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Local Privilege Escalation in EVGA Precision X1 WinRing0 Driver

IdentifiersCVE-2020-14979CWE-284

CVE-2020-14979 is a local privilege escalation vulnerability affecting EVGA Precision X1 versions prior to 1.0.7 through its bundled WinRing0.sys / WinRing0x64.sys driver version 1.2.0. The driver exposes a device object with a NULL DACL, allowing any local user, including low-integrity processes, to open the device and issue IOCTLs. Because the WinRing0 driver functionality permits arbitrary physical memory read/write, MSR access, and IO port access, an unprivileged attacker can abuse the exposed interface to read and write arbitrary memory locations. A documented exploitation path is mapping \Device\PhysicalMemory into the calling process, which can then be used to obtain NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privileges. The core flaw is improper access control on the driver device object rather than the existence of the hardware-access functionality itself.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation results in local elevation of privilege from an unprivileged or low-integrity context to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, and effectively kernel-level hardware access through the vulnerable driver interface. An attacker can perform arbitrary physical memory access, modify model-specific registers, and access IO ports, enabling full compromise of the host, security control bypass, credential theft, persistence, and use of the driver in BYOVD-style post-exploitation chains.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Remove or disable the vulnerable WinRing0.sys / WinRing0x64.sys driver where not strictly required. Restrict local execution by untrusted users, since exploitation is local. Prevent loading of known vulnerable drivers using Microsoft’s Vulnerable Driver Blocklist / WDAC where operationally feasible. Monitor for creation or access of the WinRing0_1_2_0 device/service and named pipe activity associated with the driver. In environments concerned with BYOVD abuse, block or alert on legacy signed drivers known to expose arbitrary memory or hardware access.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade EVGA Precision X1 to version 1.0.7 or later. According to the provided content, EVGA addressed the issue in 1.0.7 by replacing the vulnerable WinRing0-based component with newly written driver-x64.sys and driver-x86.sys drivers that restrict device access using a security descriptor. If modifying the original driver codebase, the cited secure design change is to replace IoCreateDevice() with IoCreateDeviceSecure() and apply a restrictive device SDDL such as SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_ALL so that only SYSTEM and Administrators can access the device.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

No valid public exploits. Mallory filtered out 1 candidate as fakes, detection scripts, or README-only repos.

VALID 0 / 1 TOTALView more in app

All candidate exploits were filtered out by Mallory's validation.

EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
EvgaPrecision X1application
Winring0 ProjectWinring0application

Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.

What this page doesn’t show

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Exposure mapping

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Threat actor evidence

Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.

Associated malware2

Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Vendor-by-vendor mapping

Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.

Social activity3

Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.