Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
When a user opened the attached PDF file, the following message is displayed. It exploits a vulnerability in Adobe Flash, CVE-2011-0611 embedded in the PDF and installs Elirks malware on the system. | Elirks, less widely known than PlugX, is a basic backdoor Trojan, first discovered in 2010, that is primarily used to steal information from compromised systems.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Elirks, less widely known than PlugX, is a basic backdoor Trojan, first discovered in 2010, that is primarily used to steal information from compromised systems.
10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
one of the unique features of Elirks is that it retrieves a command and control (C2) address from a public-facing blog service.
178 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Initial-stage malware used in the MILE TEA campaign to establish a foothold, collect system information, and download additional malware. It retrieves C2 addresses from public blog pages and decrypts them using Base64 and TEA; the report also notes TEA-with-XOR code similarities with Micrass.
A basic backdoor trojan primarily used to steal information from compromised systems. It can retrieve its C2 address from pre-determined microblog or SNS services, where attackers post encoded IP addresses or domain names before distributing the malware. In the described campaigns, it was delivered via spear-phishing attachments and installed through exploitation of Adobe Flash vulnerability CVE-2011-0611 embedded in malicious PDFs.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.