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🇰🇵 KP4 malware familiesExploits CVEs in the wild

WageMole

Also known asDPRK IT Worker Activitydprk it worker networkDPRK IT Worker OperationsDPRK IT Worker ProgramDPRK IT Worker Schemesdprk_it_workersitwNorth Korean IT Worker SchemesWageMole

WageMole is a North Korea-linked, state-sponsored threat activity cluster associated with the DPRK IT worker scheme. It is tracked as WageMole by ESET, and overlapping activity is also labeled UNC5267 and Jasper Sleet by other researchers. The activity involves operators posing as job seekers and using stolen, fabricated, or synthetic identities to obtain remote employment, particularly at Western companies, including organizations in the U.S. and Europe. Reported objectives include generating revenue for the DPRK regime and gaining footholds inside victim organizations. The cluster uses social engineering and fraudulent recruiting tradecraft, including forged resumes, fake LinkedIn and GitHub profiles, fabricated references, stolen personal data, fake passports and driver’s licenses, and AI-assisted or deepfake-enabled interviews. Reported recruitment and employment platforms include Upwork, Indeed, Freelancer, Telegram, and other job sites. Facilitators have been reported to help with account creation, bank accounts, mobile numbers or SIM cards, identity verification, and laptop farms in the victim’s country, while operators conceal location through VPNs, proxies, RMM tools, and VPS infrastructure. WageMole has been linked to fake front companies used to support recruitment lures and malicious GitHub activity, including DredSoftLabs, MetaMint Studio, MegaMint Studio, and JSoft Labs. Reporting cited in the content attributes DredSoftLabs to WageMole with high confidence and ties the activity to malicious GitHub repositories used in fake coding tests or interview tasks that ultimately deliver BeaverTail or OtterCookie malware. The content also states that WageMole overlaps with the related North Korea-linked activity cluster DeceptiveDevelopment, with ESET reporting that DeceptiveDevelopment appears to hand off stolen victim information to WageMole. Unit 42 distinguishes WageMole from Contagious Interview, describing the latter as malware delivery through fake interviews while WageMole focuses on fraudulent job-seeking and employment infiltration. Targets mentioned in the content include small to mid-sized businesses, Western companies, the U.S. tech sector, and in Europe particularly defense industrial base and government organizations. Reported risks include insider access, sensitive data theft, extortion by recently fired workers, and use of corporate access for further malicious activity.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Software & Services
  • Financial Services

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • KP
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

52 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

14 of 15 tactics60 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0043
Reconnaissance
2 techniques
T1589
Gather Victim Identity Information
T1589.001
Credentials
T1598×6
Phishing for Information
TA0042
Resource Development
4 techniques
T1583
Acquire Infrastructure
T1583.001
Domains
T1583.006
Web Services
T1584
Compromise Infrastructure
T1584.001
Domains
T1585×5
Establish Accounts
T1586×2
Compromise Accounts
TA0001
Initial Access
6 techniques
T1078×12
Valid Accounts
T1133
External Remote Services
T1189
Drive-by Compromise
T1195
Supply Chain Compromise
T1195.001
Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
T1199×2
Trusted Relationship
T1566
Phishing
T1566.001
Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002
Spearphishing Link
T1566.003×3
Spearphishing via Service
TA0002
Execution
2 techniques
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001
PowerShell
T1059.005
Visual Basic
T1059.006
Python
T1059.007
JavaScript
T1204
User Execution
T1204.002
Malicious File
TA0003
Persistence
3 techniques
T1078×12
Valid Accounts
T1133
External Remote Services
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
T1078×12
Valid Accounts
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1611
Escape to Host
TA0005
Stealth
3 techniques
T1027×2
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1036×12
Masquerading
T1078×12
Valid Accounts
TA0006
Credential Access
3 techniques
T1539
Steal Web Session Cookie
T1555
Credentials from Password Stores
T1649
Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
TA0007
Discovery
2 techniques
T1082
System Information Discovery
T1083
File and Directory Discovery
TA0008
Lateral Movement
3 techniques
T1021×4
Remote Services
T1210
Exploitation of Remote Services
T1534
Internal Spearphishing
TA0009
Collection
2 techniques
T1005
Data from Local System
T1560
Archive Collected Data
TA0011
Command and Control
5 techniques
T1071×2
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001
Web Protocols
T1090×2
Proxy
T1090.002
External Proxy
T1090.003×2
Multi-hop Proxy
T1105×2
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219×2
Remote Access Tools
T1572
Protocol Tunneling
TA0010
Exfiltration
2 techniques
T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1537
Transfer Data to Cloud Account
TA0040
Impact
2 techniques
T1486×4
Data Encrypted for Impact
T1657
Financial Theft
IOCS

Observables

233 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping52

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal4

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs1

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables233

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.

WageMole | Mallory