Loading malware…
YTStealer is a Windows information-stealing malware family focused on hijacking YouTube creator accounts. Its primary purpose is to steal browser authentication cookies associated with YouTube, then validate and monetize access to creator channels. After execution, it performs anti-analysis checks, including anti-debugging, anti-memory-analysis, and anti-virtual-machine techniques, before extracting browser cookies from local browser data stores. It then launches an installed browser in headless mode and uses browser automation via the DevTools Protocol to access YouTube Studio with the stolen session material. This allows the malware to confirm account access and collect channel metadata such as channel name, subscriber count, channel age, monetization status, official artist status, and verification status. Collected data is encrypted with a per-sample key and exfiltrated to attacker-controlled infrastructure along with a unique sample identifier.
YTStealer has been assessed as likely operated under a malware-as-a-service or stealer-as-a-service model because analyzed samples used unique identifiers and shared builder artifacts. It has been observed delivered through fake installers and cracked-software lures aimed at creators, musicians, and gamers, including impersonation of video-editing tools, streaming software, audio-production applications, plugins, game cheats, and premium consumer software offerings. Campaigns distributing YTStealer have also bundled other commodity stealers, especially RedLine and Vidar. The malware has additionally been observed among payloads distributed by the PrivateLoader pay-per-install ecosystem. Its targeting and post-theft validation workflow indicate a specialized criminal objective centered on compromising and reselling or abusing monetizable YouTube channels.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Information stealer observed as a payload delivered by PrivateLoader.
A stealer focused specifically on harvesting YouTube authentication cookies from content creators. It performs sandbox-evasion checks, extracts browser cookies, launches an installed browser in headless mode to validate the cookies and collect channel metadata, then encrypts and exfiltrates the data to its C2.
An information-stealing malware family observed as one of the payloads distributed by PrivateLoader.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.