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GOLD SOUTHFIELD is a financially motivated cybercriminal group that operates the REvil ransomware-as-a-service operation. REvil is also known as Sodinokibi or Sodin; the group is additionally tracked as PINCHY SPIDER. Its operation combines file encryption, ransom demands, and a victim leak site used to pressure compromised organizations. REvil campaigns have affected managed service providers and their customers, financial services organizations, and government entities. GOLD SOUTHFIELD has obtained initial access through publicly accessible Remote Desktop Protocol services, remote monitoring and management servers, and exploitation of Oracle WebLogic vulnerabilities. It has also distributed ransomware through backdoored software installers after compromising the website distributing the Italian version of WinRAR. Post-compromise activity includes staging and executing PowerShell scripts, using Base64 encoding to obscure scripts, and obtaining screenshots through ConnectWise. REvil functionality includes inhibiting recovery by deleting volume shadow copies and disabling Windows recovery features. Some versions included persistence to resume encryption after reboot, while later versions removed that functionality. Configurations have also contained administrative credentials used to authenticate to protected network resources before encrypting their contents. The operation experienced infrastructure shutdowns and subsequent resumptions in 2021 and 2022. Malware changes across these periods demonstrate continued development, including revised configuration storage, affiliate tracking, string-decryption controls, and encryption-related key handling. GOLD NORTHFIELD separately repurposed a REvil binary to create LV ransomware; this does not establish that it is a GOLD SOUTHFIELD subgroup.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
43 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
6 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
1 additional family tracked in Mallory.
10 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 10 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-26134, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence... This activity is significant as it allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the Confluence server without authentication, potentially leading to full system compromise.
5 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
19 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Mentioned only as an annotation associated with a detection for PYTHONPATH modification during package installation; no specific GOLD SOUTHFIELD activity is described.
GOLD SOUTHFIELD is listed only in the detection's annotations.
GOLD SOUTHFIELD is listed in the detection's annotations for Python site-hook creation during package installation.
Listed in the detection's Annotations section.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.