Silence, also tracked as Whisper Spider and Silence Group, is a financially motivated cybercrime intrusion set known primarily for targeting banks and other financial institutions. The group has been active in the cybercrime ecosystem and has been associated with operations against banking organizations in Russia, Armenia, and Malaysia. Its tradecraft overlaps in part with other financially motivated bank-focused actors, including use of spearphishing to gain initial access and modular malware to expand capability after compromise. Silence commonly relies on spearphishing emails carrying malicious attachments, including document, archive, shortcut, and compiled help file formats, to induce user execution. After initial compromise, the group has used PowerShell, JavaScript, VBScript, Windows command-line execution, and native Windows API functionality to launch payloads and perform follow-on actions. It has also downloaded additional modules and malware to victim systems, indicating a staged and modular intrusion workflow. For persistence, Silence has used scheduled tasks as well as Registry Run keys and Startup-folder mechanisms. The group has modified Registry values and used Windows autostart extensibility points to survive reboots and maintain access. It has also employed masquerading, including naming a backdoor to resemble a legitimate Microsoft Office process, to reduce suspicion. Screen capture capability has been observed in its tooling, supporting operator surveillance and victim-environment awareness. Silence has also deleted artifacts such as scheduled tasks, transferred files, and logs to hinder forensic reconstruction and cover tracks. Overall, Silence is best characterized as a bank-focused cybercrime actor with capabilities spanning initial access, persistence, execution, payload staging, surveillance, and defense evasion.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
48 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
30 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
25 additional families tracked in Mallory.
8 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 8 of them exploited in the wild.
These spear-phishing emails used exploits for the following Windows and Office vulnerabilities CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-11882+CVE-2018-0802, CVE-2017-0262, CVE-2017-0263, and CVE-2018-8174.
These spear-phishing emails used exploits for the following Windows and Office vulnerabilities CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-11882+CVE-2018-0802, CVE-2017-0262, CVE-2017-0263, and CVE-2018-8174.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
These spear-phishing emails used exploits for the following Windows and Office vulnerabilities CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-11882+CVE-2018-0802, CVE-2017-0262, CVE-2017-0263, and CVE-2018-8174.
These spear-phishing emails used exploits for the following Windows and Office vulnerabilities CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-11882+CVE-2018-0802, CVE-2017-0262, CVE-2017-0263, and CVE-2018-8174.
3 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
62 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as one of many threat actors associated with the detection's ATT&CK-style annotations for PowerShell and DNS TXT command-and-control behavior; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Listed among detected threat actors/TTP references, but not substantively discussed in the report summary.
Listed as an associated threat actor in the detection annotation for a Linux usermod root UID set analytic; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Listed as an associated threat actor in detection annotations for Ghostscript exploitation; no specific campaign activity is described in this reference.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.