Loading threat actor…
Nexus Zeta is a United States-based cybercriminal associated with the development and operation of Mirai-derived Internet of Things botnets, including Satori, Masuta, and PureMasuta. The handle has been linked to Kenneth Currin Schuchman of Vancouver, Washington, who was federally indicted on Computer Fraud and Abuse Act charges concerning alleged malware activity in 2017. Another associated online handle is 9gigs_ProxyPipe. The actor's operations compromised wireless routers and other IoT devices to build botnets capable of large-scale distributed denial-of-service attacks. Satori spread rapidly in late 2017, compromising hundreds of thousands of devices. Exploitation activity was observed worldwide, particularly in the United States, Italy, Germany, and Egypt. Targets of associated DDoS activity included the infrastructure provider ProxyPipe. The associated malware incorporated vulnerability exploitation to expand beyond the default-credential attacks characteristic of the original Mirai. Satori exploited router vulnerabilities including CVE-2017-17215 in Huawei HG532 devices and CVE-2014-8361. PureMasuta exploited a D-Link HNAP flaw combining authentication bypass with command execution through crafted SOAP requests. Compromised devices scanned for additional vulnerable systems and received centralized instructions to generate TCP or UDP floods against individual hosts or network ranges. Links between Masuta and PureMasuta included shared command-and-control infrastructure and analysis of leaked source code.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
3 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
5 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
2 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 2 of them exploited in the wild.
A Zero-Day vulnerability (CVE-2017-17215) in the Huawei home router HG532 has been discovered by Check Point Researchers, and hundreds of thousands of attempts to exploit it have already been found in the wild. The delivered payload has been identified as OKIRU/SATORI, an updated variant of Mirai.
The threat actor has already been observed in implementing two other known SOAP related exploits, CVE-2014–8361 and CVE-2017–17215 in his Satori botnet project.
4 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Alleged operator/author of the Satori (Masuta) IoT botnet, which infected hundreds of thousands of routers and IoT devices and was used for large-scale DDoS activity.
Linked to the Mirai variants Satori/Okiru, Masuta, and PureMasuta, and associated with attacks against Huawei routers and growth of IoT botnets using SOAP-related exploits.
Suspected operator behind attacks exploiting Huawei HG532 routers to spread Mirai Okiru, also known as Satori, and build an IoT botnet capable of DDoS attacks. Researchers linked the actor to the botnet through a domain-registration email address matching an account on HackForums. Attribution remained tentative, and how the actor obtained the exploit was unclear.
Suspected operator behind widespread exploitation of Huawei HG532 routers to deploy OKIRU/SATORI, a Mirai variant supporting UDP and TCP flooding attacks. Attribution rests on a botnet domain-registration email and linked forum and social-media accounts. Researchers characterize the actor as an apparently inexperienced but motivated individual; neither responsibility nor how the actor obtained the zero-day is conclusively established.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.