RansomHub
RansomHub is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation that emerged in February 2024 and rapidly became one of the most active and prolific ransomware groups following the disruption of LockBit and the collapse of ALPHV/BlackCat. Reporting in the provided content states that many displaced affiliates migrated to RansomHub, including operators associated with Scattered Spider/Octo Tempest, and that the group advertised favorable affiliate terms such as a 90% revenue share, direct payment receipt, and support for Windows, Linux, and ESXi encryptors. The encryptor is reported to be based on repurposed Knight source code rather than written from scratch, and some builds were password-protected. RansomHub was also associated with the custom BYOVD-based EDR killer EDRKillShifter, which ESET and Sophos describe as developed and maintained by RansomHub and later observed in intrusions tied to multiple ransomware brands, suggesting affiliate or tooling overlap across Play, Medusa, BianLian, and others.
The content links RansomHub to multiple initial access and delivery ecosystems. TA569’s SocGholish/FakeUpdates activity has been linked to downstream RansomHub deployment, with Orange Cyber Defense observing SocGholish delivering loaders such as GhoLoader and MintsLoader that ultimately led to payloads including GhostWeaver, LockBit, and RansomHub ransomware. Mandiant also describes a 2025 case in which FAKEUPDATES activity was followed by interactive intrusion activity and deployment of RansomHub across Windows and virtual management servers. Red Canary notes that attackers have exploited Apache ActiveMQ CVE-2023-46604 to deploy RansomHub, and other reporting in the content references exploitation of that vulnerability to spread RansomHub alongside TellYouThePass and HelloKitty. Huntress characterizes actors such as Play and RansomHub as entering environments with a clear plan and moving quickly toward ransomware deployment.
Operationally, the content explicitly states that RansomHub can enumerate all accessible machines from an infected system, indicating built-in remote system discovery capability. Multiple reports also associate RansomHub intrusions with rapid post-compromise actions, data theft, double extortion, and use of defense-evasion tooling such as AV/EDR killers. In healthcare, Trellix states that RansomHub’s affiliate model enabled some of the most damaging attacks on the sector in 2025. More broadly, the group is described as having significant market share in 2024 and being among the top ransomware brands by victim volume.
The content repeatedly associates RansomHub with Scattered Spider/UNC3944/Octo Tempest, stating that this actor added RansomHub to its ransomware payloads in 2024 and partnered with Russian ransomware gangs including RansomHub. Additional reporting notes alleged ties to Evil Corp through the broader ecosystem around TA569 and affiliate activity, but the content does not establish direct attribution of RansomHub itself to Evil Corp. The group is also referenced under the Scorpius naming convention as 'Spoiled Scorpius.'
Regarding lifecycle and status, the provided reporting indicates that RansomHub went offline around April 2025. Several sources in the content state that DragonForce claimed a partnership or transfer of RansomHub infrastructure, and S2W specifically states that RansomHub was taken over by DragonForce and shut down completely. Other reporting notes that at least part of the threat group likely migrated to Qilin, and later ecosystem summaries list RansomHub among major brands that became dormant or ceased operations in 2025.
High-confidence indicators and artifacts directly mentioned in the content include the malware name RansomHub; association with EDRKillShifter; observed use after SocGholish/FakeUpdates delivery; exploitation chains involving CVE-2023-46604; and operational overlap with affiliates and tooling seen across Play, Medusa, BianLian, DragonForce, and Scattered Spider-linked campaigns.
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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
Vulnerabilities exploited
3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Red Canary detected an adversary executing discovery commands on dozens of cloud-based Linux endpoints vulnerable to a critical remote code vulnerability (CVE-2023-46604) in Apache ActiveMQ... Security researchers have previously identified adversaries exploiting CVE-2023-46604 for malware deployment, to spread TellYouThePass, Ransomhub and HelloKitty ransomware, along with Kinsing... Finally, the adversary used curl to download two ActiveMQ JAR files... These two JAR files constitute a legitimate patch for CVE-2023-46604. | Security researchers have previously identified adversaries exploiting CVE-2023-46604 for malware deployment, to spread TellYouThePass, Ransomhub and HelloKitty ransomware...
Ransomware groups—including BlackCat/ALPHV, Black Basta, RansomHub, and Dark Angels—are increasingly targeting VMware ESXi...
Fortinet FortiOS CVE-2024-55591, a zero-day authentication bypass vulnerability disclosed in January 2025, had the highest count of ransomware groups attached to it as the year closed, with six named ransomware families (DragonForce, Hunters International, NightSpire, Qilin, RansomHub, and SuperBlack)...
Groups observed using it
10 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Ransomhub is a RaaS group that first appeared in February 2024 and is known to have gained affiliates such as Scattered Spider through its early dark web outreach, which has resulted in many victimized organizations.
The user @dragonforce ... stated, “It has been decided that RansomHub’s infrastructure will be transferred to DragonForce, and the two groups are in a partnership.”
These RaaS programs include: Akira (Howling Scorpius) ALPHV (Ambitious Scorpius) DragonForce (Slippery Scorpius) Play (Fiddling Scorpius) Qilin (Spikey Scorpius) RansomHub (Spoiled Scorpius)
RansomHub is one of the most prolific groups to emerge following the LockBit disruption and ALPHV (also known as BlackCat) demise in 2024.
New to the top three market share boards were RansomHub and Fog ransomware. RansomHub has been gaining share throughout 2024, despite its alleged ties to Evil Corp.
RansomHub, a new RaaS gang that emerged around the time of Operation Cronos... It is also worth mentioning that RansomHub’s encryptor is not written from scratch, but based on repurposed code from Knight.
Techniques & procedures
26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
Operators leveraged compromised valid accounts in 75 percent of ransomware engagements this quarter to obtain initial access and/or execute ransomware on targeted systems.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
Operators leveraged compromised valid accounts in 75 percent of ransomware engagements this quarter to obtain initial access and/or execute ransomware on targeted systems.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.
Stealth
7 techniques
Stealth
The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.
Examples throughout the content include 'encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory,' 'encrypts its configuration file,' 'AES-encrypted resource,' 'RC4 encrypted embedded scripts,' and 'payload includes an encrypted main component.'
Many entries explicitly describe deleting artifacts 'to cover tracks,' 'evade detection,' 'remove evidence,' 'reduce their footprint,' or as part of 'post-intrusion cleanup process.' Examples include APT28 deleting files to cover tracks, FIN5 using SDelete to clean up the environment, and Dragonfly deleting operational files as part of cleanup.
The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware deleting files, directories, droppers, scripts, logs, archives, staged data, and other artifacts from compromised systems, e.g., 'APT29 has used SDelete to remove artifacts from victim networks' and 'Lazarus Group malware has deleted files in various ways, including "suicide scripts" to delete malware binaries from the victim.'
Operators leveraged compromised valid accounts in 75 percent of ransomware engagements this quarter to obtain initial access and/or execute ransomware on targeted systems.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, or deobfuscating payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 traffic prior to execution or use, e.g., 'APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload' and 'Action RAT can use Base64 to decode actor-controlled C2 server communications.'
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
Discovery
4 techniques
Discovery
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team remotely discovered systems over LAN connections. OT systems were visible from the IT network as well, giving adversaries the ability to discover operational assets.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
Exfiltration
3 techniques
Exfiltration
GTIG observed confirmed or suspected data theft in approximately 77% of ransomware intrusions — a steep jump from 57% the year before. Attackers now frequently steal sensitive files before deploying encryption, threatening to post the stolen data publicly on leak sites even if victims manage to restore their systems from backup.
Impact
4 techniques
Impact
Some ransomware operators do not allow targeting (encrypting and exfiltrating data) of non-profit organizations, healthcare, and government entities...
Apostle retrieves a list of all running processes on a victim host, and stops all services containing the string "sql," likely to propagate ransomware activity to database files. LockBit 3.0 can identify and terminate specific services. RansomHub can stop processes associated with files currently in use to maximize the impact of encryption.
Other
3 techniques
Other
We have seen one payload of particular concern — an AV killer tool among the payloads. In multiple cases, this tool was detected during an ongoing ransomware attack.
IOCs tracked for this family
11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Recent activity
114 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A ransomware family explicitly linked in the content as associated with SocGholish activity and downstream loader chains.
A ransomware family observed as a downstream payload in SocGholish delivery chains.
A ransomware operation that absorbed affiliates from disrupted groups and later lost prominence after going quiet.
A ransomware platform cited as one of the destinations for affiliates after major RaaS takedowns.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.