Skip to main content
Meet us at Black Hat USA 2026— Las Vegas, August 1–6Book a Meeting
Mallory
MalwareUsed by 3 actors

WellMess

WellMess is a lightweight backdoor malware family written in .NET and Golang, with both Windows and Linux/ELF variants observed. It enables a remote operator to establish encrypted command-and-control sessions and securely pass and execute scripts or commands on infected systems. Reported capabilities include executing PowerShell and batch or shell scripts received from C2, uploading and downloading files, command execution, exfiltrating data, collecting host and system information, collecting the current username, identifying domain group membership for the current user, and generating unique victim identifiers from host metadata. The malware has used Base64 encoding, including additional junk-data obfuscation, to uniquely identify communications and place victim metadata in HTTP Cookie headers. Communications have been protected with RC6-encrypted state data, dynamically generated AES session keys exchanged with RSA, and in some cases mutual TLS where client and server validate certificates; reporting also notes DNS tunneling support for C2. High-confidence indicators from CISA analysis of sampled variants include C2 IPs 85.93.2.116, 103.73.188.101, 141.98.212.55, 192.48.88.107, and 209.58.186.196. WellMess has been publicly associated with APT29/Cozy Bear, assessed as linked to Russia’s SVR, including operations targeting organizations involved in COVID-19 vaccine research and development in the US, UK, and Canada. Recorded Future also tracked related SVR-linked hosting patterns under the designation GRAVITYWELL.

Share:
For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
APT29

GRAVITYWELL, the Recorded Future designation for server technology and TLS certificate configuration commonly used to host the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)-linked WellMess backdoor...

via recorded future blogrecordedfuture.com
SVR

“…deployment of custom malware known as WellMess, WellMail, and Sorefang to target organizations involved in COVID-19 vaccine development.”

via cisa advisoriescisa.gov
APT-29

NCSC published an advisory describing malicious activity targeting institutions related to research to find a vaccine for COVID-19. In this case, the malware used in the attacks belongs to a family called WellMess...

via securelistsecurelist.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

The group then deployed publicly known exploits against the vulnerable systems it found, including popular Citrix, Pulse Secure, and Fortinet devices, among others.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

Specifically, APT29 uses a variety of tools and techniques, including spear phishing and custom malware known as “WellMess” and “WellMail”, according to the NCSC.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

The program is capable of encrypting, decrypting, uploading and downloading files. The malware can also execute commands and send and receive encrypted communications.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using PowerShell scripts/commands for execution, download, staging, reconnaissance, persistence, credential access, lateral movement, and defense evasion; e.g., "Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses."

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Company Name Microsoft Corporation File Description Power Settings Command-Line Tool Internal Name powercfg.exe Original Filename powercfg.exe

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Based on our observations, Russian state-attributed actors often use better operational security for C2 infrastructure... We also observe that when their C2 infrastructure is publicly reported upon, it is often quickly dispensed with.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, deobfuscating, or unpacking payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 responses prior to execution or use.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

These artifacts create detection opportunities for defenders, and include software versions deployed on the server, the login panel, TLS certificate patterns...

Discovery

5 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, nbtstat, netsh, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, domains, and network adapter/interface details.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking whether the current user is an administrator, enumerating user sessions, and gathering account details from compromised hosts.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

Both collect the state of system privileges (disabled or enabled) from the infected system

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The program is capable of encrypting, decrypting, uploading and downloading files... It performs functions based on the received commands: File upload File download

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

Displayed below is sample communication traffic between this WellMess implant and its C2 server. —Begin Sample Network Traffic— POST / HTTP/1.1 ... Cookie: ... | These implants allow a remote operator to establish encrypted command and control (C2) sessions... The function appears to be the main export of the DLL, which initiates a C2 session with the implants remote C2 server at the Internet Protocol (IP) address, 85.93.2.116.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

When the file is executed, it attempts to create a C2 connection to one of the following IP addresses: 141.98.212.55 over Transmission Control Protocol(TCP) Port 53 209.58.186.196 over TCP Port 443

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Both versions also allow an operator to pass AES encrypted executable scripts to infected systems... The malware can receive and parse messages from the remote operator.

T1132Data EncodingEvidence2

C2 traffic from ADVSTORESHELL is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding... APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server... APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using SSL, TLS, HTTPS, RSA, AES, Blowfish, RC4, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman, OpenSSL, WolfSSL, and mutual TLS to protect command and control traffic.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence1

"communicate with C2 over mutual TLS"; "client and server mutually check certificates"; "can use mutual TLS and RSA cryptography to exchange a session key". | Multiple malware families and intrusion sets are described as encrypting C2 traffic using SSL/TLS/HTTPS (e.g., "used HTTPS for command and control", "encrypts C2 communications with TLS", "uses SSL for encrypting C2 communications", "TLS-encrypted WebSocket Protocol (WSS) for C2").

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence4

Many entries state malware or actors can upload, transfer, send, or exfiltrate files from compromised hosts to command-and-control servers or attacker infrastructure.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

47 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
5 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
38 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
4 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching47

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping22

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.