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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 3 actorsExploits 2 CVEs

Lokibot

LokiBot is a long-running information stealer and keylogger first advertised in May 2015 on an underground forum by actors using the nicknames "lokistov" and "carter." It remains active and widely used, and the source-code leak in 2018 led to multiple forks and modified variants, including versions with Android support, keylogging, and remote-access features. It has been prominent in cybercrime activity and was cited as one of the top banking trojan and information-stealer families in Asia and the South Pacific, one of the most prevalent malware families in public sandbox submissions, and a commonly used stealer in SilverTerrier-linked business email compromise operations.

Its primary function is credential theft. Reported targets include more than 100 applications, with theft from Chromium-, Firefox-, and Safari-based browsers; Windows OS credentials; email clients; FTP and SFTP clients; cryptocurrency wallets; password managers; and other applications. It can discover the username on the infected host, compress stolen data with aPLib, and exfiltrate it to command-and-control infrastructure over HTTP. LokiBot has also been observed initiating regular C2 communications, with C2 addresses stored in samples using 3DES encryption.

Observed delivery commonly relies on phishing and malspam attachments. Documented vectors include spearphishing emails carrying malicious XLS attachments and campaigns using heavily obfuscated JScript attachments executed by Windows Script Host. In the analyzed multi-stage chain, the JScript decodes a Base64 PowerShell stage, writes it to C:\Temp, and executes it; the PowerShell stage decrypts and reflectively loads a ConfuserEx-protected .NET injector; and the injector spawns and injects the final payload into aspnet_compiler.exe. LokiBot has also used PowerShell commands embedded in batch scripts, and one sample embedded the command "schtasks /Run /TN \Microsoft\Windows\DiskCleanup\SilentCleanup /I" in a batch script. Social-engineering behavior includes prompting victims to click "Enable Content" in malicious email attachments to enable macros.

On infected systems, LokiBot can copy itself to a hidden file and directory and has attempted persistence via a registry Run key, although newer builder-generated samples were reported to have a broken persistence mechanism. It uses runtime API resolution via custom hashing and creates a mutex derived from the MD5 hash of the machine's unique registry identifier to enforce single-instance execution. Updated variants have also been reported using steganography to hide code inside JPG files.

LokiBot has been associated with infrastructure and delivery ecosystems used by multiple threat actors and malware operators. It was observed in leaked BraZZZerS Fast Flux logs, cited as a malware family distributed by GuLoader, and noted as one of the malicious campaigns that leveraged Ngrok. In SilverTerrier reporting, LokiBot was the most popular information stealer by unique monthly samples. High-confidence indicators from the analyzed campaign include SHA256 hashes c099f965144bccd0b590f946659fc3c0747c54aef505b6caaca9078712f455fb, 64c7dd0a3a3ae49977ac05913d3878000cce14e5d8c1ee05b782bdfd648bde91, ad10ff9043d6f327045943635fcbd0c5918acb79dc998db92ee4c7dee5224710, 4c9f271242f61f1a31b8146305e9a7ed512c521445d4f7a7a901e301307add3d, and 5864a697bd7b339f56b05405f29a097cd027cafdcc4e63c2aaeccccbf930605f; the dropper filename gruijvdsdbcmcvbtryedfhpoibbedflokjqnb.js; IP 158.94.211.95; domains kbfvzoboss.bid, alphastand.trade, alphastand.win, and alphastand.top; and C2 endpoints including /alien/fre.php and /kelly/five/fre.php.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

2 CVES
CVE-2017-0199Microsoft Office/WordPad Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityExploited in the wild

Older Microsoft Office flaws (CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2017-0199) that remain unpatched in many organizations were also leveraged. | Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):- ... Malware LokiBot Infostealer deployed via legacy Office exploit chains

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
CVE-2017-11882Microsoft Office Equation Editor Remote Code ExecutionExploited in the wild

Older Microsoft Office flaws (CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2017-0199) that remain unpatched in many organizations were also leveraged. | Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):- ... Malware LokiBot Infostealer deployed via legacy Office exploit chains

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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SilverTerrier

The info stealers most popular with SilverTerrier last year were LokiBot (446 unique samples/month), Pony (330 unique samples/month), and Agent Tesla .NET keylogger (95 unique samples/month).

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
TMT

The group relied exclusively on a variety of publicly available spyware and Remote Access Trojans (RATs), including AgentTesla, Lokibot, AzoRult, Pony, and NetWire.

via group ibgroup-ib.com
RATicate

"...we found several different families of RATs and infostealers. These included Lokibot, Betabot, Formbook, and AgentTesla."

via sophos threat researchnews.sophos.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

31 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

The attack begins when a victim receives a phishing email with a JScript file attached.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence3

The sample was distributed as a malicious email attachment... The attack begins when a victim receives a phishing email with a JScript file attached.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

Once executed, the script decodes a Base64-encoded PowerShell script, saves it to the C:\Temp folder with a random filename, and runs it.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes use of cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, and xp_cmdshell to execute commands, run payloads, launch binaries, perform reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions. Examples include: 'Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL', 'APT41 used cmd.exe /c to execute commands on remote machines', and many malware families 'can use cmd.exe to execute commands on a compromised host.' | The content repeatedly mentions '.bat', '.cmd', and 'batch scripts' used to automate execution, persistence, cleanup, deployment, disabling security tools, and ransomware operations. Examples: 'APT1 has used ... batch scripting to automate execution', 'Blue Mockingbird has used batch script files to automate execution and deployment of payloads', and 'Cinnamon Tempest has executed ransomware using batch scripts deployed via GPO.'

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence2

Opening the file causes Windows to run it through the built-in Windows Script Host program. The script is heavily obfuscated using decoy functions and hexadecimal-named variables to slow down analysis.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

By relying on basic social engineering – an attack technique that takes advantage of human traits such as curiosity, trust and greed in order to obtain confidential information or to have the victim perform a certain action – it is suffice to say that certain threat actors (both criminal and nation state) are exploiting these unprecedented times for various nefarious means.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Sandworm Team leveraged Microsoft Office attachments which contained malicious macros that were automatically executed once the user permitted them... APT29 has used various forms of spearphishing attempting to get a user to open attachments... DarkGate is distributed through phishing links to VBS or MSI objects requiring user interaction for execution.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

The malware also tries to establish persistence via a registry run key, but newer samples built with custom builders contain a broken persistence mechanism due to a patched decryption routine.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

It spawns a legitimate aspnet_compiler.exe process, allocates memory inside it, and writes the final LokiBot payload into that space. This process injection technique allows the malware to run inside a trusted Windows process, making it harder to flag.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

The malware also tries to establish persistence via a registry run key, but newer samples built with custom builders contain a broken persistence mechanism due to a patched decryption routine.

Stealth

11 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The script is heavily obfuscated using decoy functions and hexadecimal-named variables to slow down analysis... The loaded .NET assembly, protected with the ConfuserEx obfuscator, acts as an injector.

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1

Defense Evasion. Загрузчик скачивает стего-контейнер с легитимного или скомпрометированного хоста. Работают сразу две техники: Steganography (T1027.003) для обфускации пейлоада...

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence2

To stay hidden, LokiBot avoids importing most Windows API functions directly and instead resolves them at runtime using a custom hashing technique.

T1027.009Embedded PayloadsEvidence1

Defense Evasion. ...Работают сразу две техники: Steganography (T1027.003) для обфускации пейлоада и Embedded Payloads (T1027.009) для сокрытия кода внутри медиафайла.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

As shown in the output of the patched assembly (Figure 7), a new aspnet_compiler.exe process is spawned.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

It spawns a legitimate aspnet_compiler.exe process, allocates memory inside it, and writes the final LokiBot payload into that space. This process injection technique allows the malware to run inside a trusted Windows process, making it harder to flag.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence4

Once executed, the script decodes a Base64-encoded PowerShell script... The PowerShell stage then decrypts a .NET assembly payload using XOR with a hard-coded key.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

It spawns a legitimate aspnet_compiler.exe process... This process injection technique allows the malware to run inside a trusted Windows process, making it harder to flag.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

Agent Tesla has created hidden folders. AppleJeus has added a leading . to plist filenames, unlisting them from the Finder app and default Terminal directory listings. APT28 has saved files with hidden file attributes. FIN13 has created hidden files and folders within a compromised Linux system /tmp directory and also used attrib.exe to hide gathered local host information.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

The PowerShell stage then decrypts a .NET assembly payload using XOR with a hard-coded key and loads it directly into memory without writing to disk.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

Once active, LokiBot creates a mutex using the MD5 hash of the machine’s unique registry identifier to ensure only one instance runs at a time.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

Banking trojans and information stealers materialized as the second most prevalent type of cybercrime, with malware families like RedLine, Lumma, LokiBot, Negasteal, and ZBot taking up the top spots.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence3

It then cycles through a list of dedicated credential-harvesting functions, each targeting a specific application, quietly collecting usernames and passwords across browsers, email clients, and more.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, nbtstat, netsh, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, domains, and network adapter/interface details.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking whether the current user is an administrator, enumerating user sessions, and gathering account details from compromised hosts.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

Once active, LokiBot creates a mutex using the MD5 hash of the machine’s unique registry identifier to ensure only one instance runs at a time.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Banking trojans and information stealers materialized as the second most prevalent type of cybercrime, with malware families like RedLine, Lumma, LokiBot, Negasteal, and ZBot taking up the top spots.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

Banking trojans and information stealers materialized as the second most prevalent type of cybercrime, with malware families like RedLine, Lumma, LokiBot, Negasteal, and ZBot taking up the top spots.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence2

After harvesting credentials, LokiBot compresses the stolen data using aPLib and sends it to a command-and-control server.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

After harvesting credentials, LokiBot compresses the stolen data using aPLib and sends it to a command-and-control server.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

Every minute, it sends an HTTP request containing information about the infected system and spawns a separate thread to process the server's response and execute any received commands.

T1568.001Fast Flux DNSEvidence1

The story we are writing here will try to explain how, from a simple mistake made by an operator, we managed to collect and exploit a lot of precious information from a “Fast Flux” network called BraZZZerS Fast Flux between end of 2018 and 2022.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

After harvesting credentials, LokiBot compresses the stolen data using aPLib and sends it to a command-and-control server whose address is stored in the binary using 3DES encryption.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

Once all credentials have been gathered, the buffer is compressed with aPLib and transmitted to the C2 server.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

2,752 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
8 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
8 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
2,736 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

93 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

cyber security newsNews
Jun 25, 2026
LokiBot Campaign Uses JScript Attachment, .NET Injector, and Process Injection to Steal Credentials

Credential-stealing malware that harvests usernames and passwords from more than a hundred applications, including browsers, cryptocurrency wallets, email clients, and FTP tools. In this campaign it is delivered via a phishing email with a JScript attachment, followed by PowerShell, an in-memory .NET injector, and process injection into aspnet_compiler.exe. It compresses stolen data with aPLib and sends it to a command-and-control server, and may attempt persistence via a registry run key.

Read more
levelblue spiderlabs blogNews
Jun 24, 2026
LokiBot After a Decade: An Analysis of a Recent LokiBot Campaign

LokiBot is a long-running infostealer focused on harvesting credentials from more than a hundred software products, including browsers, cryptocurrency wallets, password managers, email clients, and FTP clients. In the analyzed campaign it was delivered via malspam as an obfuscated JScript attachment, which launched a PowerShell loader and a .NET injector before injecting the final LokiBot payload. The malware steals credentials, compresses and exfiltrates them to C2 infrastructure, establishes persistence, and polls the C2 for additional commands.

Read more
the hacker newsNews
Jun 22, 2026
INTERPOL Warns Phishing, Ransomware, and AI Scams Are Rising Across Asia-Pacific

A banking trojan and information stealer listed among the most prevalent malware families in Asia and the South Pacific.

Read more
codebyNews
Jun 5, 2026
Стеганография в вредоносном ПО: APT-техники и детект

Инфостилер, крадущий учётные данные; обновлённые варианты используют стеганографию для сокрытия кода внутри JPG-файлов.

Read more
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IOC matching2,752

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities2

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping31

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.