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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 10 actorsExploits 3 CVEs

RansomHub

RansomHub is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation that emerged in February 2024 and rapidly became one of the most active and prolific ransomware groups following the disruption of LockBit and the collapse of ALPHV/BlackCat. Reporting in the provided content states that many displaced affiliates migrated to RansomHub, including operators associated with Scattered Spider/Octo Tempest, and that the group advertised favorable affiliate terms such as a 90% revenue share, direct payment receipt, and support for Windows, Linux, and ESXi encryptors. The encryptor is reported to be based on repurposed Knight source code rather than written from scratch, and some builds were password-protected. RansomHub was also associated with the custom BYOVD-based EDR killer EDRKillShifter, which ESET and Sophos describe as developed and maintained by RansomHub and later observed in intrusions tied to multiple ransomware brands, suggesting affiliate or tooling overlap across Play, Medusa, BianLian, and others.

The content links RansomHub to multiple initial access and delivery ecosystems. TA569’s SocGholish/FakeUpdates activity has been linked to downstream RansomHub deployment, with Orange Cyber Defense observing SocGholish delivering loaders such as GhoLoader and MintsLoader that ultimately led to payloads including GhostWeaver, LockBit, and RansomHub ransomware. Mandiant also describes a 2025 case in which FAKEUPDATES activity was followed by interactive intrusion activity and deployment of RansomHub across Windows and virtual management servers. Red Canary notes that attackers have exploited Apache ActiveMQ CVE-2023-46604 to deploy RansomHub, and other reporting in the content references exploitation of that vulnerability to spread RansomHub alongside TellYouThePass and HelloKitty. Huntress characterizes actors such as Play and RansomHub as entering environments with a clear plan and moving quickly toward ransomware deployment.

Operationally, the content explicitly states that RansomHub can enumerate all accessible machines from an infected system, indicating built-in remote system discovery capability. Multiple reports also associate RansomHub intrusions with rapid post-compromise actions, data theft, double extortion, and use of defense-evasion tooling such as AV/EDR killers. In healthcare, Trellix states that RansomHub’s affiliate model enabled some of the most damaging attacks on the sector in 2025. More broadly, the group is described as having significant market share in 2024 and being among the top ransomware brands by victim volume.

The content repeatedly associates RansomHub with Scattered Spider/UNC3944/Octo Tempest, stating that this actor added RansomHub to its ransomware payloads in 2024 and partnered with Russian ransomware gangs including RansomHub. Additional reporting notes alleged ties to Evil Corp through the broader ecosystem around TA569 and affiliate activity, but the content does not establish direct attribution of RansomHub itself to Evil Corp. The group is also referenced under the Scorpius naming convention as 'Spoiled Scorpius.'

Regarding lifecycle and status, the provided reporting indicates that RansomHub went offline around April 2025. Several sources in the content state that DragonForce claimed a partnership or transfer of RansomHub infrastructure, and S2W specifically states that RansomHub was taken over by DragonForce and shut down completely. Other reporting notes that at least part of the threat group likely migrated to Qilin, and later ecosystem summaries list RansomHub among major brands that became dormant or ceased operations in 2025.

High-confidence indicators and artifacts directly mentioned in the content include the malware name RansomHub; association with EDRKillShifter; observed use after SocGholish/FakeUpdates delivery; exploitation chains involving CVE-2023-46604; and operational overlap with affiliates and tooling seen across Play, Medusa, BianLian, DragonForce, and Scattered Spider-linked campaigns.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

3 CVES
CVE-2023-46604Apache ActiveMQ OpenWire Remote Code ExecutionExploited in the wild

Red Canary detected an adversary executing discovery commands on dozens of cloud-based Linux endpoints vulnerable to a critical remote code vulnerability (CVE-2023-46604) in Apache ActiveMQ... Security researchers have previously identified adversaries exploiting CVE-2023-46604 for malware deployment, to spread TellYouThePass, Ransomhub and HelloKitty ransomware, along with Kinsing... Finally, the adversary used curl to download two ActiveMQ JAR files... These two JAR files constitute a legitimate patch for CVE-2023-46604. | Security researchers have previously identified adversaries exploiting CVE-2023-46604 for malware deployment, to spread TellYouThePass, Ransomhub and HelloKitty ransomware...

via red canary blogredcanary.com
CVE-2024-37085VMware ESXi Active Directory Integration Authentication Bypass

Ransomware groups—including BlackCat/ALPHV, Black Basta, RansomHub, and Dark Angels—are increasingly targeting VMware ESXi...

via huntio blogblog.alphahunt.io
CVE-2024-55591Authentication Bypass in FortiOS and FortiProxy Node.js WebSocket ModuleExploited in the wild

Fortinet FortiOS CVE-2024-55591, a zero-day authentication bypass vulnerability disclosed in January 2025, had the highest count of ransomware groups attached to it as the year closed, with six named ransomware families (DragonForce, Hunters International, NightSpire, Qilin, RansomHub, and SuperBlack)...

via industrialcyberindustrialcyber.co
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

10 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Scattered Spider

Ransomhub is a RaaS group that first appeared in February 2024 and is known to have gained affiliates such as Scattered Spider through its early dark web outreach, which has resulted in many victimized organizations.

via medium s2wblogmedium.com
DragonForce

The user @dragonforce ... stated, “It has been decided that RansomHub’s infrastructure will be transferred to DragonForce, and the two groups are in a partnership.”

via medium s2wblogmedium.com
RansomHub

These RaaS programs include: Akira (Howling Scorpius) ALPHV (Ambitious Scorpius) DragonForce (Slippery Scorpius) Play (Fiddling Scorpius) Qilin (Spikey Scorpius) RansomHub (Spoiled Scorpius)

via palo alto networks unit 42 blogunit42.paloaltonetworks.com
GOLD HARVEST

RansomHub is one of the most prolific groups to emerge following the LockBit disruption and ALPHV (also known as BlackCat) demise in 2024.

via sophos threat researchnews.sophos.com
Indrik Spider

New to the top three market share boards were RansomHub and Fog ransomware. RansomHub has been gaining share throughout 2024, despite its alleged ties to Evil Corp.

via coveware blogcoveware.com
Andariel

RansomHub, a new RaaS gang that emerged around the time of Operation Cronos... It is also worth mentioning that RansomHub’s encryptor is not written from scratch, but based on repurposed code from Knight.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Operators leveraged compromised valid accounts in 75 percent of ransomware engagements this quarter to obtain initial access and/or execute ransomware on targeted systems.

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

The framework acts as a JavaScript-based dropper, deploying various malware families as part of drive-by downloads, including ransomware, banking trojans, spyware, and more...

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

Red Canary detected an adversary executing discovery commands on dozens of cloud-based Linux endpoints vulnerable to a critical remote code vulnerability (CVE-2023-46604) in Apache ActiveMQ.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Operators leveraged compromised valid accounts in 75 percent of ransomware engagements this quarter to obtain initial access and/or execute ransomware on targeted systems.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Operators leveraged compromised valid accounts in 75 percent of ransomware engagements this quarter to obtain initial access and/or execute ransomware on targeted systems.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

Examples throughout the content include 'encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory,' 'encrypts its configuration file,' 'AES-encrypted resource,' 'RC4 encrypted embedded scripts,' and 'payload includes an encrypted main component.'

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Many entries explicitly describe deleting artifacts 'to cover tracks,' 'evade detection,' 'remove evidence,' 'reduce their footprint,' or as part of 'post-intrusion cleanup process.' Examples include APT28 deleting files to cover tracks, FIN5 using SDelete to clean up the environment, and Dragonfly deleting operational files as part of cleanup.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware deleting files, directories, droppers, scripts, logs, archives, staged data, and other artifacts from compromised systems, e.g., 'APT29 has used SDelete to remove artifacts from victim networks' and 'Lazarus Group malware has deleted files in various ways, including "suicide scripts" to delete malware binaries from the victim.'

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Operators leveraged compromised valid accounts in 75 percent of ransomware engagements this quarter to obtain initial access and/or execute ransomware on targeted systems.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, or deobfuscating payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 traffic prior to execution or use, e.g., 'APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload' and 'Action RAT can use Base64 to decode actor-controlled C2 server communications.'

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

"RansomHub can retrieve information about virtual machines" and "OopsIE checks for information on the CPU fan, temperature, mouse, hard disk, and motherboard as part of its anti-VM checks."

Credential Access

1 technique
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

In a RansomHub engagement, affiliates leveraged a compromised Administrator account to execute the ransomware, dump credentials, and run scans using a commercial network scanning tool.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence1

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team remotely discovered systems over LAN connections. OT systems were visible from the IT network as well, giving adversaries the ability to discover operational assets.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

"RansomHub can retrieve information about virtual machines" and "OopsIE checks for information on the CPU fan, temperature, mouse, hard disk, and motherboard as part of its anti-VM checks."

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Once active, SocGholish connects to its C2 infrastructure and deploys a variety of second-stage payloads. We have observed it delivering loaders like Gholoader and MintsLoader.

Exfiltration

3 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

GTIG observed confirmed or suspected data theft in approximately 77% of ransomware intrusions — a steep jump from 57% the year before. Attackers now frequently steal sensitive files before deploying encryption, threatening to post the stolen data publicly on leak sites even if victims manage to restore their systems from backup.

T1537Transfer Data to Cloud AccountEvidence1

Scattered Spider threat actors typically engage in data theft for extortion using multiple social engineering techniques...

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

resulting in the exfiltration of a significant volume of confidential data... the group ultimately released the stolen data, purportedly amounting to 200 GB, onto the dark web.

Impact

4 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence15

Some ransomware operators do not allow targeting (encrypting and exfiltrating data) of non-profit organizations, healthcare, and government entities...

T1489Service StopEvidence1

Apostle retrieves a list of all running processes on a victim host, and stops all services containing the string "sql," likely to propagate ransomware activity to database files. LockBit 3.0 can identify and terminate specific services. RansomHub can stop processes associated with files currently in use to maximize the impact of encryption.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence2

Operators have moved beyond dual-threat encryption-and-theft operations toward systematically denying organizations the ability to recover, targeting identity services, virtualization management planes, and backup infrastructure.

T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

Despite extending the deadline for a ransom payment, the group ultimately released the stolen data

Other

3 techniques
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence1

We have seen one payload of particular concern — an AV killer tool among the payloads. In multiple cases, this tool was detected during an ongoing ransomware attack.

T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

We have seen one payload of particular concern — an AV killer tool among the payloads... the extracted payload... is the AVKiller again, packed this time with VMProtect and specifically targeting Eset, HitManPro, Kaspersky, Sophos, and Symantec products.

T1656ImpersonationEvidence1

Scattered Spider is the designation given to a threat actor that's known for its sophisticated social engineering schemes to breach targets and establish persistence for follow-on exploitation and data theft.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
5 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
6 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app22 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching11

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution10

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities3

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping26

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.