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GOLD SOUTHFIELD, also known as PINCHY SPIDER, is a financially motivated cybercriminal threat actor associated with operation of the REvil ransomware-as-a-service ecosystem. The group has been linked to development and operation of REvil infrastructure, including ransom payment and victim leak sites, and to subsequent reactivation and redevelopment of the malware after major service disruptions in 2021 and 2022. The actor’s tradecraft includes extensive use of PowerShell for staging and execution on compromised hosts, as well as use of remote monitoring and management software to obtain screen captures from victim systems. Reporting also links the actor to csharp-streamer, a C# remote access trojan used in ransomware intrusions. That malware supports remote command execution, file discovery and transfer, screenshot capture, keylogging, credential theft, port scanning, lateral movement, process dumping, payload execution, and other post-compromise actions, although attribution of every observed csharp-streamer deployment to GOLD SOUTHFIELD is not definitive. REvil under GOLD SOUTHFIELD operated as a ransomware and extortion service with leak-site support and affiliate-style characteristics. Analysis of later REvil samples indicated active code modification and continued development, including changes to configuration handling, affiliate tracking fields, execution logic, and operational safeguards. The group’s operations have been associated with data theft extortion through public shaming infrastructure in addition to file encryption. Known aliases include GOLD SOUTHFIELD and PINCHY SPIDER.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
41 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
6 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
1 additional family tracked in Mallory.
10 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 10 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-26134, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence... This activity is significant as it allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the Confluence server without authentication, potentially leading to full system compromise.
5 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
19 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as one of many threat actors associated with the detection's ATT&CK-style annotations for PowerShell and DNS TXT command-and-control behavior; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Listed only as an ATT&CK-associated actor in the detection annotation.
Listed as an associated threat actor in detection annotations for Ghostscript exploitation; no specific campaign activity is described in this reference.
Listed as an associated threat actor in the detection annotation for exploitation of the public-facing PTC Windchill vulnerability CVE-2026-4681.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.