ExCobalt
ExCobalt is a threat actor conducting campaigns against Russian organizations. Reported targeting includes Russian entities broadly, and the activity has been described as affecting Russian organizations through exploitation of known security flaws and the use of credentials stolen from contractors to obtain initial access. Positive Technologies described ExCobalt as one of the most dangerous groups attacking Russian entities. Observed ExCobalt-associated activity includes attempts to steal Telegram credentials and message history from compromised hosts, theft of Outlook Web Access credentials via malicious code injected into the login page, and use of the CobInt backdoor. Associated tooling and payloads include lockers such as Babuk and LockBit, the PUMAKIT kernel rootkit for privilege escalation and stealth, and the Rust-based Octopus toolkit for privilege elevation on compromised Linux systems. Positive Technologies reported that ExCobalt shifted initial access from exploiting 1-day vulnerabilities in internet-exposed corporate services such as Microsoft Exchange to penetrating primary targets through contractors. The content also states that Shedding Zmiy is a group associated with the (Ex)Cobalt activity cluster, indicating a relationship between Shedding Zmiy and ExCobalt. The alias directly provided in the source is "excobalt."
Know when an actor pivots toward your sector
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Where they target
Geographies tied to known operations.
- 🇷🇺 Russia
Tradecraft
6 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
8 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
3 additional families tracked in Mallory.
Recent activity
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Activity cluster whose members may be participating in overlapping campaigns targeting Russian organizations; associated here through Shedding Zmiy and shared tooling/infrastructure patterns.
Campaigns targeting Russian organizations using exploitation of known vulnerabilities and use of stolen credentials.
Targets Russian organizations; gains initial access by exploiting known vulnerabilities and using contractor-stolen credentials; conducts credential theft (Telegram/OWA) and uses a mix of backdoors, rootkits, and ransomware lockers.
Targets Russian organizations; gains initial access via exploitation of known vulnerabilities and use of contractor-stolen credentials; conducts credential theft (Telegram and OWA) and uses a mix of backdoors, rootkits, and ransomware lockers.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.