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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 1 actor

FlawedAmmyy

FlawedAmmyy is a remote access Trojan (RAT) first documented by Proofpoint and observed in use since the beginning of 2016 in both highly targeted email attacks and massive multi-million-message malspam campaigns. It is based on leaked source code from Version 3 of the Ammyy Admin remote desktop software. Reported capabilities include remote desktop control, file system management, proxy support, audio chat, command execution via PowerShell, screenshot capture, clipboard collection, antivirus discovery via WMI, current-user enumeration, smart-card detection, and exfiltration of collected host data to command-and-control (C2) servers. FlawedAmmyy / FlawedGrace is also described as attempting to communicate with C2 to enable download of additional malware components.

Delivery observed in the content is primarily email-based. Proofpoint linked major distribution activity to TA505, including Japan-focused campaigns in 2019 using malicious Microsoft Excel or Word attachments with macros, and large March 2018 campaigns using ZIP archives containing .url Internet Shortcut files that referenced SMB shares. In that infection chain, opening the .url file caused a JavaScript file to be downloaded and executed over SMB, which then downloaded Quant Loader, which fetched FlawedAmmyy as the final payload. Narrowly targeted campaigns in January and March 2018 used macro-enabled Word documents to download the RAT directly. The malware has also been observed installed via msiexec.exe, and TA505 was reported abusing .SettingContent-ms within PDF files to distribute FlawedAmmyy.

FlawedAmmyy communicates with C2 over HTTP on port 443. During the initial handshake, the client sends a first byte of '=' followed by 35 obfuscated and SEAL-encrypted bytes; after a server response of 0x2d00, it sends a second packet containing cleartext key-value pairs. Reported host profiling data sent to C2 includes an 8-digit malware ID, operating system, privilege level, username, computer name, antivirus product, smart-card presence, and malware build time. Identified infrastructure in the content includes C2 endpoints 179.60.146.3:443 and 194.165.16.11:443, the SMB URL file://buyviagraoverthecounterusabb.net/documents/B123456789012.js, Quant Loader infrastructure hxxp://wassronledorhad.in/q2/index.php, and a payload URL hxxp://balzantruck.com/45rt.exe.

The malware is associated in the content primarily with TA505. It was observed as a secondary payload downloaded by Get2 alongside FlawedGrace, Snatch, and SDBbot. Targeting noted in the content includes the automotive industry in narrower campaigns and Japan-focused campaigns in 2019.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TA505

Get2 was, in turn, observed downloading FlawedGrace, FlawedAmmyy, Snatch, and SDBbot (a new RAT) as secondary payloads.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

Proofpoint researchers have discovered a previously undocumented remote access Trojan (RAT) called FlawedAmmyy that has been used since the beginning of 2016 in both highly targeted email attacks as well as massive, multi-million message campaigns.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence4

The FlawedAmmyy RAT previously appeared on March 1 in a narrowly targeted attack. Emails contained an attachment 0103_022.doc ... Emails contained the attachment 16.01.2018.doc which used macros to download the FlawedAmmyy RAT directly.

Execution

7 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using WMI/WMIC/wmiexec for remote execution, lateral movement, discovery, persistence, and administrative actions; e.g., 'APT41 used WMI in several ways, including for execution of commands via WMIEXEC as well as for persistence via PowerSploit' and 'Scattered Spider used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to move laterally via Impacket.'

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using PowerShell scripts/commands for execution, download, staging, reconnaissance, persistence, credential access, lateral movement, and defense evasion; e.g., "Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses."

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

Emails contained the attachment 16.01.2018.doc which used macros to download the FlawedAmmyy RAT directly.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

This JavaScript in turn downloads Quant Loader, which, in this case, fetched the FlawedAmmyy RAT as the final payload.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

As a result, the system downloads and executes a JavaScript file over the SMB protocol rather than launching a web browser if the user clicks “Open” on the warning dialog shown in Figure 3.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

These documents contained macros that, when enabled, installed an instance of Emotet.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1070.004File DeletionEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

card 1 if a usable smart-card is inserted into a reader, 0 otherwise

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

Discovery

6 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking whether the current user is an administrator, enumerating user sessions, and gathering account details from compromised hosts.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

avname Antivirus product name obtained via WMI query Windows Defender

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

The body of this packet contains cleartext key-value pairs: os Operating system ... pcname Computer name ... build_time Malware build time

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors identifying, monitoring, or enumerating connected peripheral devices such as USB mass storage, Bluetooth devices, printers, smart card readers, cameras, Apple devices, VGA/display devices, and removable drives.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

card 1 if a usable smart-card is inserted into a reader, 0 otherwise

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

Examples include 'Action RAT can use WMI to gather AV products installed on an infected host,' 'FlawedAmmyy leverages WMI to enumerate anti-virus on the victim,' and 'TA2541 has used WMI to query targeted systems for security products.'

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

the attacker specified the URL to be a “file://” network share instead of the typical http:// link. As a result, the system downloads and executes a JavaScript file over the SMB protocol

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware collecting, stealing, identifying, copying, or staging files, documents, credentials, logs, databases, and other information from compromised hosts or local systems.

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

Agent Tesla can steal data from the victim’s clipboard. APT38 used a Trojan called KEYLIME to collect data from the clipboard. APT39 has used tools capable of stealing contents of the clipboard.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

The FlawedAmmyy C&C protocol occurs over port 443 with HTTP.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

Once URLZone determines the host environment is suitable, URLZone downloads Ursnif, which begins stealing information and operating as a more 'typical' banker.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

FlawedAmmyy is based on leaked source code for Version 3 of the Ammyy Admin remote desktop software.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2... Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers... numerous malware and groups sent victim data, files, credentials, or host information over existing C2 channels.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

44 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
11 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
25 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
8 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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IOC matching44

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping26

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.