CVE-2014-8361 is an OS command injection vulnerability in the UPnP miniigd SOAP service distributed with the Realtek SDK. Insufficient filtering of user-controlled data before system calls allows a crafted NewInternalClient request to trigger arbitrary command or code execution. Affected implementations occur in routers and other network devices from vendors including D-Link, NEC Aterm, ELECOM, and Buffalo; affected firmware boundaries vary by model and hardware revision. Exploitation has been documented in the wild, including use by multiple IoT botnets for propagation.
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2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/linux/http/dlink_upnp_exec_noauth.rb) targeting D-Link routers (specifically DIR-865 and DIR-645) vulnerable to unauthenticated OS command injection via the UPnP SOAP interface (CVE-2014-8361). The exploit works by sending a crafted SOAP AddPortMapping request to the /soap.cgi endpoint, injecting arbitrary shell commands into the NewInternalClient field. The module uses Metasploit's command stager to deliver payloads, supporting both MIPS Little Endian and Big Endian architectures. The exploit is blind (no command output is returned) and requires the target's UPnP SOAP web interface to be accessible (default port 49152). The module includes a check method to verify if the target is a D-Link device by requesting /InternetGatewayDevice.xml and looking for a model number. The code is operational and ready for use within the Metasploit framework.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/linux/http/realtek_miniigd_upnp_exec_noauth.rb) targeting a command injection vulnerability (CVE-2014-8361) in the Realtek SDK miniigd UPnP SOAP interface. The exploit is unauthenticated and works by sending a crafted SOAP request to the /wanipcn.xml endpoint, injecting arbitrary OS commands via the NewInternalClient field. The module supports both MIPS Little Endian and Big Endian architectures, and uses Metasploit's command stager to deploy payloads. The exploit checks for the presence of the vulnerable service by requesting /picsdesc.xml and looking for a specific server header. The main attack vector is network-based, requiring access to the device's UPnP SOAP web interface (default port 52869). The exploit is operational and can be used to gain remote code execution on affected devices, such as the Trendnet TEW-731BR router. No authentication is required, making this a high-impact vulnerability for exposed devices.
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A vulnerability associated with Realtek Miniigd UPnP, identified in observed router-worm scanning activity. The content does not provide technical details, confirm successful compromise, or name the worm family.
A vulnerability affecting a Realtek device, included among ClingSTUN's hard-coded exploits for spreading to additional IoT systems. The article establishes an embedded exploitation capability but does not explicitly confirm successful in-the-wild exploitation of this particular flaw.
A SOAP command injection vulnerability in Realtek SDK miniigd. ClingSTUN contains an exploit for self-propagation, but the article does not separately confirm successful in-the-wild exploitation of this specific flaw.
A remote code execution vulnerability affecting Realtek SDK. Cling contains exploit logic for this flaw, but the content does not establish observed exploitation of this specific vulnerability.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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