FlawedAmmyy
FlawedAmmyy is a remote access Trojan (RAT) first documented by Proofpoint and observed in use since the beginning of 2016 in both highly targeted email attacks and massive multi-million-message malspam campaigns. It is based on leaked source code from Version 3 of the Ammyy Admin remote desktop software. Reported capabilities include remote desktop control, file system management, proxy support, audio chat, command execution via PowerShell, screenshot capture, clipboard collection, antivirus discovery via WMI, current-user enumeration, smart-card detection, and exfiltration of collected host data to command-and-control (C2) servers. FlawedAmmyy / FlawedGrace is also described as attempting to communicate with C2 to enable download of additional malware components.
Delivery observed in the content is primarily email-based. Proofpoint linked major distribution activity to TA505, including Japan-focused campaigns in 2019 using malicious Microsoft Excel or Word attachments with macros, and large March 2018 campaigns using ZIP archives containing .url Internet Shortcut files that referenced SMB shares. In that infection chain, opening the .url file caused a JavaScript file to be downloaded and executed over SMB, which then downloaded Quant Loader, which fetched FlawedAmmyy as the final payload. Narrowly targeted campaigns in January and March 2018 used macro-enabled Word documents to download the RAT directly. The malware has also been observed installed via msiexec.exe, and TA505 was reported abusing .SettingContent-ms within PDF files to distribute FlawedAmmyy.
FlawedAmmyy communicates with C2 over HTTP on port 443. During the initial handshake, the client sends a first byte of '=' followed by 35 obfuscated and SEAL-encrypted bytes; after a server response of 0x2d00, it sends a second packet containing cleartext key-value pairs. Reported host profiling data sent to C2 includes an 8-digit malware ID, operating system, privilege level, username, computer name, antivirus product, smart-card presence, and malware build time. Identified infrastructure in the content includes C2 endpoints 179.60.146.3:443 and 194.165.16.11:443, the SMB URL file://buyviagraoverthecounterusabb.net/documents/B123456789012.js, Quant Loader infrastructure hxxp://wassronledorhad.in/q2/index.php, and a payload URL hxxp://balzantruck.com/45rt.exe.
The malware is associated in the content primarily with TA505. It was observed as a secondary payload downloaded by Get2 alongside FlawedGrace, Snatch, and SDBbot. Targeting noted in the content includes the automotive industry in narrower campaigns and Japan-focused campaigns in 2019.
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Groups observed using it
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Get2 was, in turn, observed downloading FlawedGrace, FlawedAmmyy, Snatch, and SDBbot (a new RAT) as secondary payloads.
Techniques & procedures
26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
Execution
7 techniques
Execution
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using WMI/WMIC/wmiexec for remote execution, lateral movement, discovery, persistence, and administrative actions; e.g., 'APT41 used WMI in several ways, including for execution of commands via WMIEXEC as well as for persistence via PowerSploit' and 'Scattered Spider used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to move laterally via Impacket.'
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using PowerShell scripts/commands for execution, download, staging, reconnaissance, persistence, credential access, lateral movement, and defense evasion; e.g., "Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses."
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.
Emails contained the attachment 16.01.2018.doc which used macros to download the FlawedAmmyy RAT directly.
This JavaScript in turn downloads Quant Loader, which, in this case, fetched the FlawedAmmyy RAT as the final payload.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.
Stealth
2 techniques
Stealth
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
Discovery
6 techniques
Discovery
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking whether the current user is an administrator, enumerating user sessions, and gathering account details from compromised hosts.
avname Antivirus product name obtained via WMI query Windows Defender
The body of this packet contains cleartext key-value pairs: os Operating system ... pcname Computer name ... build_time Malware build time
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors identifying, monitoring, or enumerating connected peripheral devices such as USB mass storage, Bluetooth devices, printers, smart card readers, cameras, Apple devices, VGA/display devices, and removable drives.
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
Collection
2 techniques
Collection
Command and Control
4 techniques
Command and Control
The FlawedAmmyy C&C protocol occurs over port 443 with HTTP.
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2... Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers... numerous malware and groups sent victim data, files, credentials, or host information over existing C2 channels.
IOCs tracked for this family
44 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
Recent activity
41 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
FlawedAmmyy is a remote access trojan (RAT) used by threat actors for persistent access and control over compromised systems.
Remote access trojan that uses PowerShell to execute commands.
A RAT distributed as a secondary payload by Get2 and also noted as frequently distributed by TA505 in South Korea campaigns.
Remote access trojan derived from leaked Ammyy Admin v3 source code. Provides remote desktop control, file system management, proxy support, and audio chat, and is delivered via macro-enabled Office documents.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.