CVE-2024-7344 is a Secure Boot bypass vulnerability in the Howyar UEFI application Reloader, in both 32-bit and 64-bit variants, distributed with multiple system recovery products including Howyar SysReturn. The vulnerable application is signed by a trusted Microsoft UEFI certificate, but instead of relying on standard UEFI image-loading mechanisms that enforce signature validation, it uses a custom PE loader and executes a UEFI binary from a hardcoded path and name without properly verifying its signature. As a result, an attacker can use the trusted signed Reloader binary to load and execute unsigned or otherwise untrusted code in the UEFI environment, defeating Secure Boot protections. The issue affects SysReturn prior to version 10.2.02320240919 and has also been associated with other recovery-tool distributions that embed the same vulnerable component.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository is a research and educational proof-of-concept for CVE-2024-7344, a UEFI Secure Boot bypass caused by improper PE image loading via a custom loader. It is not a network exploit or post-exploitation framework; instead it demonstrates a boot-time trust-boundary failure in which a signed UEFI application manually maps and executes an unsigned PE/COFF image from cloak.dat without using standard LoadImage/StartImage verification paths. Structure: the repo contains EDK II package metadata (.dec, .dsc), two UEFI applications in C, and Markdown documentation. Component01_VulnerableBinary/UefiApplication_Emulate_Custom_PE_Loader.c is the main exploit-relevant code: it locates an existing cloak.dat, then calls a local routine to load and execute the PE payload. This is the core capability that reproduces the vulnerable logic pattern. Component02_Vulnerability/UefiApplication_Explain_Exploitation.c is not an exploit; it is an explanatory/demo application that prints vulnerability metadata and exploitation flow. The README files document prerequisites, affected products, exploitation steps, and mitigation/detection guidance. Main exploit capability: local/boot-level execution of arbitrary unsigned UEFI code by abusing a trusted but vulnerable loader. The attacker must already have privileged access to write to the EFI System Partition and place both the vulnerable loader and crafted cloak.dat. Successful use yields pre-OS code execution, enabling bootkits, persistence, boot-chain tampering, and runtime/boot services access. Because the repo provides a recreated vulnerable loader rather than a turnkey offensive implant, maturity is best classified as POC.
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70 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A previously disclosed UEFI Secure Boot bypass vulnerability referenced as related background and defensive guidance.
A specific vulnerability referenced in connection with bootkit/UEFI Secure Boot-related exploitation context.
A UEFI Secure Boot-related vulnerability referenced as relevant background for bootloader/firmware persistence detection on Linux.
Уязвимость в подписанном Microsoft UEFI-приложении Reloader, позволяющая обойти Secure Boot через подход BYOVB (bring your own vulnerable bootloader) и выполнить неподписанный код до запуска ОС.
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Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.