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CVE-2025-56383 describes a disputed DLL-hijacking issue in Notepad++ 8.8.3. An attacker able to replace a DLL or place a malicious library in a directory searched during application startup can cause Notepad++ to load attacker-controlled code. The issue is disputed because the described behavior requires installation in a directory tree writable by arbitrary unprivileged users, and the Notepad++ developers consider DLL-based plugin loading standard application functionality rather than a vulnerability. Related malware campaigns abuse this plugin-loading mechanism, but do not establish exploitation of a distinct software flaw.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository demonstrates a DLL hijacking vulnerability in Notepad++ v8.8.3, specifically targeting the NppExport plugin DLL (NppExport.dll). The exploit consists of a proof-of-concept C source file (poc.c) that builds a malicious DLL. This DLL forwards all required exports to the original DLL (original-NppExport.dll) but also executes arbitrary code (in this case, displaying a message box) when loaded by Notepad++. The README provides detailed instructions on replacing the legitimate DLL with the malicious one to achieve code execution when Notepad++ is launched. The attack vector is local, requiring the attacker to have the ability to replace files on the target system. The repository contains two files: a README with exploitation instructions and a C source file for the malicious DLL payload.
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
46 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Unknown. The content names the vulnerability but does not explain its impact, affected products, or relationship to the campaign.
A disputed DLL hijacking / plugin-loading issue in Notepad++ 8.8.3 that is referenced as similar to the technique used in the campaign.
A reported DLL hijacking issue in Notepad++ v8.8.3 that CERT-UA referenced because the attackers used that exact version, though the article states the Notepad++ team disputes that it is a true vulnerability.
A disputed NVD entry related to Notepad++ plugin DLL loading behavior; the content says CERT-UA does not rely on it and mentions it only for easier information lookup.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.