Keksec, also known as Kek Security and #keksec, is a financially motivated cybercrime group formed in 2016 by experienced botnet operators. It develops, operates, and distributes malware for distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, DDoS-based extortion, cryptocurrency mining, information theft, and underground malware sales. Its operations compromise Linux and Windows systems, including internet-facing servers, routers, cameras, and other IoT devices. Gaming services are among its DDoS targets, while its propagation campaigns broadly seek vulnerable systems rather than a consistently defined geographic victim population. Keksec's malware portfolio includes Necro, Gafgyt and Gafgyt_tor variants, Tsunami, EnemyBot, Cloud9, DarkIRC, and DarkHTTP. The group extensively modifies leaked and open-source malware and rapidly incorporates publicly disclosed vulnerabilities into self-propagating botnets. Initial access commonly combines internet-wide scanning, exploitation of exposed applications and network devices, and brute-force attacks against weak or default Telnet and SSH credentials. EnemyBot supports multiple processor architectures and extends targeting to web servers, content management systems, and exposed Android Debug Bridge services. The group's tooling supports remote command execution, additional payload delivery, network sniffing, credential theft, keylogging, browser-cookie theft, clipboard interception, and data exfiltration. Necro can inject Cloud9 browser malware into compromised websites, enabling browser-based mining, information theft, and DDoS activity. Persistence mechanisms include scheduled jobs and Windows autorun entries. Defense evasion includes process-name disguise, string encryption and obfuscation, code morphing, and injection of the r77 rootkit into Windows processes. Tor-based command-and-control and domain-generation algorithms provide infrastructure concealment and resilience. Keksec maintains multiple botnet families in parallel and frequently updates their propagation and attack capabilities.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
57 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
21 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
16 additional families tracked in Mallory.
29 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 29 of them exploited in the wild.
CVE-2014-9118: ZHOME S3.0.501 – Remote Code Execution.
CVE-2015-2051: D-Link devices – HNAP SOAPAction.
CVE-2017-18368: Zyxel P660HN – Unauthenticated Command Injection.
CVE-2018-10823: D-Link WR – Remote Code Execution.
CVE-2020-17456: SEO WON INTECH SLC-130 SLR-120S – Remote Code Execution.
24 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
273 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Suspected ecosystem linked via shared infrastructure to the operator behind TuxBot v3 Evolution; no confirmed attribution is made.
Operates multiple parallel IoT botnets; TuxBot is assessed as part of its ecosystem.
An IoT botnet operator ecosystem linked to TuxBot through shared infrastructure with Kaitori v3.9 and AISURU; known for running multiple IoT botnet variants in parallel.
Infrastructure overlap with TuxBot through shared hosting and certificate artifacts; not stated to be the same malware/codebase.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.