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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 9 actorsExploits 7 CVEs

Egregor

Egregor is a ransomware family active since mid-September 2020 and described as an offshoot of the Sekhmet malware family. It operated as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) and has been linked by multiple security firms to former Maze affiliates; some reporting also linked it to ProLock and LockBit. Egregor conducts double-extortion attacks by stealing sensitive data, encrypting victim systems, and threatening to publish exfiltrated data on its victim blog if ransom demands are not met. Reported victims include GEFCO, Barnes & Noble, Crytek, and Ubisoft-related claims. As of 2020-11-24, its leak site reportedly listed 152 victim companies across multiple industries worldwide, with information technology, construction, retail, consumer goods, and automotive especially represented.

Initial access and delivery varied by affiliate activity, but the content states Egregor operators commonly deployed the ransomware after prior compromise through phishing or RDP exploitation, with Cobalt Strike described as the primary distribution method. QBot/QakBot has also been observed distributing Egregor, and related activity used living-off-the-land tools such as bitsadmin to download or update DLL components. One affiliate cluster, Lockean, used Egregor among several RaaS families after gaining access primarily through Qbot/QakBot and then using tools including Cobalt Strike, Adfind, BloodHound, BITSadmin, and Rclone. Microsoft also noted DEV-0216 operated as an affiliate for Egregor, Maze, LockBit, REvil, and Conti.

Technically, Egregor payloads are heavily obfuscated DLLs containing Salsa20-encrypted configuration data. Each payload requires a sample-specific launch key passed with the -p parameter; without the correct key, the malware fails to launch correctly. The malware encrypts files using ChaCha together with RSA, and each payload contains an RSA-2048 public key. Ransom notes instruct victims to visit a Tor-based payment portal and contain an encrypted blob with victim-specific system data and an encoded RSA public key. The victim-specific blob can include local drive information, drive size and free space, hostname, discovered antivirus or security products, and user or domain context.

Observed behavior includes HTTPS command-and-control communications, user discovery, disabling Windows Defender, anti-analysis and anti-sandbox techniques, process injection into iexplore.exe, use of encoded PowerShell commands via a service created by Cobalt Strike for lateral movement, and checking for the LogMeIn event log in an attempt to encrypt files on remote machines. Egregor also used Rclone for data exfiltration, dropping its own copy together with attacker-supplied configuration data. The malware reportedly avoids encrypting systems whose primary language is Armenian, Azerbaijani, Belarusian, Georgian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Romanian, Russian, Tajik, Tatar, Turkmen, Ukrainian, or Uzbek.

Egregor also used intimidation tactics associated with ransomware operations, including "print bombing" victim organizations by repeatedly printing ransom notes from connected printers. Known infrastructure mentioned in the content includes the victim blog egregoranrmzapcv[.]onion, archive site egregornews[.]com, and payment portal egregor4u5ipdzhv[.]onion.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

7 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

7 CVES
CVE-2018-8174Windows VBScript Engine Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityExploited in the wild

Some sources also report the possible exploitation of CVE-2018-8174 (VBScript Engine), CVE-2018-4878 (Adobe Flash Player) & CVE-2018-15982 (Adobe Flash Player). | Egregor ransomware is an offshoot of the Sekhmet malware family that has been active since mid-September 2020.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
CVE-2020-0688Microsoft Exchange Memory Corruption VulnerabilityExploited in the wild

There have been limited and uncorroborated reports of Egregor utilizing CVE-2020-0688 (a remote code execution flaw in Microsoft Exchange). | Egregor ransomware is an offshoot of the Sekhmet malware family that has been active since mid-September 2020.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
CVE-2018-4878Adobe Flash Player Primetime SDK use-after-free RCEExploited in the wild

Some sources also report the possible exploitation of CVE-2018-8174 (VBScript Engine), CVE-2018-4878 (Adobe Flash Player) & CVE-2018-15982 (Adobe Flash Player). | Egregor ransomware is an offshoot of the Sekhmet malware family that has been active since mid-September 2020.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
CVE-2018-15982Adobe Flash Player Use-After-Free Remote Code ExecutionExploited in the wild

Some sources also report the possible exploitation of CVE-2018-8174 (VBScript Engine), CVE-2018-4878 (Adobe Flash Player) & CVE-2018-15982 (Adobe Flash Player). | Egregor ransomware is an offshoot of the Sekhmet malware family that has been active since mid-September 2020.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
CVE-2020-0787Windows BITS Elevation of Privilege via Improper Symlink HandlingExploited in the wild

The Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is vulnerable to a privilege elevation vulnerability... Actors exploiting this vulnerability commonly used the proof of concept code released by the security researcher... The exploit was used in Maze and Egregor ransomware campaigns. | The exploit was used in Maze and Egregor ransomware campaigns.

via ic3 alertsic3.gov
CVE-2020-14750Unauthenticated RCE in Oracle WebLogic Server ConsoleExploited in the wild

Researchers noticed a recent trend in which Prophet Spider uses CVE-2020-14882 and CVE-2020-14750 to get a foothold into target environments. Both CVEs relate to path traversal vulnerabilities that enable an attacker to access the WebLogic administrative console, which then allows for unauthenticated remote code execution.

via dark readingdarkreading.com
CVE-2020-14882Oracle WebLogic Server Console Authentication Bypass and RCEExploited in the wild

Researchers noticed a recent trend in which Prophet Spider uses CVE-2020-14882 and CVE-2020-14750 to get a foothold into target environments. Both CVEs relate to path traversal vulnerabilities that enable an attacker to access the WebLogic administrative console, which then allows for unauthenticated remote code execution.

via dark readingdarkreading.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

9 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
DEV-0216

DEV-0216 ... has operated as an affiliate for Egregor, Maze, Lockbit, REvil, and Conti in numerous high-impact incidents.

via microsoft generalmicrosoft.com
Lockean

Between June 2020 and March 2021, Lockean attacked at least seven more companies with various ransomware families: Maze, Egregor, ProLock, REvil.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
OnePercent

Between June 2020 and March 2021, Lockean attacked at least seven more companies with various ransomware families: Maze, Egregor, ProLock, REvil.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
Twisted Spider

"...TWISTED SPIDER achieved at least 26 infections at healthcare sector victims with their Maze and Egregor ransomware families..."

via crowdstrike bloggo.crowdstrike.com
UNC2414

At the close of 2020, we noticed a shift in a subset of these groups that have started to deploy EGREGOR ransomware in favor of MAZE ransomware following access acquired from ICEDID infections.

via fireeyefireeye.com
ToyMaker

Prophet Spider functioned as an access broker and likely granted access to Egregor and MountLocker ransomware operators in exchange for payment.

via dark readingdarkreading.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

30 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

"After the hacker gained access to a Windows domain administrator account..."

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

"Prophet Spider has also been seen using older Oracle CVEs such as CVE-2016-0545, as well as gaining initial access via SQL injection." | "attackers exploit Oracle WebLogic server flaws to access target environments" ... "uses CVE-2020-14882 and CVE-2020-14750 to get a foothold" ... "path traversal vulnerabilities that enable an attacker to access the WebLogic administrative console, which then allows for unauthenticated remote code execution."

Execution

4 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using PowerShell scripts/commands for execution, download, staging, reconnaissance, persistence, credential access, lateral movement, and defense evasion; e.g., "Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses."

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

The content repeatedly mentions '.bat', '.cmd', and 'batch scripts' used to automate execution, persistence, cleanup, deployment, disabling security tools, and ransomware operations. Examples: 'APT1 has used ... batch scripting to automate execution', 'Blue Mockingbird has used batch script files to automate execution and deployment of payloads', and 'Cinnamon Tempest has executed ransomware using batch scripts deployed via GPO.' | The content repeatedly describes use of cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, and xp_cmdshell to execute commands, run payloads, launch binaries, perform reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions. Examples include: 'Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL', 'APT41 used cmd.exe /c to execute commands on remote machines', and many malware families 'can use cmd.exe to execute commands on a compromised host.'

T1106Native APIEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Native API T1106

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

Citrix ADC maintains a vulnerable Perl script (newbm.pl) that, when accessed via HTTP POST request ... allows local operating system (OS) commands to execute. Attackers can use this functionality to upload/execute command and control (C2) software ... and gain unauthorized access to the OS.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

"After the hacker gained access to a Windows domain administrator account..."

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Modify Registry T1112

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence4

MITRE ATT&CK Process Injection T1055

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

The Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is vulnerable to a privilege elevation vulnerability ... An actor can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code with system-level privileges.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

"After the hacker gained access to a Windows domain administrator account..."

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

"Sandworm Team used UPX to pack a copy of Mimikatz"; "APT38 has used several code packing methods such as Themida, Enigma, VMProtect, and Obsidium"; "Lazarus Group packed malicious .db files with Themida to evade detection."

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Masquerading T1036

T1055Process InjectionEvidence4

MITRE ATT&CK Process Injection T1055

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion T1070.004

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

"After the hacker gained access to a Windows domain administrator account..."

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, deobfuscating, or unpacking payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 responses prior to execution or use.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion T1497

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The LockBit 3.0 ransomware uses a variety of anti-analysis techniques to hinder static and dynamic analysis... Several techniques are implemented for detecting the presence of a debugger and hindering dynamic analysis.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Modify Registry T1112

Discovery

9 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Query Registry T1012

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking whether the current user is an administrator, enumerating user sessions, and gathering account details from compromised hosts.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

MITRE ATT&CK System Information Discovery T1082

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Peripheral Device Discovery T1120

T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK System Time Discovery T1124

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion T1497

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery T1518.001

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence1

Examples include "Bazar can also check if the Russian language is installed on the infected machine and terminate if it is found," "DropBook has checked for the presence of Arabic language," and "Maze has checked the language of the infected system using the GetUSerDefaultUILanguage function."

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The LockBit 3.0 ransomware uses a variety of anti-analysis techniques to hinder static and dynamic analysis... Several techniques are implemented for detecting the presence of a debugger and hindering dynamic analysis.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

"During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team utilized a PowerShell utility called TANKTRAP to spread and launch a wiper using Windows Group Policy," and "Cuba has been dropped onto systems and used for lateral movement via obfuscated PowerShell scripts."

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Archive Collected Data T1560

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."

Impact

3 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence5

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Inhibit System Recovery T1490

T1491.001Internal DefacementEvidence3

Encryption malware may also leverage Internal Defacement, such as changing victim wallpapers or ESXi server login messages, or otherwise intimidate victims by sending ransom notes or other messages to connected printers (known as "print bombing").

Other

2 techniques
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware disabling, stopping, uninstalling, or modifying antivirus, EDR, Windows Defender, AMSI, logging, and other security controls.

T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Examples include 'Aquatic Panda has attempted to stop endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools', 'BlackByte disabled security tools such as Windows Defender', 'Scattered Spider has uninstalled and disabled security tools', and many malware families terminating AV/EDR processes or services.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

45 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
7 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
38 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching45

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution9

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities7

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping30

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.