Loading threat actor…
BlackByte, also tracked by Symantec as Hecamede, is a cybercriminal ransomware operation active since 2021 that has operated both directly and through a ransomware-as-a-service model. The group is associated with BlackByte ransomware and has targeted corporate and critical-infrastructure victims worldwide, including organizations in government, financial, and food and agriculture sectors. Reporting also places victims across North America, Europe, Latin America, and Asia, with confirmed activity against U.S. organizations and broader global targeting. BlackByte is known for double extortion: affiliates or operators steal data prior to encryption and threaten public release through a leak site if victims do not pay. The operation has used dedicated victim portals and live-chat negotiation infrastructure, and has publicly named victims to increase pressure. Early BlackByte variants were written in C#, while later versions were redeveloped in Go and added stronger cryptography, improved obfuscation, and more mature anti-analysis and anti-recovery features. Initial access has been achieved through phishing and exploitation of unpatched internet-facing systems, especially Microsoft Exchange Server vulnerabilities including ProxyShell and ProxyLogon. After access, BlackByte operators have used web shells, remote administration tools, and publicly available offensive tooling. Observed tooling includes Cobalt Strike, Mimikatz, AdFind, PowerView, PsExec, AnyDesk, and network-scanning utilities. The group has conducted Active Directory and host enumeration, queried installed security products, dumped credentials, elevated privileges, created or abused scheduled tasks, and moved laterally using legitimate administrative mechanisms and remote execution. BlackByte demonstrates strong defense-evasion tradecraft. Documented behaviors include process hollowing and process injection, deletion of shadow copies, disabling or modifying Windows Defender and firewall settings, terminating security and backup software, checking for debugging or sandbox artifacts, and using bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver techniques to bypass endpoint protections. Reporting on BlackByte 2.0 also described attempts to interfere with endpoint monitoring through kernel-level notification tampering. The malware has also been observed deleting its on-disk binary after execution and selectively avoiding systems configured for multiple CIS-region languages. For propagation and impact, BlackByte has enabled network discovery and file sharing, enumerated hosts and Active Directory assets, targeted administrative shares and backup repositories, and encrypted files on Windows systems including servers. Some incidents involved only partial encryption. The operation has also used custom exfiltration tooling, including the Go-based Exbyte stealer, to accelerate theft of victim documents before ransomware deployment. BlackByte is widely recognized as a financially motivated cybercrime actor. It has been linked to multi-million-dollar ransom demands and to attacks against high-profile enterprises and critical infrastructure. Some reporting has suggested overlap in personnel with former Conti operators, but BlackByte remains tracked as its own ransomware operation.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
50 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
12 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
7 additional families tracked in Mallory.
10 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 10 of them exploited in the wild.
The BlackByte gang often uses phishing and/or vulnerable unpatched applications or services like vulnerable versions of SonicWall VPN or the ProxyShell vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange servers to gain access to the victim's network.
Le groupe de ransomware BlackByte exploite activement la vulnérabilité « CVE-2024-37085 » de contournement d'authentification récemment corrigée dans les hyperviseurs VMware ESXi pour déployer des ransomwares et obtenir un accès administratif complet aux réseaux des victimes.
In recent BlackByte attacks investigated by Symantec, the attackers exploited the ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyLogon (CVE-2021-26855 and CVE-2021-27065) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Servers to gain initial access.
In recent BlackByte attacks investigated by Symantec, the attackers exploited the ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyLogon (CVE-2021-26855 and CVE-2021-27065) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Servers to gain initial access.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
5 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
74 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Named as one of multiple ransomware groups operating data leak sites and listing fresh victims.
Ransomware group observed using malware signed through Fox Tempest's illicit signing service.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the generic installation exploitation analytic, but no campaign-specific activity is described in this reference.
Listed as one of many threat actors associated with the detection's ATT&CK-style annotations for PowerShell and DNS TXT command-and-control behavior; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.