WASSONITE is a Dragos-tracked industrial intrusion activity group active since at least 2018 that targets industrial control system-related organizations in Asia, especially India, and likely also Japan and South Korea. The group came to prominence following a malware intrusion at the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant in India. Its victimology includes electric generation, nuclear energy, manufacturing, and space-related research organizations, indicating a focus on strategic industrial and research environments rather than indiscriminate targeting. WASSONITE operations are assessed as Stage 1 ICS kill chain activity centered on access operations in enterprise IT networks, with no confirmed ICS-specific disruptive or destructive capability. Observed tradecraft includes spearphishing for initial access, use of DTrack malware for remote access, credential capture with tools such as Mimikatz and other public utilities, and use of native system tools for file transfer and lateral movement. Reporting also links newer DTrack activity associated with WASSONITE to interaction with Fujitsu Systemwalker management software, reflecting interest in enterprise and operational management infrastructure that can support broader intrusion objectives. The group has limited technical overlap with activity tracked as Kimsuky. Third-party security firms have associated DTrack and related malware with the Lazarus Group, and Dragos separately links its COVELLITE cluster to Lazarus-related activity; however, WASSONITE is distinguished from COVELLITE by different capabilities, infrastructure, and target overlap. Based on observed targeting and tooling, WASSONITE is best characterized as an industrial-focused intrusion set conducting reconnaissance, credential theft, and lateral movement in support of espionage-oriented access into high-value industrial environments.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
7 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
2 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Targets industrial sectors in Asia using spear phishing and AppleSeed backdoor, with advanced knowledge of industrial operations.
ICS-focused access operations targeting Asian entities, especially in India, with activity against electric generation, nuclear energy, manufacturing, and space-related research organizations. The content states the activity is Stage 1 ICS kill-chain access operations within IT networks and does not appear to have ICS-specific disruptive or destructive capability.
Targets electric generation and nuclear energy (plus manufacturing/research) primarily in India; uses DTrack and credential theft plus lateral movement tooling.
Uses known malware for remote access, credential capture, and lateral movement.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.