Loading threat actor…
Thor is a pro-Ukrainian threat group first observed attacking Russian companies in May 2025. Its operations combine ransomware-based financial extortion with cyberespionage and politically motivated or destructive activity. At least 12 attacks were attributed to Thor during 2025. The group uses LockBit and Babuk ransomware and deploys Tactical RMM and MeshAgent to maintain persistent remote access. Its political alignment does not establish its operators' country of origin or state sponsorship. Thor exploits known vulnerabilities in internet-facing applications, including Microsoft SharePoint vulnerabilities CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2021-27065. Its publicly available toolset includes ADRecon for Active Directory reconnaissance, GodPotato for privilege escalation, Secretsdump and Mimikatz for credential extraction, and Rclone for data collection and exfiltration. Operators enumerate systems, processes, privileges, domain controllers, and trust relationships; create local administrator accounts; and collect local and domain credentials, mail-server credentials, and employees' Telegram sessions. Reconnaissance telemetry identified approximately 110 Russian companies as potential targets, including organizations in defense, healthcare, and research; these were not all confirmed compromised victims. In two investigated intrusions, early detection prevented observed ransomware deployment. Thor and the cyberespionage group QuietCrabs operated in the same victim environments within days of one another, but no collaboration was established.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
3 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
7 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
2 additional families tracked in Mallory.
2 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 2 of them exploited in the wild.
To gain initial access, the attackers exploited several remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, including CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2021-27065.
In the second incident, we found traces of successful exploitation of CVE-2025-53770 within 24 hours of a working exploit being published, and failed attempts within a few hours of the first, non-working exploits appearing.
4 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Mentioned solely as a possible, unconfirmed historical infrastructure overlap with Hacking Cat activity.
A pro-Ukraine operation assessed as the likely predecessor or prior branding of VantaCore. Its 2025 operations combined financial extortion with politically motivated destructive activity.
A pro-Ukrainian ransomware operation assessed as the predecessor or rebranded identity of VantaCore. Its 2025 operations against Russia combined financial extortion with destructive or politically motivated activity.
Previously known pro-Ukrainian ransomware group assessed to have been rebranded as, or closely connected with, VantaCore.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.