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CVE-2014-8361 is a remote code execution vulnerability in the miniigd UPnP SOAP service included in the Realtek SDK and used by multiple embedded and IoT devices. The flaw is triggered by sending a crafted SOAP request containing a malicious NewInternalClient parameter in a NewInternalClient/AddPortMapping-style request to the exposed miniigd service. Available reporting characterizes the issue as OS command injection in the UPnP SOAP interface, allowing attacker-supplied input to be interpreted as shell commands by the vulnerable service. The vulnerability has been widely incorporated into Mirai- and Gafgyt-derived botnets and was reported as exploited in the wild through 2023.
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2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/linux/http/dlink_upnp_exec_noauth.rb) targeting D-Link routers (specifically DIR-865 and DIR-645) vulnerable to unauthenticated OS command injection via the UPnP SOAP interface (CVE-2014-8361). The exploit works by sending a crafted SOAP AddPortMapping request to the /soap.cgi endpoint, injecting arbitrary shell commands into the NewInternalClient field. The module uses Metasploit's command stager to deliver payloads, supporting both MIPS Little Endian and Big Endian architectures. The exploit is blind (no command output is returned) and requires the target's UPnP SOAP web interface to be accessible (default port 49152). The module includes a check method to verify if the target is a D-Link device by requesting /InternetGatewayDevice.xml and looking for a model number. The code is operational and ready for use within the Metasploit framework.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/linux/http/realtek_miniigd_upnp_exec_noauth.rb) targeting a command injection vulnerability (CVE-2014-8361) in the Realtek SDK miniigd UPnP SOAP interface. The exploit is unauthenticated and works by sending a crafted SOAP request to the /wanipcn.xml endpoint, injecting arbitrary OS commands via the NewInternalClient field. The module supports both MIPS Little Endian and Big Endian architectures, and uses Metasploit's command stager to deploy payloads. The exploit checks for the presence of the vulnerable service by requesting /picsdesc.xml and looking for a specific server header. The main attack vector is network-based, requiring access to the device's UPnP SOAP web interface (default port 52869). The exploit is operational and can be used to gain remote code execution on affected devices, such as the Trendnet TEW-731BR router. No authentication is required, making this a high-impact vulnerability for exposed devices.
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
23 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A specific CVE for which exploit code is implemented in native C inside TuxBot, but the exploit engine is dead code and never called at runtime in the analyzed version.
A specific vulnerability included among the exploit targets used by the Gitpaste-12/X10-unix cryptomining worm.
A high-severity vulnerability in Realtek SDK-based IoT and network equipment that continues to appear in exploitation-focused detections, with exploit code available.
A known vulnerability being actively scanned for by Moobot botnet infrastructure against Tenda routers.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.