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CVE-2025-56383 describes a DLL hijacking condition in Notepad++ 8.8.3 in which the application can load a malicious DLL in place of an expected library or plugin during startup. Reported exploitation centers on the product's plugin-loading behavior, including replacement of the NppExport plugin DLL, allowing attacker-controlled code to run when Notepad++ is launched. The issue is disputed by multiple parties because the observed behavior depends on installation into a directory tree that is writable by arbitrary unprivileged users and may reflect standard Windows DLL/plugin loading semantics rather than a defect unique to Notepad++.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository demonstrates a DLL hijacking vulnerability in Notepad++ v8.8.3, specifically targeting the NppExport plugin DLL (NppExport.dll). The exploit consists of a proof-of-concept C source file (poc.c) that builds a malicious DLL. This DLL forwards all required exports to the original DLL (original-NppExport.dll) but also executes arbitrary code (in this case, displaying a message box) when loaded by Notepad++. The README provides detailed instructions on replacing the legitimate DLL with the malicious one to achieve code execution when Notepad++ is launched. The attack vector is local, requiring the attacker to have the ability to replace files on the target system. The repository contains two files: a README with exploitation instructions and a C source file for the malicious DLL payload.
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44 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A disputed DLL hijacking / plugin-loading issue in Notepad++ 8.8.3 that is referenced as similar to the technique used in the campaign.
A reported DLL hijacking issue in Notepad++ v8.8.3 that CERT-UA referenced because the attackers used that exact version, though the article states the Notepad++ team disputes that it is a true vulnerability.
A disputed NVD entry related to Notepad++ plugin DLL loading behavior; the content says CERT-UA does not rely on it and mentions it only for easier information lookup.
A referenced example of a DLL side-loading / uncontrolled search path issue in a Windows application, cited to illustrate that this class of behavior is common across many Windows apps.
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Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.