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Mallory
MalwareRansomwareUsed by 3 actorsExploits 1 CVE

PowerLess

PowerLess is a PowerShell backdoor associated with Iranian threat activity, specifically APT35/Charming Kitten (also referenced alongside TA453 and overlapping with Mint Sandstorm/APT42 reporting). It is written in and executed via PowerShell without invoking powershell.exe. Reported capabilities include encrypted command-and-control communications, browser information theft from Chrome and Edge database files, encryption of browser database files prior to exfiltration, and local staging of stolen data. Reported staging paths include C:\Windows\Temp\cup.tmp for stolen browser data and C:\Windows\Temp\Report.06E17A5A-7325-4325-8E5D-E172EBA7FC5BK for keylogger data. Reporting also states that newer observed versions advanced from 3.3.0 to 3.3.4 and added AMSI and ETW bypass techniques, AES-encrypted payload delivery via malicious LNK files, and Telegram-based C2. Separate reporting noted execution style similarities between another TunnelVision backdoor and PowerLess. PowerLess has been described as a custom backdoor used for espionage.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2021-44228Log4ShellExploited in the wild

In this post, we highlight some of the activities we recently observed from TunnelVision operators, focusing around exploitation of VMware Horizon Log4j vulnerabilities. TunnelVision attackers have been actively exploiting the vulnerability to run malicious PowerShell commands, deploy backdoors, create backdoor users, harvest credentials and perform lateral movement.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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tunnelvision

Although it is not encrypted, it is deobfuscated and executed in a somewhat similar manner to how PowerLess, another backdoor used by the group, executes its PowerShell payload.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
Magic Hound

This name was previously used by the TA453 POWERLESS browser stealer module as reported by Volexity.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
Islamic Hacker Army

Their tools include custom backdoors like FalseFont or Powerless for espionage...

via polyswarmblog.polyswarm.io
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

"we have observed wide exploitation of ... recently Log4Shell... focusing around exploitation of VMware Horizon Log4j vulnerabilities."

T1566PhishingEvidence1

“Initial access continued to rely on spear phishing — delivering macro-enabled documents or malicious links …” and “Iranian-linked threat actors have commonly used phishing (T1566) as the primary vector for initial access …”

Execution

6 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

TunnelVision attackers have been actively exploiting the vulnerability to run malicious PowerShell commands... Typically, the threat actor initially exploits the Log4j vulnerability to run PowerShell commands directly, and then runs further commands by means of PS reverse shells.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence6

Typically, the threat actor initially exploits the Log4j vulnerability to run PowerShell commands directly, and then runs further commands by means of PS reverse shells, executed via the Tomcat process.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

“PowerShell and Cmd serve as the universal backbone for execution across nearly all groups”

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

TunnelVision attackers have been actively exploiting the vulnerability to run malicious PowerShell commands, deploy backdoors, create backdoor users, harvest credentials and perform lateral movement.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

In recent years, Iranian-linked threat actors have commonly used phishing (T1566) as the primary vector for initial access, often leading to execution via user execution (T1204) of malicious files

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

The backdoor drops an additional executable file to %ProgramData%\Installed Packages\InteropServices.exe and registers it as a service named “InteropServices”.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

"ADVSTORESHELL encrypts with the 3DES algorithm and a hardcoded key prior to exfiltration."; "Agent Tesla can encrypt data with 3DES..."; "APT32's backdoor has used...RC4 encryption before exfiltration."; "Epic encrypts collected data using a public key framework..."; "Some variants encrypt...with AES and encode it with base64..."; "Prikormka...encrypts it with Blowfish."; "VERMIN encrypts the collected files using 3-DES."; "Zebrocy...RC4...as well as AES...and hexadecimal for encoding"

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence6

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, deobfuscating, or unpacking payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 responses prior to execution or use.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

The content references collection of credential material from local systems, including "Bumblebee can capture and compress stolen credentials from the Registry and volume shadow copies," "GALLIUM collected ... password hashes from the SAM hive in the Registry," and "Windigo has used a script to gather credentials in files left on disk by OpenSSH backdoors."

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Operation MidnightEclipse stole saved cookies and login data from targeted systems; IceApple can collect files, passwords, and other data from a compromised host; RedLine Stealer collected chat logs and files associated with chat services.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

PowerLess has the ability to exfiltrate data, including Chrome and Edge browser database files, from compromised machines. QakBot can use esentutl.exe to steal sensitive data from Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge.

Discovery

1 technique
T1217Browser Information DiscoveryEvidence3

APT38 has collected browser bookmark information to learn more about compromised hosts, obtain personal information about users, and acquire details about internal network resources.

Collection

5 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware collecting, stealing, identifying, copying, or staging files, documents, credentials, logs, databases, and other information from compromised hosts or local systems.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1
T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.

T1074.001Local Data StagingEvidence1
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence2

"AppleSeed has compressed collected data before exfiltration."; "APT28 used a publicly available tool to gather and compress multiple documents..."; "Aria-body has used ZIP to compress data..."; "Cadelspy...compress stolen data into a .cab file."; "Daserf hides collected data in password-protected .rar archives."; "FIN6 has compressed log files into a ZIP archive prior to staging and exfiltration."; "Lazarus Group has compressed exfiltrated data with RAR...archive specified directories in .zip format"; "XCSSET will compress entire ~/Desktop folders..."

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Finally, for command and control and exfiltration, Iranian-linked groups most commonly rely on application layer protocols (T1071), such as HTTP

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Reverse Shell #1 uses WebClient UploadFile/DownloadString to "www.microsoft-updateserver[.]cf"; also notes webhook.site for output exfil.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

In this example, the threat actor attempted to download ngrok to a compromised VMware Horizon server.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

This domain was also used to host a zip file ... containing a custom backdoor ... The dropped executable contains an obfuscated version of the reverse shell as described above, beaconing to the same C2 server.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence3

“APT29 has used multiple layers of encryption within malware to protect C2 communication… BITTER has encrypted their C2 communications… MacMa has used TLS encryption… Magic Hound has used an encrypted http proxy in C2 communications… gh0st RAT has encrypted TCP communications…”

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

“APT29 has used multiple layers of encryption within malware to protect C2 communication… BITTER has encrypted their C2 communications… Emotet has encrypted data before sending to the C2 server… gh0st RAT has encrypted TCP communications to evade detection… Gomir uses a custom encryption algorithm…”

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

TypeValueLatest sighting
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching1

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping25

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.