Malware

Anubis Loader

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

According to the report, “Privacy tools” domains were utilized as a primary delivery for SmokeLoader.

Execution

2 techniques

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

After registration, the bot will check for tasks to perform: Task parsing

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

the malware leverages powershell to setup some exclusion paths

Persistence

1 technique

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Sets a runkey in Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run and the registry name and install name will be randomly generated

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Sets a runkey in Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run and the registry name and install name will be randomly generated

Stealth

4 techniques

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Some of the strings are obfuscated but the deobfuscation is simply subtracting one from every character... For HTTP traffic... the data sent to the server is obfuscated by adding two to every byte.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

install names: svchost csrss rundll32 winlogon smss taskhost unsecapp AdobeARM winsys jusched...

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Upon execution, the sample performs a check to see if it has admin privileges by attempting to open \\PHYSICALDRIVE:

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

it will use ‘attrib’ to set itself as a system file and hidden: attrib +S +H

Discovery

2 techniques

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

register itself by sending various information back to the C2 via TCP: md5(cmd /c whoami) + “->Reg->[“ + Datetime + ”]->” + <cmd /c whoami> + “->” + <wmic cpu get name> + “->” + <wmic path win32_VideoController get name> + “->” + <cmd /C ver>

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Upon execution, the sample performs a check to see if it has admin privileges by attempting to open \\PHYSICALDRIVE:

Collection

1 technique

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Next it takes a screenshot:

Command and Control

3 techniques

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

For HTTP traffic an example can be seen below... POST /callback HTTP/1.1

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

After installation the bot will connect to the C2 either over HTTP or TCP and register itself by sending various information back to the C2 via TCP

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

After downloading a proxy list and contacting statistics.php, the payload link is encrypted with a simple xor routine and delivered to the client.

Impact

1 technique

T1565.001Stored Data ManipulationEvidence1

Along with altering the HOSTS file

Other

1 technique

T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

the malware leverages powershell to setup some exclusion paths: powershell -Command Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath on: AppData\Local\Temp AppData\Local\Microsoft

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

3 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes

3 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app21 days ago

ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app8 months ago

hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

walmart global tech infosecNews

Feb 14, 2022

PrivateLoader to Anubis Loader. By: Jason Reaves and Joshua Platt | by Jason Reaves | Walmart Global Tech Blog | Medium

A Go-based loader/bot that checks for admin privileges, takes screenshots, installs persistence via Run keys, adds Microsoft Defender exclusions, hides itself with attrib, alters the HOSTS file, flushes DNS, registers with C2 over HTTP or TCP, and retrieves tasks for follow-on activity including crypto mining and malware distribution.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

Start free trial

IOC matching6

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping15

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

Malware

Anubis Loader

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

According to the report, “Privacy tools” domains were utilized as a primary delivery for SmokeLoader.

Execution

2 techniques

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

After registration, the bot will check for tasks to perform: Task parsing

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

the malware leverages powershell to setup some exclusion paths

Persistence

1 technique

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Sets a runkey in Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run and the registry name and install name will be randomly generated

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Sets a runkey in Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run and the registry name and install name will be randomly generated

Stealth

4 techniques

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Some of the strings are obfuscated but the deobfuscation is simply subtracting one from every character... For HTTP traffic... the data sent to the server is obfuscated by adding two to every byte.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

install names: svchost csrss rundll32 winlogon smss taskhost unsecapp AdobeARM winsys jusched...

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Upon execution, the sample performs a check to see if it has admin privileges by attempting to open \\PHYSICALDRIVE:

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

it will use ‘attrib’ to set itself as a system file and hidden: attrib +S +H

Discovery

2 techniques

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Upon execution, the sample performs a check to see if it has admin privileges by attempting to open \\PHYSICALDRIVE:

Collection

1 technique

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Next it takes a screenshot:

Command and Control

3 techniques

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

For HTTP traffic an example can be seen below... POST /callback HTTP/1.1

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

After installation the bot will connect to the C2 either over HTTP or TCP and register itself by sending various information back to the C2 via TCP

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

After downloading a proxy list and contacting statistics.php, the payload link is encrypted with a simple xor routine and delivered to the client.

Impact

1 technique

T1565.001Stored Data ManipulationEvidence1

Along with altering the HOSTS file

Other

1 technique

T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

the malware leverages powershell to setup some exclusion paths: powershell -Command Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath on: AppData\Local\Temp AppData\Local\Microsoft

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

3 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes

3 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app21 days ago

ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app8 months ago

hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

walmart global tech infosecNews

Feb 14, 2022

PrivateLoader to Anubis Loader. By: Jason Reaves and Joshua Platt | by Jason Reaves | Walmart Global Tech Blog | Medium

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching6

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping15

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.