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Mukashi is a Mirai-derived botnet malware that compromises Linux-based connected devices and recruits them for distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Observed targeting Zyxel network-attached storage devices in March 2020, it exploits CVE-2020-9054, a critical pre-authentication command-injection vulnerability affecting Zyxel NAS firmware through version 5.21. Its exploitation chain uses a shell script to download and execute architecture-specific bot binaries and subsequently delete them.
Mukashi also scans random hosts for Telnet services and attempts logins using default credentials, reporting successful credential pairs to its command-and-control infrastructure. It receives commands for multiple UDP-, TCP-, and HTTP-based DDoS methods. During initialization, it decodes embedded credentials and command strings using a custom decryption routine, changes its process name, and binds a local socket to prevent multiple instances from running. Some architecture-specific builds include functionality to terminate competing processes.
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1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
A preauthentication command injection vulnerability (CVE-2020-9054), which resides in a “web login.cgi” program used by the Zyxel devices, is potentially allowing attackers to perform remote code execution via command injection. | Mukashi, a new variant of Mirai, uses brute-force attacks to log into Zyxel NAS, UTM, ATP, and VPN firewall products to take control of the devices and add them to a network of infected bots that can be used to carry out Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks.
12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
this threat actor attempted to download a shell script to the tmp directory, execute the downloaded script, and remove the evidence on a vulnerable device.
Mirai managed to keep 200,000 – 300,000 enslaved devices and peaked at an unbelievable 600,000... FBI special agents compared Mirai’s 1+ Tbps (1,000 Gbps)... The first Mirai incident was reported after the 18th Sep 2016 attack against popular Minecraft servers hosted on French service OVH.
86 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Mirai variant targeting Zyxel devices via brute force and exploitation, enrolling compromised devices into a DDoS botnet.
Named as another Mirai variant seen in recent months.
A previously observed Mirai variant mentioned as background; the content provides no further technical details.
A new Mirai variant targeting vulnerable Zyxel NAS devices via CVE-2020-9054. It scans random hosts on TCP/23, brute-forces default credentials, reports successful logins to its C2, receives commands, and launches DDoS attacks including UDP, TCP, HTTP, and bypass variants. It also enforces single-instance execution and in some builds can kill competing processes.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.