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CVE-2016-11021 is an OS command injection vulnerability in D-Link DCS-930L devices before firmware version 2.12. The flaw is present in the setSystemCommand functionality, which insufficiently sanitizes or neutralizes attacker-controlled input supplied through the SystemCommand parameter before passing it to the underlying operating system for execution. A remote attacker can exploit this condition by sending a crafted request containing shell metacharacters or additional commands in that parameter, causing arbitrary command execution on the device.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module targeting the D-Link DCS-930L Network Video Camera (firmware 2.01, fixed in 2.12) for authenticated remote command execution (CVE-2016-11021). The exploit works by logging into the camera's web interface using valid credentials, then exploiting a command injection vulnerability at the /setSystemCommand HTTP endpoint. The module sends a POST request to this endpoint to start a telnet daemon on a random high port, then connects to it to provide an interactive shell to the attacker. The code is written in Ruby and follows the standard Metasploit module structure, including options for HTTP credentials and telnet timeouts. The main exploit file is 'modules/exploits/linux/http/dlink_dcs_930l_authenticated_remote_command_execution.rb'. The exploit is operational, providing a working shell if the target is vulnerable and valid credentials are supplied.
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