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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 2 actorsExploits 1 CVE

AppleSeed

AppleSeed is a backdoor malware family attributed to the North Korean threat actor Kimsuky. It was first discovered in 2019 and has since appeared in multiple structural and functional variants, including at least Dropper and Spy forms, with reporting noting historical evolution up to version 3.0 and more recent observation of version 2.1. AppleSeed has been used extensively in Kimsuky spear-phishing operations and is commonly delivered through malicious email attachments, including droppers in formats such as JSE, PIF, SCR, and EXE; victims are typically induced to execute files disguised as documents or installers, sometimes while a decoy document is opened. AppleSeed has also been observed executing via PowerShell, using JavaScript to launch PowerShell, and calling regsvr32.exe for execution.

Functionally, AppleSeed is a backdoor and information stealer. The Dropper variant downloads additional malware and executes commands received from its C2 server. The Spy variant gathers sensitive information including documents, screenshots, keystrokes, lists of USB drives, and data from the C:\GPKI directory; reporting also states that since 2022 AppleSeed version 2.1 has collected the C:\GPKI directory, which contains digital certificates used by the South Korean government for secure authentication. AppleSeed can automatically collect data from USB drives, keystrokes, and screen images, find and collect data from removable media devices, take screenshots through API calls, stage files in a central location prior to exfiltration, zip and encrypt collected data, split files when size is 0x1000000 bytes or greater, and exfiltrate files over its command-and-control channel. One report also states AppleSeed used email-based C2 communications via SMTP and IMAP.

AppleSeed is closely associated with Kimsuky campaigns targeting primarily South Korean entities. Reporting indicates the AppleSeed cluster mainly targeted government organizations, with broader Kimsuky victimology including South Korean military, corporate, defense, government, healthcare, medical, machinery, and energy sectors, as well as Korean universities, public institutions, and companies. AppleSeed has often been deployed alongside PebbleDash and related tooling, and enhanced derivatives such as HappyDoor have been described as evolving from the AppleSeed cluster with a focus on data exfiltration and GPKI certificate extraction. A noted artifact is the debug path F:\PC_Manager\Utopia_v0.1\bin\AppleSeed.pdb. A reported C2 indicator associated with one AppleSeed sample is peras1[.]n-e[.]kr at 45.58.52[.]104.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2021-34527PrintNightmareExploited in the wild

5.3. Privilege Escalation …….. 5.3.1. UACMe …….. 5.3.2. CVE-2021-1675 Vulnerability

via ahnlab asec blogasec.ahnlab.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Kimsuky

The group is also deploying new malware families like HelloDoor and HttpMalice, variants of PebbleDash, and enhanced versions of AppleSeed, such as HappyDoor, which focuses on data exfiltration and GPKI certificate extraction.

via scworldscworld.com
SeedpuNK

AppleSeed, a backdoor-type malware that was developed and used by the Kimsuky group, was first discovered in 2019 and has been circulating in various structural and functional variations since then.

via virusbulletinvirusbulletin.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

33 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

The group primarily uses spear-phishing attacks to distribute malware and attempt to take over accounts to harvest data.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

HappyDoor in this case is also being distributed via an email attachment just like the previous method of distribution. This attachment file contains a compressed file, and the latter carries a JScript or a dropper (executable file). Once that is run, HappyDoor is created and executed along with normal bait files.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

HTTPSpy is a full-featured remote access trojan that supports a wide range of capabilities to run shell commands, upload/download files, execute processes, capture screenshots, inject DLL paths into specified PID processes, and erase itself from the endpoint.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

The discovered JSE file drops two additional pieces of malware encoded in Base64 and executes them through PowerShell commands.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

AppleSeed has the ability to use JavaScript to execute PowerShell. APT32 has used JavaScript for drive-by downloads and C2 communications. Astaroth uses JavaScript to perform its core functionalities.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

Sandworm Team leveraged Microsoft Office attachments which contained malicious macros that were automatically executed once the user permitted them... APT29 has used various forms of spearphishing attempting to get a user to open attachments... DarkGate is distributed through phishing links to VBS or MSI objects requiring user interaction for execution.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder. | Examples include AppleSeed creating 'HKCU\Software\Microsoft/Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce', AvosLocker executed via the RunOnce Registry key, NanoCore creating a RunOnce key, and Raspberry Robin setting a RunOnce key.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder. | Examples include AppleSeed creating 'HKCU\Software\Microsoft/Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce', AvosLocker executed via the RunOnce Registry key, NanoCore creating a RunOnce key, and Raspberry Robin setting a RunOnce key.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

The malware is packed with VMProtector.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

Akira has used legitimate names and locations for files to evade defenses.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware deleting files, directories, droppers, scripts, logs, archives, staged data, and other artifacts from compromised systems, e.g., 'APT29 has used SDelete to remove artifacts from victim networks' and 'Lazarus Group malware has deleted files in various ways, including "suicide scripts" to delete malware binaries from the victim.' | Several entries explicitly state files were deleted after exfiltration or upload, such as 'AppleSeed can delete files from a compromised host after they are exfiltrated,' 'Attor’s plugin deletes the collected files and log files after exfiltration,' and 'Ursnif has deleted data staged in tmp files after exfiltration.'

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, deobfuscating, or unpacking payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 responses prior to execution or use.

T1218.010Regsvr32Evidence1

Loads malicious DLL through regsvr32.exe.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

AppleSeed has automatically collected data from USB drives, keystrokes, and screen images before exfiltration.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

enhanced versions of AppleSeed, such as HappyDoor, which focuses on data exfiltration and GPKI certificate extraction.

Discovery

7 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, nbtstat, netsh, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, domains, and network adapter/interface details.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Uses the systeminfo command to gather system information.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").

T1087.001Local AccountEvidence1

Gathers user account information on the system by using ‘net user’

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1

The Spy version gathers sensitive information such as documents, screenshots, keystrokes, and lists of USB drives.

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1

Checks for installed anti-virus software on the system.

Collection

6 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

The Spy version gathers sensitive information such as documents, screenshots, keystrokes, and lists of USB drives. This also includes harvesting data from the C:\GPKI directory.

T1025Data from Removable MediaEvidence2

AppleSeed can find and collect data from removable media devices. APT28 backdoor may collect the entire contents of an inserted USB device. Aria-body has the ability to collect data from USB devices. BADNEWS copies files with certain extensions from USB devices to a predefined directory.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

AppleSeed has automatically collected data from USB drives, keystrokes, and screen images before exfiltration.

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

AppleSeed has automatically collected data from USB drives, keystrokes, and screen images before exfiltration... Metamorfo has automatically collected mouse clicks, continuous screenshots on the machine... RTM monitors browsing activity and automatically captures screenshots if a victim browses to a URL matching one of a list of strings.

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

Agrius used a custom tool, sql.net4.exe, to query SQL databases and then identify and extract personally identifiable information... AppleSeed has automatically collected data from USB drives, keystrokes, and screen images before exfiltration... Ember Bear engages in mass collection from compromised systems during intrusions.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

The DLL establishes persistence on the host using a scheduled task and contacts a command-and-control (C2) server to retrieve an as-yet-unknown payload.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The DLL establishes persistence on the host using a scheduled task and contacts a command-and-control (C2) server to retrieve an as-yet-unknown payload.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1030Data Transfer Size LimitsEvidence1

AppleSeed has divided files if the size is 0x1000000 bytes or more. APT28 has split archived exfiltration files into chunks smaller than 1MB. APT41 transfers post-exploitation files dividing the payload into fixed-size chunks to evade detection.

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence4

enhanced versions of AppleSeed, such as HappyDoor, which focuses on data exfiltration and GPKI certificate extraction.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

27 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
6 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
20 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago
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IOC matching27

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping33

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.