the wild

Observed lure documents repeatedly made use of CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2014-1761, CVE-2013-3906, CVE-2015-1641 exploits to drop and execute their malware of choice. | The threat actor uses spearphishing with malicious documents to deliver malware, such as NetWire, DarkComet, and simple keyloggers... The primary malware families deployed were NetWire and DarkComet remote access trojans (RATs).

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
CVE-2015-1641Microsoft Office RTF Memory Corruption RCEExploited in the wild

Observed lure documents repeatedly made use of CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2014-1761, CVE-2013-3906, CVE-2015-1641 exploits to drop and execute their malware of choice. | The threat actor uses spearphishing with malicious documents to deliver malware, such as NetWire, DarkComet, and simple keyloggers... The primary malware families deployed were NetWire and DarkComet remote access trojans (RATs).

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

6 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
TA2541

Currently, TA2541 prefers AsyncRAT, but other popular RATs include NetWire, WSH RAT and Parallax.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
ModifiedElephant

The threat actor uses spearphishing with malicious documents to deliver malware, such as NetWire, DarkComet, and simple keyloggers... The primary malware families deployed were NetWire and DarkComet remote access trojans (RATs).

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
WindShift

Bahamut utilized the publicly available, cross-platform remote administration tools (RATs) NETWIRE and Revenge RAT for remote control.

via ptsecurity globalglobal.ptsecurity.com
SilverTerrier

The top 10 of the RATs used in Nigerian BEC scams is formed by NetWire, DarkComet, NanoCore, LuminosityLink, Remcos, ImminentMonitor, NJRat, Quasar, Adwind, and Hworm.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
TMT

The group relied exclusively on a variety of publicly available spyware and Remote Access Trojans (RATs), including AgentTesla, Lokibot, AzoRult, Pony, and NetWire.

via group ibgroup-ib.com
RATicate

"...identified at least 5 different malware families used as final payload—all of them InfoStealer or RAT malware: ... Netwire"

via sophos threat researchnews.sophos.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

32 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

TA2541 uses themes related to aviation, transportation, and travel. When Proofpoint first started tracking this actor, the group sent macro-laden Microsoft Word attachments that downloaded the RAT payload. The group pivoted, and now they more frequently send messages with links to cloud services such as Google Drive hosting the payload.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

Throughout the last decade, ModifiedElephant operators sought to infect their targets via spearphishing emails with malicious file attachments, with their techniques evolving over time. Their primary delivery mechanism is malicious Microsoft Office document files weaponized to deliver the malware of choice at the time.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

In 2019 phishing campaigns, ModifiedElephant operators also took the approach of providing links to files hosted externally for manual download and execution by the target.

Execution

6 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using PowerShell scripts/commands for execution, download, staging, reconnaissance, persistence, credential access, lateral movement, and defense evasion; e.g., "Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses."

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

Observed lure documents repeatedly made use of CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2014-1761, CVE-2013-3906, CVE-2015-1641 exploits to drop and execute their malware of choice.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes victims being lured into opening malicious attachments, enabling macros, launching installers, clicking embedded files/links, or otherwise directly executing malicious content.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence3

Sandworm Team leveraged Microsoft Office attachments which contained malicious macros that were automatically executed once the user permitted them... APT29 has used various forms of spearphishing attempting to get a user to open attachments... DarkGate is distributed through phishing links to VBS or MSI objects requiring user interaction for execution.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence3

Many malware families store configuration, payloads, encryption keys, C2 addresses, or other operational data in Registry keys, such as QakBot storing configuration in a randomly named subkey under HKCU\Software\Microsoft and PolyglotDuke writing encrypted JSON configuration files to the Registry. | The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence1

Bundlore can persist via a LaunchAgent. Calisto adds a .plist file to the /Library/LaunchAgents folder to maintain persistence. CoinTicker creates user launch agents named .espl.plist and com.apple.[random string].plist to establish persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

A group of remote access trojans, among them WarZoneRAT, njrat, nanocore, and netwire, overlap on process injection, keylogging-related calls, and command-and-control traffic.

T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence1

Bundlore can persist via a LaunchAgent. Calisto adds a .plist file to the /Library/LaunchAgents folder to maintain persistence. CoinTicker creates user launch agents named .espl.plist and com.apple.[random string].plist to establish persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

A group of remote access trojans, among them WarZoneRAT, njrat, nanocore, and netwire, overlap on process injection, keylogging-related calls, and command-and-control traffic.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

Agent Tesla has created hidden folders. AppleJeus has added a leading . to plist filenames, unlisting them from the Finder app and default Terminal directory listings. APT28 has saved files with hidden file attributes. FIN13 has created hidden files and folders within a compromised Linux system /tmp directory and also used attrib.exe to hide gathered local host information.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence3

Many malware families store configuration, payloads, encryption keys, C2 addresses, or other operational data in Registry keys, such as QakBot storing configuration in a randomly named subkey under HKCU\Software\Microsoft and PolyglotDuke writing encrypted JSON configuration files to the Registry. | The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

A group of remote access trojans, among them WarZoneRAT, njrat, nanocore, and netwire, overlap on process injection, keylogging-related calls, and command-and-control traffic.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

Agent Tesla has the ability to steal credentials from FTP clients and wireless profiles... APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne to gather credentials... Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from the credential vault and DPAPI.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware stealing usernames, passwords, cookies, session tokens, and other saved credentials from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Edge, Opera, Safari, and Yandex.

T1555.005Password ManagersEvidence1

Evilnum can collect email credentials from victims... Malteiro has obtained credentials from mail clients via NirSoft MailPassView... MgBot includes modules for stealing stored credentials from Outlook and Foxmail email client software... PLEAD has the ability to steal saved passwords from Microsoft Outlook.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, nbtstat, netsh, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, domains, and network adapter/interface details.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").

Collection

4 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

A group of remote access trojans, among them WarZoneRAT, njrat, nanocore, and netwire, overlap on process injection, keylogging-related calls, and command-and-control traffic.

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

Agrius used a custom tool, sql.net4.exe, to query SQL databases and then identify and extract personally identifiable information... AppleSeed has automatically collected data from USB drives, keystrokes, and screen images before exfiltration... Ember Bear engages in mass collection from compromised systems during intrusions.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

APT28 used a publicly available tool to gather and compress multiple documents... LoFiSe can collect all the files from the working directory every three hours and place them into a password-protected archive... NETWIRE can automatically archive collected data.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

First, we see a call to a location in the stack ... that will execute the function InternetOpenUrlA, we also see the C2 it will use... the second shellcode downloads further malware.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

The primary malware families deployed were NetWire and DarkComet remote access trojans (RATs). Both of these RATs are publicly available, and have a long history of abuse by threat actors across the spectrum of skill and capability.

Impact

2 techniques
T1565Data ManipulationEvidence1

It turns out that a compromise of defendant systems led to the planting of files that were later used as evidence of terrorism and justification for the defendants’ imprisonment.

T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

Scammers running business email compromise (BEC) fraud have grown in number, attack more often, and turn to remote access trojans as the preferred malware type to accompany their raids.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
6 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
2 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 years ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching8

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution6

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities4

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping32

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.