Akira is a ransomware operation that emerged in March 2023 and is widely tracked as a financially motivated cybercriminal threat actor. It is also referred to as Gold Sahara, Howling Scorpius, Punk Spider, and Storm-1567. Akira operates through an affiliate-driven intrusion model consistent with ransomware-as-a-service activity, with affiliates conducting compromises, data theft, and encryption against organizations worldwide, especially in North America. Akira is known for double extortion: operators steal data before encrypting systems and then threaten public release of the stolen information through a leak site if victims do not pay. Reported victim sectors include health care, financial services, manufacturing, education, real estate, consulting, agriculture, information technology, and professional services. The group has shown a strong concentration on U.S.-based organizations, with additional activity affecting the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Japan, and other countries. Observed initial access methods include exploitation of internet-facing appliances and services, especially VPN infrastructure, use of stolen credentials, password spraying and brute-force activity against remote access portals, and exploitation of known vulnerabilities including CVE-2023-20269 on Cisco ASA and FTD devices and CVE-2021-21972 on VMware vCenter. Akira has also been associated with targeting SSL VPN appliances and other exposed edge systems where patching or MFA was absent or weak. Post-compromise tradecraft includes extensive reconnaissance and Active Directory enumeration, use of legitimate administrative and remote access tools, creation of local and domain accounts for persistence, lateral movement over RDP and SMB administrative shares, and exfiltration with common file-transfer utilities. Reported tooling and techniques include PowerShell, WMI, Impacket, AdFind, WinRAR, WinSCP, FileZilla, RClone, AnyDesk, TeamViewer, OpenSSH, MobaXterm, RustDesk, network scanners, and Cloudflared tunneling. Akira operators have also disabled or degraded defenses, including Windows Defender and EDR products, deleted shadow copies, attempted to destroy backups, and in at least one case rebooted a host into Safe Mode with Networking to suppress endpoint protections before launching the encryptor. Akira has demonstrated notable hands-on-keyboard capability in virtualized environments. In one documented intrusion, operators compromised VMware infrastructure, created a new virtual machine, mounted copied virtual disks from a domain controller, extracted Active Directory database material and the SYSTEM hive, and used the recovered credential material to obtain highly privileged access before deploying ransomware. The group has also abused legacy backup software components and network shares to distribute payloads at scale. The Akira malware family is a 64-bit Windows ransomware written in C++ that appends a distinct extension to encrypted files, drops ransom notes, deletes shadow copies, and uses partial encryption for speed. It uses ChaCha for file encryption with RSA-protected key material and employs multithreading based on available processors. Akira also uses the Windows Restart Manager API to close processes and services that would otherwise lock files during encryption. Akira is best characterized as a financially motivated ransomware and extortion actor rather than a state-sponsored group. Reporting has also noted possible affiliate overlap or tradecraft sharing with other ransomware ecosystems, including Snatch, but such overlap does not change Akira’s core identity as a criminal extortion operation.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
60 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
3 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
17 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 17 of them exploited in the wild.
CVE-2024-40766 (SonicWall SonicOS SSL VPN) : exploité massivement par Akira en 2024–2025
Additional exploited vulnerabilities include CVE-2023-20269 (Cisco ASA/FTD zero-day) ... MITRE ATT&CK TTP Matrix ... CVE-2023-20269 (Cisco)
and CVE-2020-3259, a memory disclosure vulnerability which can be used to retrieve credentials without authentication.
Akira have been observed to exploit Veeam vulnerabilities such as CVE-2023-27532 and CVE-2024-40711.
Akira have been observed to exploit Veeam vulnerabilities such as CVE-2023-27532 and CVE-2024-40711.
12 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
164 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Conducting ransomware intrusions involving VPN access, credential theft, Active Directory enumeration, data exfiltration, EDR evasion via Safe Mode with Networking, and attempted ransomware deployment for extortion.
Ransomware attack and data extortion against Cozad Asset Management, with claims of stealing and planning to leak 13GB of corporate data including employee personal information, financials, confidential files, contracts, and legal files.
Conducting a ransomware attack and data extortion against Keystops, with claims of stealing corporate data including employee/client personal information, financials, payment details, and contracts, and threatening to upload 15GB of data.
Persistent North America-focused ransomware operator targeting SMBs, especially in construction, manufacturing, and professional services.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.