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Mallory
Financially Motivated5 malware familiesExploits CVEs in the wild

ToyMaker

Also known asgold_melodygoldmelodyPROPHET SPIDERtgr_cri_0045toymakerUNC961

ToyMaker is a financially motivated initial access broker (IAB), also described by Cisco Talos as a financially motivated initial access group, active against vulnerable internet-facing systems. Known aliases include GoldMelody / GOLD MELODY, UNC961, Prophet Spider, and TGR-CRI-0045; Unit 42 attributed TGR-CRI-0045 to Gold Melody (aka UNC961, Prophet Spider) with medium confidence, and BlackBerry correlated Prophet Spider activity with exploitation of Log4j in VMware Horizon. The group has been active since at least 2017 in reporting on Gold Melody / Prophet Spider. ToyMaker has been observed exploiting known vulnerabilities in public-facing infrastructure, including Oracle WebLogic Server flaws such as CVE-2020-14882, CVE-2020-14750, and older WebLogic CVEs including CVE-2016-0545, as well as SQL injection, vulnerable internet-facing servers, VMware Horizon systems exposed to Log4Shell-related vulnerabilities, and ASP.NET IIS servers through leaked Machine Keys and View State deserialization. Unit 42 reported that TGR-CRI-0045 targeted organizations in Europe and the United States, including financial services, manufacturing, wholesale/retail, high technology, and transportation/logistics. Talos also noted ToyMaker targeting high-value organizations including critical infrastructure. Talos reported that in a 2023 critical infrastructure intrusion, ToyMaker exploited vulnerable internet-facing systems, conducted preliminary reconnaissance, created a fake local administrator account named support, enabled or used Windows OpenSSH components, executed Magnet RAM Capture to dump memory, archived the dumps with 7za.exe, exfiltrated them with pscp.exe, and deployed the custom reverse-shell backdoor LAGTOY. Mandiant reported the same backdoor family as HOLERUN. Talos observed LAGTOY persisted as a Windows service named WmiPrvSV, communicated with a hard-coded C2 over TCP/443 using raw sockets rather than TLS, and included anti-debugging and time-based execution logic. Talos assessed that ToyMaker harvested credentials from memory and later transferred access to Cactus, which used those credentials after roughly three weeks. ToyMaker has been observed handing off access to multiple ransomware groups. Talos stated ToyMaker transferred access to Maze, Egregor, and Cactus. Reporting on Prophet Spider assessed that it likely functioned as an access broker and likely granted access to Egregor and MountLocker operators. Cisco Talos specifically described ToyMaker passing access to secondary threat actors, most notably the Cactus group. Unit 42 reported that TGR-CRI-0045 used forged ASP.NET View State payloads signed with exposed Machine Keys to execute malicious .NET assemblies directly in memory via w3wp.exe, minimizing on-disk artifacts. Observed activity included use of C:\Windows\Temp\111t as a staging directory, retrieval of tooling via curl, reflective loading of .NET assemblies, reconnaissance commands, use of the custom privilege-escalation tool updf leveraging GodPotato to obtain SYSTEM, creation of local administrator accounts such as support:Sup0rt_1!admin, export of web.config files, and use of the Golang port scanner TxPortMap. BlackBerry linked Prophet Spider to VMware Horizon Log4Shell exploitation, where ws_TomcatService.exe spawned cmd.exe or powershell.exe, often followed by encoded PowerShell download cradles. Observed post-exploitation included host and domain enumeration, dumping SAM, SYSTEM, and SECURITY hives, use of C:\Windows\Temp\7fde\ as a staging directory, downloading wget.bin and additional payloads, and in some cases deployment of cryptocurrency miners or Cobalt Strike. BlackBerry described Prophet Spider as an IAB known for selling access to ransomware operators. The group’s tradecraft across reporting includes exploitation of internet-facing applications, credential harvesting, creation of unauthorized local accounts, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, persistence through services or scheduled tasks, in-memory execution, and transfer of access to downstream ransomware actors.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

11 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

10 of 15 tactics15 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0043
Reconnaissance
1 technique
T1590
Gather Victim Network Information
TA0001
Initial Access
2 techniques
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
T1190×3
Exploit Public-Facing Application
TA0003
Persistence
3 techniques
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
T1136
Create Account
T1543
Create or Modify System Process
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
T1543
Create or Modify System Process
TA0005
Stealth
1 technique
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
TA0006
Credential Access
1 technique
T1003
OS Credential Dumping
TA0007
Discovery
2 techniques
T1033
System Owner/User Discovery
T1082
System Information Discovery
TA0008
Lateral Movement
1 technique
T1021
Remote Services
TA0009
Collection
1 technique
T1560
Archive Collected Data
TA0010
Exfiltration
1 technique
T1048
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
IOCS

Observables

16 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

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Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping11

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal5

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs3

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables16

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.