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CVE-2014-9583 is a critical unauthenticated command execution vulnerability in the infosvr service of ASUS WRT firmware (including versions 3.0.0.4.376_1071, 3.0.0.376.2524-g0013f52, and others) as used in routers such as RT-AC66U, RT-N66U, and others. The vulnerability arises from improper authentication checks in common.c, where the MAC address is not properly validated (using memcpy instead of memcmp), and a password check is present but commented out. This allows any attacker on the local network to send a specially crafted NET_CMD_ID_MANU_CMD packet to UDP port 9999 and execute arbitrary commands as root on the device.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/linux/misc/asus_infosvr_auth_bypass_exec.rb) that exploits an authentication bypass vulnerability (CVE-2014-9583) in the infosvr service on various ASUS routers. The exploit targets UDP port 9999, sending a specially crafted packet that bypasses authentication and executes arbitrary commands as root. By default, it launches a BusyBox telnet daemon on a configurable port (default 4444), allowing the attacker to connect and obtain a root shell. The module is operational and provides a working exploit with a hardcoded payload, but is not weaponized for mass exploitation. The code is written in Ruby and is designed to be used within the Metasploit framework. The only endpoints involved are the infosvr UDP service (port 9999) and the telnet daemon started by the exploit (default port 4444).
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