GOLD SOUTHFIELD
GOLD SOUTHFIELD, also known as PINCHY SPIDER, is a financially motivated threat actor associated in the provided content with ransomware deployment, exploitation of public-facing applications, PowerShell-based execution, command obfuscation, software supply chain compromise, and use of legitimate remote management tooling. The content states that GOLD SOUTHFIELD has staged and executed PowerShell scripts on compromised hosts and is associated with ATT&CK techniques including T1059.001 (PowerShell), T1129 (Shared Modules), T1027.010 (Command Obfuscation), T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application), T1505.003 (Web Shell), T1505.004 (IIS Components), and T1219 (Remote Access Tools). Reported activity in the content includes exploiting Oracle WebLogic vulnerabilities for initial compromise, using web shells and IIS components for persistence, and using the cloud-based remote management and monitoring tool ConnectWise Control to deploy REvil. The content also states that GOLD SOUTHFIELD distributed ransomware by backdooring software installers through a strategic web compromise of the site hosting Italian WinRAR, indicating software supply chain compromise activity.
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Tradecraft
33 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
5 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
Associated vulnerabilities
10 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 10 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-26134, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence... This activity is significant as it allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the Confluence server without authentication, potentially leading to full system compromise.
5 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
Observables
1 indicator attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as an associated threat actor in the detection annotation for exploitation of the public-facing PTC Windchill vulnerability CVE-2026-4681.
Named threat actor referenced in global threat reporting.
Listed as a threat actor associated with PowerShell execution behavior relevant to this detection.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the PowerShell P/Invoke process injection API chain detection and related ATT&CK techniques.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.