PowerLess
PowerLess is a PowerShell backdoor associated with Iranian threat activity, specifically APT35/Charming Kitten (also referenced alongside TA453 and overlapping with Mint Sandstorm/APT42 reporting). It is written in and executed via PowerShell without invoking powershell.exe. Reported capabilities include encrypted command-and-control communications, browser information theft from Chrome and Edge database files, encryption of browser database files prior to exfiltration, and local staging of stolen data. Reported staging paths include C:\Windows\Temp\cup.tmp for stolen browser data and C:\Windows\Temp\Report.06E17A5A-7325-4325-8E5D-E172EBA7FC5BK for keylogger data. Reporting also states that newer observed versions advanced from 3.3.0 to 3.3.4 and added AMSI and ETW bypass techniques, AES-encrypted payload delivery via malicious LNK files, and Telegram-based C2. Separate reporting noted execution style similarities between another TunnelVision backdoor and PowerLess. PowerLess has been described as a custom backdoor used for espionage.
Hunt this family in your stack
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
Vulnerabilities exploited
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
In this post, we highlight some of the activities we recently observed from TunnelVision operators, focusing around exploitation of VMware Horizon Log4j vulnerabilities. TunnelVision attackers have been actively exploiting the vulnerability to run malicious PowerShell commands, deploy backdoors, create backdoor users, harvest credentials and perform lateral movement.
Groups observed using it
3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Although it is not encrypted, it is deobfuscated and executed in a somewhat similar manner to how PowerLess, another backdoor used by the group, executes its PowerShell payload.
This name was previously used by the TA453 POWERLESS browser stealer module as reported by Volexity.
Their tools include custom backdoors like FalseFont or Powerless for espionage...
Techniques & procedures
25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
Execution
6 techniques
Execution
TunnelVision attackers have been actively exploiting the vulnerability to run malicious PowerShell commands... Typically, the threat actor initially exploits the Log4j vulnerability to run PowerShell commands directly, and then runs further commands by means of PS reverse shells.
Typically, the threat actor initially exploits the Log4j vulnerability to run PowerShell commands directly, and then runs further commands by means of PS reverse shells, executed via the Tomcat process.
“PowerShell and Cmd serve as the universal backbone for execution across nearly all groups”
TunnelVision attackers have been actively exploiting the vulnerability to run malicious PowerShell commands, deploy backdoors, create backdoor users, harvest credentials and perform lateral movement.
Stealth
2 techniques
Stealth
"ADVSTORESHELL encrypts with the 3DES algorithm and a hardcoded key prior to exfiltration."; "Agent Tesla can encrypt data with 3DES..."; "APT32's backdoor has used...RC4 encryption before exfiltration."; "Epic encrypts collected data using a public key framework..."; "Some variants encrypt...with AES and encode it with base64..."; "Prikormka...encrypts it with Blowfish."; "VERMIN encrypts the collected files using 3-DES."; "Zebrocy...RC4...as well as AES...and hexadecimal for encoding"
Credential Access
4 techniques
Credential Access
The content references collection of credential material from local systems, including "Bumblebee can capture and compress stolen credentials from the Registry and volume shadow copies," "GALLIUM collected ... password hashes from the SAM hive in the Registry," and "Windigo has used a script to gather credentials in files left on disk by OpenSSH backdoors."
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
Collection
5 techniques
Collection
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware collecting, stealing, identifying, copying, or staging files, documents, credentials, logs, databases, and other information from compromised hosts or local systems.
The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.
"AppleSeed has compressed collected data before exfiltration."; "APT28 used a publicly available tool to gather and compress multiple documents..."; "Aria-body has used ZIP to compress data..."; "Cadelspy...compress stolen data into a .cab file."; "Daserf hides collected data in password-protected .rar archives."; "FIN6 has compressed log files into a ZIP archive prior to staging and exfiltration."; "Lazarus Group has compressed exfiltrated data with RAR...archive specified directories in .zip format"; "XCSSET will compress entire ~/Desktop folders..."
Command and Control
6 techniques
Command and Control
Finally, for command and control and exfiltration, Iranian-linked groups most commonly rely on application layer protocols (T1071), such as HTTP
Reverse Shell #1 uses WebClient UploadFile/DownloadString to "www.microsoft-updateserver[.]cf"; also notes webhook.site for output exfil.
In this example, the threat actor attempted to download ngrok to a compromised VMware Horizon server.
This domain was also used to host a zip file ... containing a custom backdoor ... The dropped executable contains an obfuscated version of the reverse shell as described above, beaconing to the same C2 server.
“APT29 has used multiple layers of encryption within malware to protect C2 communication… BITTER has encrypted their C2 communications… MacMa has used TLS encryption… Magic Hound has used an encrypted http proxy in C2 communications… gh0st RAT has encrypted TCP communications…”
“APT29 has used multiple layers of encryption within malware to protect C2 communication… BITTER has encrypted their C2 communications… Emotet has encrypted data before sending to the C2 server… gh0st RAT has encrypted TCP communications to evade detection… Gomir uses a custom encryption algorithm…”
IOCs tracked for this family
1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
Recent activity
26 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Custom backdoor referenced as used for espionage operations; sometimes paired with destructive tooling in campaigns described.
APT35 backdoor enhanced with AMSI/ETW bypasses, AES-encrypted payload delivery via LNK files, and Telegram-based C2.
A PowerShell-based backdoor attributed to APT35 that executes without launching powershell.exe, aiding stealthy execution and persistence on Windows environments.
A PowerShell backdoor designed to execute without invoking powershell.exe, likely to evade detection while providing backdoor access.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.