CVE-2023-1389 is an unauthenticated OS command injection vulnerability in the web management interface of TP-Link Archer AX21 (AX1800) routers before firmware version 1.1.4 Build 20230219. The flaw is present in the locale endpoint, exposed through /cgi-bin/luci;stok=/locale, where the country parameter in the write operation is not properly sanitized before being passed to popen(). Because attacker-controlled input reaches a shell command context without adequate neutralization, a remote attacker can send a crafted POST request and inject arbitrary commands. Successful exploitation results in command execution as root.
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2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository is a Go-based proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2023-1389, targeting TP-Link Archer AX21 routers vulnerable to unauthenticated command injection. The main file, main.go, reads a list of target IP addresses from 'list.txt' and attempts to exploit each by sending a crafted HTTPS request to the /cgi-bin/luci/ endpoint, injecting a reverse shell payload. The payload causes the target device to connect back to the attacker's netcat listener, granting a remote shell. The exploit supports concurrent execution using goroutines and a concurrency manager. The repository includes a README with usage instructions, a Go module definition, and dependencies for command-line flag parsing and concurrency control. No detection or scanning functionality is present; the tool is strictly for exploitation. The main attack vector is network-based, exploiting a web interface on the target devices.
This repository contains two Python proof-of-concept exploits for CVE-2023-1389, an unauthenticated command injection vulnerability in the TP-Link Archer AX21 (AX1800) router's web management interface. The vulnerability exists in the 'country' parameter of the 'write' callback at the '/cgi-bin/luci/;stok=/locale' endpoint, allowing arbitrary command execution as root without authentication. - 'archer-file-transfer.py' allows the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the router and exfiltrate their output by writing to '/tmp/out' and transferring it via netcat to the attacker's machine. - 'archer-rev-shell.py' provides a simpler method to obtain a reverse shell on the attacker's system using netcat. Both scripts require the attacker to specify the router's IP, their own IP, and a listening port. The exploit works by sending crafted GET requests to the vulnerable endpoint, leveraging command injection in the 'country' parameter. The README provides usage instructions and mitigation advice. The repository is structured with a README and two Python scripts, both of which are functional proof-of-concept exploits for the described vulnerability.
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58 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A vulnerability affecting TP-Link products for which Evooo1Bot includes exploit capability in its CVE attack module.
A vulnerability affecting TP-Link products for which the Evooo1Bot attack module includes exploit capability.
A vulnerability affecting TP-Link Archer AX21 included in Evooo1Bot's embedded exploit module.
A vulnerability affecting TP-Link Archer AX21 included in Evooo1Bot's embedded exploit module.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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