Embargo is a Rust-based ransomware-as-a-service operation, first observed in April 2024, that conducts double-extortion attacks. It is also tracked as Storm-0501 and is assessed by multiple researchers as a probable BlackCat/ALPHV successor or rebrand, although direct organizational continuity remains unconfirmed. Embargo affiliates exfiltrate victim data—commonly using Rclone to MEGA or MegaSync—before encrypting files with ChaCha20 and Curve25519 cryptography and demanding payment.
The operation uses a Rust-native toolchain that includes the MDeployer loader and MS4Killer security-tool killer. MDeployer decrypts and deploys the ransomware and supporting payloads, establishes persistence through Windows services and scheduled tasks, and can reboot systems into Safe Mode to weaken endpoint protections. MS4Killer uses a bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver technique to terminate targeted security products. Embargo also disables or tampers with security controls, enumerates processes, services, volumes, local and networked storage, inhibits recovery by deleting or disabling recovery resources, and removes artifacts following execution.
Storm-0501, a principal publicly tracked Embargo affiliate, has targeted Windows enterprise environments and hybrid Microsoft Azure and Entra ID environments. Its intrusions have involved exploitation of known internet-facing application vulnerabilities, credential abuse and brute-force activity, Active Directory and cloud reconnaissance, credential theft, remote-management tooling, and lateral movement using Windows remote-execution mechanisms. Cloud-focused activity has included compromise of Entra Connect synchronization accounts, privileged-account and MFA manipulation, federated-domain persistence, access to cloud secrets and storage, cloud data theft, and backup destruction. Reported victim sectors include technology, healthcare, manufacturing, government, transportation, and law enforcement, with a substantial concentration of publicly named victims in the United States.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Storm-0501 exploits unpatched Zoho ManageEngine (CVE-2022-47966) as an initial-access vector. | Embargo is a Rust-native ransomware-as-a-service operation using double extortion, data exfiltration via Rclone to MEGA/MegaSync, and ChaCha20 plus Curve25519 encryption.
The profile identifies CVE-2023-4966 (Citrix NetScaler, "Citrix Bleed") as a known N-day vulnerability exploited by Storm-0501 for initial access. | Embargo is a Rust-native ransomware-as-a-service operation using double extortion, data exfiltration via Rclone to MEGA/MegaSync, and ChaCha20 plus Curve25519 encryption.
The profile lists CVE-2023-29300 / CVE-2023-38203 as Adobe ColdFusion vulnerabilities used as known N-day initial-access vectors by Storm-0501; its infection chain specifically cites CVE-2023-29300. | Embargo is a Rust-native ransomware-as-a-service operation using double extortion, data exfiltration via Rclone to MEGA/MegaSync, and ChaCha20 plus Curve25519 encryption.
The profile lists CVE-2023-29300 / CVE-2023-38203 as Adobe ColdFusion vulnerabilities exploited as known N-day initial-access vectors by Storm-0501. | Embargo is a Rust-native ransomware-as-a-service operation using double extortion, data exfiltration via Rclone to MEGA/MegaSync, and ChaCha20 plus Curve25519 encryption.
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Embargo is a Rust-native ransomware-as-a-service operation using double extortion, data exfiltration via Rclone to MEGA/MegaSync, and ChaCha20 plus Curve25519 encryption.
Hastalamuerte was an experienced affiliate who had previously worked with Embargo, LockBit, and Medusa before joining Qilin.
23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
33 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced as another ransomware operation previously observed using Safe Mode for defense evasion.
Named as one of the ransomware operations with which hastalamuerte reportedly had prior experience.
A ransomware group referenced as the prior operation with which LARVA-368 was associated before launching ArmCorp/The Gentlemen.
A named ransomware operation referenced as one of the affiliate programs previously used by The Gentlemen founder.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.