APT39 is an Iranian state-linked cyber espionage threat actor tracked under aliases including Chafer, Remix Kitten, Cadelle, Burgundy Sandstorm, and ITG07. The group is associated with intelligence collection operations and has historically targeted organizations and individuals of strategic interest to Iran, particularly across the Middle East, while also conducting activity affecting the United States and other countries. APT39 commonly gains initial access through spearphishing emails carrying malicious attachments and relies heavily on user execution. Observed tradecraft includes PowerShell-based execution, use of malicious VBScript, downloading additional tools to compromised hosts, and persistence via scheduled tasks and Startup folder mechanisms. The group has also used malware masquerading as legitimate software to evade detection. Post-compromise behavior includes user and account discovery, network share enumeration, file searching and collection, screenshot capture, keylogging, and theft of files from victim systems. APT39 has exfiltrated stolen data over command-and-control channels and has used HTTP for C2 communications. Reported tooling includes Remexi for collecting usernames and CrackMapExec for enumerating network shares. The overall pattern is consistent with a mature espionage operator focused on surveillance, collection, persistence, and operational stealth rather than disruptive or ransomware activity.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
54 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
34 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
29 additional families tracked in Mallory.
9 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 9 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-26134, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence... This activity is significant as it allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the Confluence server without authentication, potentially leading to full system compromise.
4 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
60 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the generic installation exploitation analytic, but no campaign-specific activity is described in this reference.
Listed as one of many threat actors associated with the detection's ATT&CK-style annotations for PowerShell and DNS TXT command-and-control behavior; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Listed as an example threat actor associated with T1190 in detection metadata; no specific activity is described.
Iranian cyber espionage group described as a fronted by Rana Intelligence Computing Company and linked to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security. It conducted targeted surveillance and intrusions against domestic and international targets, including telecom providers and organizations in travel, academic, and telecommunications sectors.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.