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APT39 is an Iranian advanced persistent threat group also tracked as Chafer, Burgundy Sandstorm, Cadelle, ITG07, and Remix Kitten. Its documented targets include air transportation organizations and government entities in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The group gains initial access through spearphishing emails containing malicious links or attachments, SQL injection against public-facing applications, and stolen credentials used to access Outlook Web Access. It deploys ANTAK and ASPXSpy web shells and maintains access through scheduled tasks, newly created local accounts on compromised hosts, and Remote Desktop Protocol. RDP also supports lateral movement, with additional tooling used to manage concurrent sessions. Credential theft is a prominent component of its operations. APT39 uses Mimikatz, Windows Credential Editor, and ProcDump for credential dumping, and SmartFTP Password Decryptor to recover FTP passwords. It discovers remote systems through NBTscan and custom tools and modifies publicly available utilities, including PLINK and Mimikatz. Its malware drops and decrypts encrypted CAB archives, concealing payloads from inspection. The group also uses WinRAR and 7-Zip to compress and archive stolen data.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
53 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
39 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
34 additional families tracked in Mallory.
9 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 9 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-26134, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence... This activity is significant as it allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the Confluence server without authentication, potentially leading to full system compromise.
4 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
77 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Iranian-linked group mentioned as a possible—but unconfirmed—threat relevant to the compromise of U.S. military personnel information.
Annotation-only mention; no actor-specific operation or behavior is described.
Listed as an annotation to a renamed-Python-binary detection; no actor-specific campaign or behavior is described.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.