Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Researchers found over 10,000 distinct samples of the shared OfferLoader component... OfferLoader used a trojanized Inno Setup installer to start the next stages.
15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The TTP list identifies T1059.001, and t.ps1 is listed among the campaign files.
Installers that looked like useful software, game tools or performance fixes... a harmless WinRAR lookalike... a trojanized Inno Setup installer.
“Envoie un beacon de tracking à voyagemist[.]space” and “User-agent C2 : insomnia/2023.4.0 Windows.”
308 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A loader used in the CL-CRI-1171 pay-per-install operation. It is delivered through trojanized utility, game-tool, and performance-fix installers, tracks installations, evades some automated analysis, and delivers multiple buyer-selected payloads from a single compromised host.
A pay-per-install loader delivered through SEO-poisoned search results and YouTube gaming lures. It uses a trojanized Inno Setup installer, performs tracking checks, and launches multiple child processes to deliver independently monetized payloads, including RATs and a Chrome hijacker.
Loader PPI trojanisé qui envoie un beacon de suivi à voyagemist[.]space, reçoit une décision de déploiement, puis lance trois processus enfants (eld0.exe, eld1.exe et eld2.exe) correspondant à différents payloads.
A disposable pay-per-install loader delivered through trojanized software, SEO poisoning, and gaming-related YouTube lures. It performs victim gating and tracking, then spawns separate payload branches (“offers”) for unrelated malware campaigns.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.