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Bearlyfy, also known as Labubu, is a pro-Ukrainian ransomware and sabotage group active since January 2025. It has been attributed more than 70 attacks against Russian companies, progressing from smaller businesses to large industrial enterprises. Its operations combine financial extortion with politically motivated disruption, including encryption, destruction, and modification of victim data. Its political alignment does not establish its geographic origin or state sponsorship. Bearlyfy gains initial access by exploiting exposed services and vulnerable applications and uses MeshAgent for remote access. Its operations are characterized by limited preparation and rapid encryption. Early campaigns employed LockBit 3 Black and a modified Babuk variant, including against Linux systems; a modified PolyVice variant entered its toolset in May 2025. Since March 2026, the group has deployed its own Windows ransomware, GenieLocker, which incorporates anti-analysis techniques and cryptographic approaches associated with Venus and Trinity. Earlier attacks frequently used manually delivered ransom messages, sometimes with mocking language intended to pressure victims, whereas GenieLocker can generate ransom notes automatically. Ransom demands have increased to hundreds of thousands of dollars. Bearlyfy has collaborated with Head Mare and shares tooling and infrastructure overlaps with PhantomCore, while maintaining a distinct operational identity.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
50 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
8 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
3 additional families tracked in Mallory.
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
31 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced as another pro-Ukrainian group that adopted its own ransomware, GenieLocker, and as a design comparison for VantaCore.
Dual-purpose ransomware and sabotage group targeting Russian businesses, conducting rapid attacks for both extortion and destructive impact.
Pro-Ukrainian ransomware and disruptive operations targeting Russian companies, combining political and financial motives and escalating from small-business attacks to larger enterprises with custom ransomware.
Проукраинская группа, осуществившая более 70 атак на российские компании с января 2025 года, совмещая вымогательство с диверсионной деятельностью. Сначала использовала чужие и модифицированные ransomware-семейства, а с марта 2026 года перешла на собственные шифровальщики, включая GenieLocker.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.