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Ryuk is a financially motivated ransomware operation first observed in August 2018 and linked to Russian cybercriminals and the TrickBot-associated Wizard Spider ecosystem. Also known as the Ryuk gang or Ryuk operators, its intrusion activity has been tracked under UNC1878. Conti is widely recognized as its successor, with operational overlap in personnel, tooling, and procedures. Ryuk conducts enterprise-scale ransomware attacks against organizations worldwide, with prominent targeting of U.S. hospitals, municipal governments, educational institutions, and media organizations. Its operators encrypt victim data and demand substantial payments, historically including multimillion-dollar ransoms. The attack on Universal Health Services caused extensive disruption and reportedly cost the hospital chain approximately $67 million. Initial access has been obtained through TrickBot infections, QakBot, Zloader, and access supplied by BazarCall callback-phishing operators. After gaining a foothold, Ryuk operators perform network reconnaissance, collect administrator credentials, compromise domain controllers, and move laterally before deploying ransomware throughout the environment. Documented tooling includes Cobalt Strike, PowerShell Empire, and Advanced IP Scanner. Techniques include SMB password guessing with SMBAutoBrute, Active Directory Group Policy abuse, and exploitation of Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472). In documented incidents, operators progressed from phishing to domain-wide ransomware deployment within two to five hours.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
49 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
11 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
6 additional families tracked in Mallory.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Mentioned as a historical recipient of victim-network access supplied through BazarCall. The article does not connect Ryuk to SRG's current extortion operation or financial flows.
Mentioned only as a prior example of a ransomware group that used Group Policy abuse; no Ryuk activity is described in this incident.
A ransomware operation whose members conducted large-scale attacks against global victims, including U.S. hospitals, state and local municipalities. The operation disrupted access to victim data and communications and obtained at least $15 million in ransom payments.
A ransomware operation responsible for thousands of attacks globally, including against U.S. state and local governments and hospitals. Its attacks restricted access to data and disrupted communications; the group reportedly received at least $15 million in ransom payments. The operation has been linked to Russian cybercriminals and to a Russian group managing Trickbot.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.